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| Identifier: | 02ABUJA3341 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 02ABUJA3341 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Abuja |
| Created: | 2002-12-19 14:43:00 |
| Classification: | UNCLASSIFIED |
| Tags: | EFIN ECON EPET EAID PGOV NI |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 ABUJA 003341 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: EFIN, ECON, EPET, EAID, PGOV, NI SUBJECT: YEAR-END ECONOMIC POTPOURRI REF: ABUJA 3101 1. This cable covers: -- Ambassador's Meets with World Bank and IMF prior to Article Four Consultation Meetings in Washington -- Central Bank is Optimistic about Near Term -- CBN and IMF Statistics on GDP Differ -- GON Not Worried About Drop in FOREX Reserves -- CBN Claims States Continue to Receive Derivation Funds at same level as before April Supreme Court Decision -- Dutch Auction System is a Success Many Happy to Claim -- Quick look at Nigeria in the West Africa Monetary Zone -- CBN Will not Enforce Interest Rate Cap --------------------------------------------- ------------ Nigeria as Seen by the IFIs: A Glass Half-full or a Broken Vessel --------------------------------------------- ------------ 1. Summary. IMF Senior Representative Gary Moser and World Bank Country Director Mark Tomlinson called on Ambassador Jeter on Sunday, December 15, at his residence to discuss the economic and political situation in Nigeria as part of their preparation for this week's Article IV Consultations on Nigeria in Washington. Moser believes his policy of low-key, behind-the-scenes advice has made a positive impact, while Tomlinson reiterated the Bank's frustration with the lack of political commitment to poverty reduction and economic reform throughout the Nigerian political class. Both will advise their home offices to continue a wait-and-see attitude until after next year's elections. End summary. 2. IMF Representative Gary Moser listed four areas of success by the Nigerian Government: GSM auctions and telecommunication reform which tripled the number of phone lines in the last 18 months; privatization of state-owned enterprises; due process review of Federal Government capital projects; and the reintroduction of the Dutch Auction System (DAS) which narrowed the difference between the official and parallel exchange rates. Moser says the Fund now enjoys close contact and a reservoir of goodwill with key players in the Presidency, Central Bank, and with the Federal Accountant General's office. By avoiding the public eye, the IMF has quietly helped in the formulation of a number of recent policies, especially the introduction of the Dutch Auction exchange mechanism. 3. World Bank Country Director Mark Tomlinson will echo Moser in advising his home office to keep a low profile until after the elections. The Bank's official relationship with Nigeria deteriorated in 2002 when assistance was set at the low mark (approximately $200 million) though that decision was not nearly as public as the GON's April announcement of a suspension of its program with the IMF. Whereas the decision on the IMF was mutually agreed (despite the politically opportunistic public announcement), the GON claims to have been taken aback by the reduction of its World Bank program, particularly eliminating a $200 million agricultural project. 4. Tomlinson believes Nigeria's addiction to easy oil money revenues is the problem. Political elites are too busy chasing rents from the petroleum sector to address the core problems of the economy. As a result the vast majority of Nigerians are resigned to poverty, increasingly worse off than the people in neighboring countries who do not enjoy the benefit of oil wealth. 5. Both Moser and Tomlinson think Nigeria will face the worst economic crunch in a generation when the GON's wasteful and unsustainable policies coincide with the cyclical drop in world oil prices projected within the next few years. The World Bank Country Director believes that the Nigerian economy hitting bottom within the next several years may provide the country's last best hope for meaningful reform, poverty reduction, and sustainable non-oil development. If this six or seven year window of opportunity for reform is missed, Tomlinson foresees the subsequent income from natural gas production perpetuating the status quo of waste and corruption which enriches very few while leaving most Nigerians in abject poverty. --------------------------------------------- ------ Central Bank is Optimistic About Near Term Policies --------------------------------------------- ------ 6. EconOff called on Ernest Ebi, Central Bank Deputy Governor for International Operations, on November 15, who argued that Nigeria,s homegrown economic program is working and, in most cases reflected the goals of the now suspended IMF Stand-By Arrangement. Ebi confirmed that most policies recently implemented were designed to meet IMF benchmarks. The difference, he insisted, is policies are now tempered by local considerations, without the one-size-plan-fits-all formula used by the IMF. Because of this, economic reform has a better chance of succeeding. Ebi judged the current GON-IMF working relationship as much more positive than 2000-01 when they had a Stand by Agreement in place. Despite Ebi's esteem for Country Director Gary Moser and IMF Washington Office Director Menachem Katz, he and other Nigerian policymakers think formal re-engagement with the IMF unlikely, even undesirable, until after the 2003 elections. --------------------------------------------- -------------- Nigeria's Economy: An IMF Recession or a CBN Non-Oil Boom? --------------------------------------------- -------------- 6. The Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) and the IMF are using very different numbers to describe current economic growth. The IMF reported in October that Nigeria's economy will shrink by 0.9 percent in 2002 (an increase from an earlier projection of negative 2.5 percent growth). CBN Director of Research Dr. Joseph Nnanna claimed IMF and CBN numbers are the same on the oil sector, where there is reliable data, but his office believes the non-oil sector is growing at the rate of 8.8 percent as opposed to the IMF estimate of 5.3 percent. Where the IMF sees a recession, the CBN predicts overall economic growth of 3.4 percent, the third consecutive year of positive GDP per capita growth. Nnanna discussed statistics with the IMF team in mid-October. The IMF based its prediction of agricultural growth (40 percent of GDP) using credit data from the banking system. Nnanna believes bank lending to the agricultural sector has always been insignificant, and that peasant farmers get over 90 percent of their financing from the informal financial institutions, including cooperatives. Nnanna plans an economic survey next year which will give a better idea of which numbers are most accurate. There is much more growth in the non-oil, non-governmental and informal sectors than people believe, he said. --------------------------------------------- ------------- Drop in Foreign Exchanges Reserves -- What Worry? --------------------------------------------- ------------- 7. Both Ebi and Nnanna claim critics are wrong in raising alarms about the recent 25 percent fall in foreign exchange reserves. They argue reserves of $7.7 billion, representing almost seven months of import cover, are healthy, even when one considers that reserves stood at U.S. $10.4 at the end of 2001. Minister of Finance Adamu Ciroma's semi-annual August economic assessment report also noted that the fall in reserves had been expected. Nnanna claims internal documents from 2001 envisioned a draw down on reserves, and that the initial runs on the Dutch Auction System were part of that drain. Nnanna cited Forex reserve levels, the Naira exchange rate, and the minimum wage as politically sensitive economic indicators. He believed that reserves have stabilized and will remain above the target of six-month import cover. "Nigeria is a country with an unusual dependence on imports and very volatile foreign exchange earnings," Nnanna observed. "With the Dutch Auction Nigeria can control how much of its reserves it sells and is in better shape to deal with reserve than it has ever been." Comment: Falling reserves are an easy target for anti-Obasanjo politicians. However, up till now, management of foreign exchange has not figured as a political issue against the President. As long as reserves stay above the magic six-month import cover, management of foreign reserves will not become campaign fodder for anti-Obasanjo forces. End comment. ------------------------------------ Resource Allocation: Status Quo Ante ------------------------------------ 8. Despite continued wrangling between the National Assembly and Presidency over the October legislation designed to restore off-shore oil derivation funds to States, vetoed by the President last week, Dr. Nnanna believes the issue is not only finished, in terms of its effect on the national and local economies, it is almost like it never happened. Nnanna claims that Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Delta and other coastal oil-producing States never lost their 13 percent derivation on oil produced offshore, as some Governors claimed. The April 5 decision was not quickly enforced, and the federal government passed on the 13 percent (proportion of revenue) to the States as always, claiming it was now a loan. Oil-producing states suffered the same 40 percent drop in revenues that hit all States in the first part of the year when the GON's income crashed because of decline in demand, the post 9/11 oil market and Nigeria's loss of 20 percent of its OPEC quota. 9. Nnanna says that blaming the President and the Supreme Court decision was probably the astute political thing to do, and in fact, may have helped get the legislation approved. However, he does not believe the decision affected a major change in the economic fortunes of the oil-producing states vis-a-vis other states. The Revenue Mobilization Allocation and Fiscal Commission is proposing more changes, including reserving derivation funds for local communities in the oil-producing areas. While politically popular in the South-South, it is not clear who is empowered to make such changes as there may be constitutional challenges to the October legislation restoring the status quo ante. And the beat goes on as the States are again suing the Federal Government, this time over the 7.5 percent special fund which is used for "national priority projects" controlled by the Federal government. --------------------------------- DAS Success -- Ebi Takes Credit --------------------------------- 10. Four months since the introduction of the Dutch Auction foreign exchange system, the parallel market premium has stabilized at just under ten percent. More importantly, devaluaton of the Naira (most of which took place right before the DAS was introduced) has been slow enough to mute most political criticism of the CBN and Obasanjo Administration. This is the first of the old IMF targets that the GON met, and Ebi is quite proud of it. He credits the success this time (as compared to two earlier failures of the DAS) to several factors. First, the CBN enjoys much more independence from the Ministry of Finance and the President than under previous military and civilian governments. Secondly, the foreign reserve level was not at a crisis point when the DAS was introduced. Forex reserves were about $500 million, the equivalent of less than one month of imports the last time the DAS was tried and failed. And perhaps most importantly, the political and economic timing was right. Introduction came at a time when the system was not stressed, making its implementation easy. The public break with the IMF was also a plus, given historical Nigerian antipathy, this time the DAS was introduced independently of the IMF. Before making the announcement, Ebi only informed the office of the Presidency and the IMF. He claims he purposely did not inform the President because he believed this would have been viewed as asking permission, and would have lessened the perception of CBN independence. --------------------------------------------- -------------- The West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ) and More Missed Macroeconomic Targets --------------------------------------------- -------------- 11. Despite being freed (at least officially) from its IMF obligations, Nigeria still is obligated by treaty to meet West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ) convergence targets. The criteria for WAMZ members Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Ghana, Liberia and the Gambia are: --- Single digit inflation stabilizing at not more than 5 percent by end of 2002; --- External reserves sufficient to finance 3 months of imports; --- Central Bank financing of budget deficit not exceeding ten percent of previous year's tax revenue; and -- Overall budget deficit not exceeding 4 percent of GDP (excluding grants). 12. Nigeria's inflation rate continues to remain in double digits and while year-to-year rates have dropped to the low teens from a high near 20 percent a year ago, the WAMZ targets will not be met in the near future. The budget deficit is projected at 4.2 percent of GDP, missing the IMF target of 3.0 percent and the more permissive WAMZ target of 4.0 percent. Nnanna thinks the GON will have a tough time meeting the ten percent financing limit because the 1958 Central Bank of Nigeria Act ceiling of 12.5 percent has become the de facto minimum as well. External reserves, which currently stand at 6.8 months of import cover, is the only WAMZ benchmark met. 13. According to the plan, by January 2003, all five WAMZ member countries were to have met the above convergence criteria and on New Year's Day, 2003 the new WAMZ joint currency would be introduced. This would be English-speaking West Africa's answer to the French-speaking CFA and would become a single ECOWAS currency by 2004. Nnanna and others at the CBN are working with counterparts from WAMZ countries to prepare for the new currency even though only the Gambia has come close to meeting convergence criteria and none of the political groundwork has been laid to prepare the business or larger Nigerian community for a unified currency. Nnanna admitted that the new currency will obviously be delayed but that when the right time comes Obasanjo, who first proposed the common currency with former Ghanaian President Jerry Rawlings, will provide the political muscle necessary to implement the change. --------------------------------------------- ----------- CBN Won't Enforce New Interest Rate Cap --------------------------------------------- ----------- 14. Contrary to perceptions in the banking community (reftel), the CBN will not monitor enforcement of the voluntary interest rate cap of four percent over the Minimum Rediscount Rate (MRR). Ebi claims the CBN is not obligated to enforce the interest rate cap, criticizing it as expansionary. "Anything that would lead to greater liquidity would be one more problem the CBN would have to mop up," Ebi claimed. Interest rates, he insisted, are only one factor in a bank's determination of cost of lending funds. Institutional inefficiency and high rates of default are others, perhaps of higher importance. JETER
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