US embassy cable - 02HARARE2826

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 HARARE 002826 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AIDAC 
 
USAID/W FOR DCHA/OFDA FOR HAJJAR, KHANDAGLE AND MARX, 
DCHA/FFP FOR LANDIS, BRAUSE, SKORIC AND PETERSEN, AFR/SA 
FOR POE AND COPSON, AFR/SD FOR ISALROW AND WHELAN 
STATE FOR AF/S DELISI AND RAYNOR 
NAIROBI FOR DCHA/OFDA/ARO FOR RILEY, MYER AND SMITH, 
REDSO/ESA/FFP FOR SENYKOFF 
GENEVA PLEASE PASS TO UNOCHA, IFRC 
PRETORIA FOR USAID/DCHA/FFP FOR DISKIN, DCHA/OFDA FOR BRYAN 
AND FAS FOR HELM 
ROME PLEASE PASS TO FODAG 
AIDAC 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAID, PREL, US, ZI 
SUBJECT: FOOD SECURITY ASSESSMENT CONDUCTED IN ZIMBABWE 
 
 
 ------- 
SUMMARY 
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1.  The Zimbabwe Vulnerability Assessment Committee (VAC) 
conducted an assessment of food security in Zimbabwe between 
December 2 and 6, 2002.  A preliminary report on the 
assessment is expected o/a December 18, 2002.  Monitoring 
teams conducted focus group interviews in 62 villages 
throughout Zimbabwe.  Two USAID Food for Peace Officers 
participated on the VAC as observers, visiting five 
districts.  Results for these five villages show a 
deterioration in food security and increasingly stretched 
coping mechanisms.  Insufficient seed distribution and late 
rains have led to a small percentage of arable land being 
planted.  Zimbabwean government maize distribution has been 
insufficient to meet demand, forcing people to rely more on 
wild foods and humanitarian assistance.  There were many 
allegations of corruption in the distribution of government 
maize, but not for political purposes.  Humanitarian food 
assistance is critical to meet the food needs of the 
population of the villages visited.  There is some concern 
about the randomness of the villages chosen for the 
assessment, as some were chosen by ward councilors, rather 
than by the VAC.  END SUMMARY. 
 
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VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT CONDUCTED 
------------------------------------------- 
 
2.  Between December 2 and 6, 2002, the Zimbabwe 
Vulnerability Assessment Committee (VAC) conducted an 
assessment of food security throughout Zimbabwe.  (Note: The 
VAC consists of representatives from the World Food Programme 
(WFP), the Famine Early Warning System Network (FEWSNET), the 
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the Government of 
Zimbabwe (GOZ) through the National Early Warning Unit and 
agriculture extension services, and international and local 
non-governmental organizations (NGO).  End Note.)  This 
assessment is a follow-up to the VAC assessment conducted in 
August 2002, and is intended to investigate the predictions 
of the &Emergency Food Security Report8 published on 
September 16, 2002.  Therefore, this shorter and less 
comprehensive assessment will be used in conjunction with the 
August findings to refine food assistance targeting in 
Zimbabwe.  A preliminary report on the findings of the 
assessment is expected o/a December 18, 2002. 
 
3.  The VAC assessment did not include a nutritional survey 
component in spite of the recommendations that followed the 
August VAC.  The United Nations Children,s Fund (UNICEF) has 
not been able to receive the necessary governmental 
permissions to conduct a nutritional survey.  UNICEF has made 
plans to conduct a nutritional survey during January 2003, 
however, the data gathered is expected to be reported at too 
late a date to assist in food targeting during the hungry 
season. 
 
4.  The VAC assessment was conducted by twelve teams in 62 
villages within 43 of the 57 districts and all eight 
provinces of Zimbabwe.  The wards where the villages are 
located were randomly selected from each of Zimbabwe,s food 
economy zones.  Information was collected through interviews 
with focus groups composed of village headmen and both male 
and female community members.  The size of the focus groups 
ranged from between nine and eighteen members.  An additional 
female-only focus group was also interviewed.  Unlike the 
August assessment, no individual household interviews were 
held.  Each assessment team consisted of two to three members 
from WFP, FEWSNET, GOZ, and the NGOs.  In addition to the 
twelve assessment teams, two roving teams moved around the 
country in order to get a more complete picture of the 
country as a whole and to ensure consistency of the interview 
process across teams. 
 
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DETERIORATION IN FOOD SECURITY 
------------------------------ 
 
5.  The USAID Southern Africa Regional Food for Peace Officer 
(FFPO) and the Zimbabwe FFPO participated in the VAC 
assessment as observers on one of the roving teams.  The 
FFPOs visited a total of five villages in the districts of 
Kwekwe and Gweru in Midlands province, Umzingwane in 
Matabeleland South province, and Tsholotsho and Hwange in 
Matabeleland North province.  While the five villages visited 
represent too small a sample to draw conclusions about the 
current state of food security in all of Zimbabwe, it is 
clear that there has been a serious deterioration in food 
security in the villages visited. 
 
6.  Each of the five focus groups reported insufficient 
access to maize or maize meal.  Zimbabwean government 
distributions through the Grain Marketing Board (GMB) have 
not been sufficient to meet demand.  Maize was sometimes 
available through the local (black) markets, but the prices 
were too high for 85 to 90 percent of the village 
populations.  When GMB maize was available, the focus groups 
reported that the official price ranged between 555 and 580 
Zimbabwean dollars per 50kg sack.  They reported that the 
local market price for a 50 kg sack of maize was 6,000 
Zimbabwean dollars, over ten times the official price. 
 
--------------------------------- 
COPING MECHANISMS STRETCHING THIN 
--------------------------------- 
 
7.  In each of the villages visited, the focus groups 
reported that their coping mechanisms were severely 
stretched.  Of the five villages, three reported increased 
sales of livestock over the same period last year to raise 
money for food.  The remaining two villages reported 
decreased sales because they had already sold most of their 
livestock.  All villages reported a decline in the price of 
livestock because of the increased number of livestock on the 
market.  Three of the villages reported that they had no more 
goats or chickens available to sell.  The focus group in the 
village of Mkwandala in Hwange district reported that up to 
five cattle were dying each day within their ward due 
insufficient feed and water caused by the drought. 
 
8.  All five focus groups reported an increased reliance on 
wild fruits and roots as a substitute for maize.  In two 
villages, the majority of the population was relying on meals 
of cabbage and tea.  There were several anecdotal reports of 
families becoming sick from improper preparation of poisonous 
wild fruits and roots. 
 
9.  To raise money, villagers reported resorting to irregular 
forms of income.  All villages reported a rise in number of 
cases of theft and three villages reported an increase in 
panning for gold.  Prostitution was reported on the rise in 
each of the villages.  In Mkwandala in Hwange district, the 
most desperate of the villages visited by the FFPOs, one 
woman was quoted as saying, "if I had a daughter, I would 
send her to the city for employment," a euphemism for 
prostitution. 
 
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POOR PROSPECTS FOR 2003 MAIZE CROP 
---------------------------------- 
 
10.  In the five villages visited by the FFPOs, only 10 to 30 
percent of the population had already planted the majority of 
their land for this agricultural season.  The focus groups 
reported that they planned to plant less land than in past 
years due to insufficient access to seed / agricultural 
inputs and the late rains.  All of the focus groups reported 
that they feared that the little maize seed that had already 
been planted would be unable to grow to maturity due to 
continued drought.  All groups expected to have to rely on 
assistance to make it through the hungry season. 
 
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GMB MAIZE DISTRIBUTIONS INSUFFICIENT 
------------------------------------ 
 
11.  Each of the five focus groups reported that the GMB had 
made deliveries of maize to their villages between September 
and November.  In no case, however, was the quantity of maize 
sufficient.  Four of five villages reported only one delivery 
of GMB maize during this time, and even this one delivery was 
insufficient to meet the needs for one month.  For example, 
in the village of Sikombingo in Gweru district, the focus 
group reported that only 15.5 sacks of maize (50 kilograms 
(kg) each) were made available for purchase in their village 
during the three-month period.  Dividing each sack four ways, 
only 62 of the total 110 households were able to purchase 
12.5 kg each.  The village of Mkwandala in Hwange district 
received one distribution of GMB maize in September that was 
made available to most households, but has received nothing 
since.  Only the village of Mbambangamandla in Tsholotsho 
district reported three distributions of GMB maize since 
September.  Even these distributions, however, were 
insufficient as only 34 of 125 households were able to 
purchase half a sack (25 kg) of maize at each distribution. 
 
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NO REPORTS OF POLITICAL MANIPULATION OF GMB 
FOOD DISTRIBUTIONS 
------------------------------------------- 
 
12.  None of the focus groups that the FFPOs observed made 
any allegations of political manipulation of food distributed 
by GMB.  In each case, the groups reported that the 
distribution lists were drawn up on a first-come first-served 
basis.  While there were no reports of political 
manipulation, there were numerous allegations of GMB maize 
being sold on the local market by corrupt GMB officials. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
LOCAL OFFICIALS PRESENT DURING FOCUS GROUP 
INTERVIEWS 
------------------------------------------ 
 
13.  It is not surprising, however, that there were no 
allegations of political manipulation of GMB food 
distributions.  In four of the five focus groups observed by 
the FFPOs, either the ward councilor (a political position) 
or his designee was present during the interview.  In one 
village, the councilor,s designee was a war veteran.  Given 
the presence of these political figures, the focus group 
members were not likely to feel free to speak of political 
manipulation. 
 
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SCHOOL FEEDING MITIGATES DROPOUT RATE 
------------------------------------- 
 
14.  Four of the five focus groups reported that 
supplementary feeding programs for children were being 
implemented by NGOs in their villages.  Two kinds of programs 
are being implemented, those which target children under 
five, and those which target students in the primary schools 
themselves.  The focus groups reported that school dropout 
rates had reached as high as 70 percent because of hunger or 
the need for child labor.  Because of the recently started 
school-based wet feeding programs in two of the villages, 
however, the majority of children have returned to school. 
(NOTE: Wet feeding is when beneficiaries receive porridge to 
be eaten on site rather than receiving dry cereal to be 
prepared at home. END NOTE.) 
 
----------------------------------- 
FOOD ASSISTANCE CONSIDERED CRITICAL 
----------------------------------- 
 
15.  Three of the five villages reported receiving general 
distribution of humanitarian food assistance through the WFP 
implementing partner in these districts, the Organization of 
Rural Associations for Progress (ORAP), a local Zimbabwean 
NGO.  The remaining two districts had not yet begun to 
receive any assistance.  The focus groups in the three 
villages receiving food assistance insisted that there was no 
manipulation of NGO-provided food assistance.  These three 
villages reported that the food aid was critical to their 
survival especially since they did not expect to receive 
sufficient assistance from GMB.  While they claimed that they 
understood the principle of targeting the most vulnerable for 
assistance, the focus groups insisted that they were all poor 
and vulnerable, and, therefore, all should be eligible for 
assistance. 
 
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CONCERN ABOUT RANDOMNESS OF ASSESSMENT SAMPLE 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
16.  In order to ensure full cooperation from local 
authorities with the implementation of the VAC assessment, 
the Provincial Administrators (PA) and District 
Administrators (DA) were informed in advance that the 
assessment would take place.  The PAs and DAs were provided 
with the location of the district and ward within which the 
interview would take place.  The actual selection of these 
wards was made randomly by the VAC prior to the beginning of 
the assessment, ensuring representation of wards in each of 
Zimbabwe,s different food economy zones. 
 
17.  Prior to each focus group interview in each village, it 
was necessary for the monitoring team to pay a courtesy call 
to the DA.  Following this meeting, the monitoring team would 
go to the center of the chosen ward and meet with the ward 
councilor or drought relief committee.  In three of the five 
villages visited by the FFPOs, the ward councilor or the 
drought relief committee had chosen the actual village within 
the ward that was to be the subject of the interview.  In at 
least these three cases, the randomness of the sample used in 
the VAC was compromised.  Because the actual site of the 
interview was not randomly selected in these three cases, it 
is possible that the data collected will not be 
representative.  If each of the 62 villages in the survey 
were chosen by ward councilors who wanted to show only the 
best or worst-case villages, the picture developed by the VAC 
would be skewed.  It is even conceivable that these villages 
could have been prepped in advance for political reasons. 
WFP has given assurance that the number of villages not 
chosen by the VAC is small, and does not adversely affect the 
results of the survey. 
SULLIVAN