US embassy cable - 05WARSAW4030

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 WARSAW 004030 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR THE SECRETARY 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/16/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, MARR, MOPS, ECON, PL, Polish Elections 
SUBJECT: POLISH FOREIGN MINISTER MELLER'S VISIT TO 
WASHINGTON 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Victor Ashe, reasons 1.4b,d 
 
1. (C) Summary: Polish Foreign Minister Stefan Meller travels 
to Washington next week as the representative of a new 
center-right government that pledges continuity in foreign 
policy and sustained engagement in support of democracy 
throughout the world.  Meller is expected to bring a positive 
message on Poland's Iraq deployment, with or without a formal 
Polish government decision.  He will highlight Poland's 
interest in advancing reforms in Eastern Europe and will seek 
assurances that his government will remain an integral part 
of common efforts there.  Meller will be looking for signs of 
movement on U.S. visa policy, including a more 
forward-leaning statement from us on Poland's visa waiver 
aspirations and a response to Polish President Kwasniewski's 
suggestion of no-cost visas for students.  Energy security, 
strengthened defense and security cooperation, and Polish 
representation in international organizations are among his 
other expected themes.  Your discussions with him should 
include reference to upcoming Strategic Dialogue talks and 
the first post-inaugural visit of President Lech Kaczynski to 
Washington.  End summary. 
 
New Polish government 
--------------------- 
 
2. (C) Meller represents a country whose political landscape 
has been dramatically altered since your visit here in 
February.  Poland has once again performed its post-1989 
ritual of alternating post-communist and post-Solidarity 
governments. Control of the government, very soon the 
presidency and, to a lesser degree, the parliament is now in 
the hands of the center-right Law and Justice (PiS) party. 
The new PiS-led minority government of PM Kazimierz 
Marcinkiewicz and President-elect Kaczynski were elected this 
fall on promises of sweeping domestic reforms aimed at 
rooting out corruption, "de-communizing" public life, and 
expanding government social programs.  The new government 
will seek to show that it is defending Poland's interests 
more vigorously than its predecessors, with consequences for 
relations with us and Poland's EU partners (as we have seen 
on the EU budget), but Marcinkiewicz and others have stated 
clearly that they will preserve the country's Atlanticist 
orientation.  The government will be forced to depend in 
parliament, however, on the votes of fiercely nationalist 
opposition parties such as the populist Self-Defense and the 
right-wing League of Polish Families (whose electorates PiS 
also hopes to capture), and this is bound to complicate 
policy making.  Although its position is secure, the 
government could well seek new elections in 2006 if its 
legislative agenda stalls.  PiS would stand to improve its 
strength in parliament, judging by recent opinion polls. 
 
3. (C) The new Polish government hopes to highlight its close 
relations with the United States, particularly on strategic 
issues, as it approaches its stated objective of 
strengthening Poland's position in Europe and the wider 
world.  For all the Euroskepticism of many of PiS's leaders 
and despite pressure from outright opponents of the EU in 
parliament, this government recognizes that Poland's 
prosperity and its future development depend on EU 
membership; moreover, public support for EU membership 
remains very high, as the material benefits became apparent 
even in the first months following accession.  The Kaczynski 
brothers' barely-concealed antipathy towards Russia and 
Germany is likely to be held in check, in recognition of the 
importance of improved relations with those neighboring 
states, but long-standing strategic concerns and historical 
memories underscore, for many, the need for a strong alliance 
with the U.S. -- not only as a potential counterweight to 
Brussels. 
 
FM Meller a career diplomat, Russia expert 
------------------------------------------ 
 
4. (C) By its selection of professionals for the foreign and 
defense portfolios, PiS has sought to reassure international 
partners who might be concerned that its populist reform 
agenda will extend to foreign affairs.  However, the 
conservative and relatively inexperienced President-elect 
Lech Kaczynski and, behind the scenes, his twin brother 
Jaroslaw are widely expected to want to exert direct control 
over foreign policy.  Foreign Ministry officials have 
privately reacted with concern to plans to strengthen the 
foreign affairs departments of the prime minister's office 
and the presidential chancellery, although their real impact 
will not be clear until after the new president takes office 
December 23. A well-regarded career diplomat (most recently 
Poland's ambassador to Moscow), FM Meller lacks both 
political standing and a personal relationship with the 
Kaczynskis.  We do not yet have a sense of how he views his 
role within the government, but one of his key advisors 
confided that the MFA intends to try to stay "fifteen minutes 
ahead" of party officials and guide policy through better 
preparation.  You will find Meller a cordial and professional 
interlocutor. 
 
Meller's Agenda: Iraq, Eastern Policy, Visas, Respect 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
5. (C) Foreign Minister Meller intends to deliver a clear 
message that our strategic relationship will continue 
uninterrupted by the change in government.  Your remarks 
should welcome the new government's declared interest in 
deepening this relationship and underscore our determination 
to sustain a true partnership with the Poles.  Sensitivities 
and perceptions that we have not responded adequately to 
Polish support in Iraq (whether in terms of military 
assistance or of less directly related things, such as visa 
policy) remain widely felt here, but the new government is 
keen to work with us to come up with demonstrable evidence of 
the U.S.-Polish partnership. 
 
6. (C) Although it is not yet clear whether the Polish 
government will make a formal decision on its Iraq mission in 
advance of Meller's visit, Polish MFA officials maintain that 
Meller will provide you, at a minimum, with the general 
outlines of the Polish approach. Meller's staff suggests that 
we will get to a good outcome concerning extension of the 
Polish deployment into 2006 and that the foreign minister 
recognizes -- without undermining Polish Defense Minister 
Sikorski's recent requests in support of Polish deployments 
and defense transformation -- that conditioning such a 
decision on increased U.S. assistance will not be viewed 
positively by us.  Meller will be interested in hearing your 
assessment of December 15 parliamentary elections in Iraq and 
their impact on next year's mission. 
 
7. (C) Long an active partner in the promotion of democratic 
and economic reform in Eastern Europe, Poland under the new 
center-right government can be expected to step up its 
engagement, particularly in neighboring Belarus and Ukraine. 
FM Meller will want to exchange views on further 
coordination, and may seek to ensure that Poland not be left 
out of joint U.S. and European efforts.  MFA officials told 
us that they had heard that Washington intends to encourage 
Germany to take a leading role in the east, and they 
apparently fear being sidelined.  Given your respective 
backgrounds, Meller may wish to discuss developments in 
Russia as well, although it is worth noting that his focus at 
this point appears to be repairing bilateral ties, which had 
deteriorated badly over the past year.  The MFA was unwilling 
to approach the Russians on the draft NGO law, for example, 
suggesting that they already had enough on their plate as it 
was. 
 
8. (C) On visa policy, FM Meller can be expected to take 
account of our road map process, but also press further for 
some new signs of progress.  Specifically, the Polish 
government is looking for an unqualified statement 
articulating a clear, shared vision of visa-free travel for 
Poles, and for some gesture from us in response to President 
Kwasniewski's proposal that we waive application fees for 
students and other young travelers. 
 
9. (C) As noted above, one recurring element in the Polish 
approach to these issues is the assumption (widely shared, 
especially among PiS officials) that Poland's contributions 
are undervalued and that the country has somehow not been 
given its due.  Former PM Belka's unsuccessful OECD candidacy 
has contributed to that view, and we understand from MFA 
officials that Meller would like to highlight Polish concerns 
about the lack of high-ranking Poles in international 
organizations. 
 
Other strategic issues 
---------------------- 
 
10. (C) While in Washington, Foreign Minister Meller intends 
to review Polish interest in energy security policy in both 
the EU and NATO context (the Russian-German gas pipeline 
project remains a source of great consternation here), 
non-proliferation, defense transformation and other strategic 
issues that are certain to be addressed in more detail in 
upcoming Strategic Dialogue talks. The Poles view PSI as a 
great success, for example, and would like to exchange views 
on the possibility of expanding it.  Meller's approach to 
defense cooperation will contrast with Defense Minister 
Sikorski's in style if not in substance.  He will not seek 
immediate commitments or major initiatives requiring FMF but 
will underscore Poland's need for support in defense 
modernization.  Meller will look for ways to achieve this, 
perhaps including more PSI exercises. 
 
11. (C) FM Meller might also raise missile defense, as Polish 
officials are keen to obtain a definitive review of our MD 
planning, and remain very interested in further discussions 
concerning a Polish site.  PM Marcinkiewicz was forced to 
backpedal publicly from his government program's explicit -- 
and premature -- position seeking an MD site, but there is no 
question that the Poles want to pursue this; they are 
especially keen that Poland not be overlooked in favor of 
another state in the region.  An MD site, in the GOP's view, 
would be a symbol of U.S.-Polish defense cooperation. 
 
12. (C) Meller's staff expects that the renditions and "CIA 
prisons" issue will continue to dog the Polish government, 
despite our and the Poles' best efforts to put this story to 
rest.  In response to sustained media pressure, PM 
Marcinkiewicz announced December 10 that his government will 
order an internal probe "to close the issue."  Meller 
anticipates being asked about renditions by the Polish press 
while in Washington, and the MFA has asked that we remain in 
close contact to coordinate our public stance. 
 
13. (C) Finally, President-elect Kaczynski's plans to visit 
the U.S. early in the new year should be more clear by the 
time of Meller's meetings, and we have recommended that the 
foreign minister use his discussions to preview the new 
president's agenda and to discuss Polish objectives for that 
visit. 
ASHE