US embassy cable - 05RIYADH9142

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RIYADH 009142 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DHAHRAN SENDS 
PARIS FOR ZEYA, LONDON FOR TSOU 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/12/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PTER, KIRF, SA, Shi'a, Judges 
SUBJECT: SHI'ITE COUNCIL MEMBER PREDICTS SACKING OF SAUDI 
ARABIA'S LEADING SHI'A JUDGE 
 
REF: A. RIYADH 8582 
     B. RIYADH 3154 (NOTAL) 
 
Classified by Consul General John Kincannon for reasons 1.4 
(b) and (d). 
 
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Summary 
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1.  (C) Shi'a activist Jafar Al-Shayeb described efforts to 
oust Abdullah Al-Khunaizi, Qatif's Shi'a judge, saying that 
he was not effective as a representative of the community 
given "new social forces" gaining strength in Qatif.  He said 
that the Shi'a were pleased with the signals from King 
Abdullah but waiting for concrete initiatives to help realize 
their goals of religious freedom and an end to 
discrimination.  He and his colleague Mohammed Mahfoodh 
argued that pluralism in Iraq, if it were achieved in a 
stable way, would set a good example for the region's 
governments.  They also downplayed the idea that Iran was 
actively trying to influence the Saudi Shi'a.  The movement 
to oust Judge Khunaizi is the most striking example we have 
seen to date of the struggle for leadership in the Qatifi 
Shi'a community, and we will follow it closely.  End summary. 
 
2.  (SBU) The CG and PolOff called on Jafar Al-Shayeb, a 
Shi'a activist, businessman, and elected member of the Qatif 
municipal council, at his offices in Qatif on December 11. 
Mohammed Mahfoodh, a writer on Islamic issues and a political 
associate of Al-Shayeb's, also joined the meeting. 
 
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A Judgeship in the Balance 
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3.  (C) Noting that the CG had recently called on Abdullah 
Al-Khunaizi (ref A), the Shi'a judge in Qatif, Al-Shayeb 
began the conversation by saying that the Ministry of Justice 
was likely to replace Judge Khunaizi with Ghalib Al-Hammad, a 
Shi'ite from Tarut Island who had studied Shi'a jurisprudence 
in Qum and was currently in Iran.  Al-Shayeb said that he 
hoped Al-Hammad would be more successful than Judge Khunaizi 
in working with the Minsitry of Justice to define and 
formalize the authority of the Shi'a court vis-a-vis the 
Sunni courts and to increase the staffing and capabilities of 
the Shi'a court. 
 
4.  (C) Asked by the CG why the Ministry of Justice would 
want to replace Judge Khunaizi, Al-Shayeb explained that 
"new, more powerful social forces" were at work in Qatif and 
that Al-Khunaizi did not represent these forces.  Traditional 
leaders like the large families, wealthy merchants, and 
traditional religious figures no longer represented the 
diversity of the community, Al-Shayeb said.  "The municipal 
elections were a real turning point.  We now are seeing the 
rise of younger religious leaders, who are able to think more 
openly."  He argued that Judge Khunaizi was not effective and 
expressed confidence that Al-Hammad would be "more open, more 
communicative, and more able to resolve problems."  The 
Ministry of Justice, Al-Shayeb said, had come to realize the 
consensus of the community and was therefore poised to 
replace Judge Khunaizi, a member of a large Qatifi family who 
represented the traditional establishment, with Al-Hammad, a 
younger figure from a less well-known family and from an area 
outside of central Qatif. 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
Shi'a and Liberal Reformers Waiting for Change 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
5.  (C) Speaking more broadly about recent changes in 
conditions for the Shi'a, Al-Shayeb said that there are 
"signals" from King Abdullah that he will act to improve 
conditions for the Shi'a, but as yet no "initiatives."  He 
gave examples of how Shi'a are not represented in the 
government bureaucracy, even as it relates to Qatif:  "We 
have not had a Shi'a mayor for thirty years, and even the 
local heads of the government ministries are from outside." 
Asked by the CG what requests the Shi'a were making of King 
Abdullah, Al-Shayeb said, "We are asking for an end to 
discrimination against the Shi'a and for religious freedom - 
the freedom to have Shi'a books, to study religion from a 
Shi'a perspective, and to have Shi'a religious educators." 
Al-Shayeb and Mahfoodh also discussed the Shi'a imprisoned in 
connection with the 1996 Khobar Towers bombings, saying that 
the individuals had either not been tried, had not been tried 
fairly, or had not received any sentence.  Mahfoodh asked 
rhetorically, "If the government is rehabilitating the 
extremists coming back from Iraq and letting them go, then 
why can't it at least do the same with the Shi'a prisoners?" 
6.  (C) Al-Shayeb, who is also active in the liberal reform 
movement, said that reformers were giving King Abdullah 
breathing space so that he could introduce reforms without 
additional pressure:  "Let the Sunni extremists be the ones 
who force the pressure on him for now."  The reformers, he 
said, were using this time to build more bridges at a 
non-governmental level with international civil society, 
citing as an example an upcoming seminar with the Washington, 
DC-based Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy, to be 
held in Riyadh on December 29.  Al-Shayeb noted on the other 
hand that the perception of official U.S. efforts to promote 
democracy in the region was "not positive," given people's 
"skepticism" about U.S. methods and goals. 
 
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Iraq:  A Good Example if Stability Prevails 
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7.  (C) Al-Shayeb and Mahfoodh were optimistic that 
developments in Iraq would have a good impact on the region 
as long as stability was achieved.  The Saudi Shi'a are glad 
that Saddam is gone and that the Iraqi Shi'a will play a 
major role in the new government, Al-Shayeb explained, but 
"people are fearful about the extremists in Iraq, and worried 
they will come back to Saudi Arabia as they did from 
Afghanistan."  Mahfoodh continued:  "The central lesson from 
Iraq is pluralism, that no one group can govern Iraq by 
itself.  There should be greater diversity and participation 
in government throughout the region."  Both argued that 
moderate Shi'a, in the mould of Ayatollah Sistani, would 
prove more influential in Iraq than extremist Shi'a as long 
as stability prevailed. 
 
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"There is No Role for Iran Here" 
-------------------------------- 
 
8.  (C) Asked by the CG what role Iran was playing among the 
Shi'a in Saudi Arabia, Mahfoodh replied, "There is no role 
for Iran here."  In response to the CG's observation that 
many Saudi Shi'a appeared to go to Iran for religious study, 
Mahfoodh drew a distinction between the religious schools and 
the government.  "Each school is under the authority of the 
marja', not the (Iranian) state," he explained.  "It is the 
marja' who funds the school and pays a stipend to the 
student."  Mahfoodh and Al-Shayeb noted that study in Qum did 
not necessarily imply exposure to Iranian revolutionary-style 
instruction or an inclination toward Iran's ideology.  The 
inability of the Saudi Shi'a to train their own "home grown" 
clerics and the problems of sending students to Najaf for the 
past fifteen years, they explained, had forced would-be Saudi 
Shi'a clerics to study in Qum.  They noted that in Qum there 
are many schools, including schools run by followers of 
Najaf-based clerics such as Sistani and Al-Najafi, and that 
most Saudi students study in these schools rather than more 
radical or activist schools run by Iranians. 
 
9.  (C) Al-Shayeb qualified Mahfoodh's distinction between 
the religious schools and the government somewhat, noting 
that the schools and students did have to interact with the 
Iranian state on logistical issues like visas and permits and 
conceding that Iran did have an opportunity to try to 
influence students, "like we saw in the 1980s."  He 
acknowledged that Saudi Hezbollah still operated in Qatif but 
said that it was now purely a social and cultural 
organization, no longer interested in spreading revolutionary 
political ideology.  Mahfoodh opined that Shi'a throughout 
the region identified closely with their country, citing the 
example of a referendum in Bahrain in the 1970s when Bahraini 
Shi'a rejected the idea of uniting with Iran. 
 
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Comment 
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10.  (C) Ref B provides biographic information on Al-Shayeb 
and notes that he appears to have a foot in both the liberal 
and Islamist camps:  on the one hand, he supports human 
rights and political reform and has signed several petitions 
advocating a liberal platform; on the other hand, he has 
close ties to Hassan Al-Saffar and received strong support 
from Shi'a Islamists in the municipal council elections. 
Although we did not talk about Al-Saffar with Al-Shayeb, we 
suspect that they are both involved in maneuvering to have 
the Ministry of Justice replace Judge Khunaizi with someone 
who is more aligned with them politically and/or religiously 
(see ref A for Judge Khunaizi's attack on Al-Saffar and his 
allies).  Al-Shayeb's explanation of why the replacement was 
in the interests of the Shi'a community at large - that 
Al-Khunaizi could not represent its "new social forces" - was 
vague and unconvincing, and he never clarified what he meant 
by these "new forces" despite probing questions from the CG. 
It may grow increasingly difficult for Al-Shayeb and 
Al-Saffar to simultaneously position themselves as leaders of 
the Shi'a community, to maintain strong connections with 
liberal reformers throughout the Kingdom, and to derive 
organizational and financial support from Shi'a Islamist 
networks.  We will follow the issue of Judge Khunaizi's 
potential replacement closely, as we suspect it will be a 
contentious and revealing issue in Qatif.  End comment. 
 
(APPROVED:  KINCANNON) 
OBERWETTER