US embassy cable - 02ABUJA3324

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 003324 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
LONDON FOR GURNEY 
PARIS FOR NEARY 
 
 
E.O.12958: DECL: 12/15/12 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, MOPS, IV, NI 
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: OBASANJO COOL TO PARIS SUMMIT ON 
COTE D'IVOIRE 
 
 
REF: STATE 256597 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR HOWARD F.JETER. REASON 1.5 
(B) and (D). 
 
 
1. (C) I spoke at length by phone on Saturday evening 
with President Obasanjo on the French proposal to hold 
a summit on Cote d'Ivoire.  Obasanjo is opposed and I 
think adamantly so, to the French proposal.  He said 
that, if invited, he would not attend. "They can hold 
the summit, but I am not going; Nigeria will not be 
represented," he bluntly declared.  Cote d'Ivoire, he 
contended, is an African problem that must be solved 
by African leaders. 
 
 
2. (C) Anticipating my question, a more statesmanlike 
Obasanjo expressed gratitude to France (and the U.S.) 
for helping to broker a meeting with Cameroonian 
President Biya. However, Obasanjo added that he had 
told Biya at their meeting in Geneva that he would not 
meet again outside of the African continent, or for 
that matter, outside of Cameroon or Nigeria. 
 
 
3.  (C) I explained the French were not trying to 
overshadow ECOWAS peacemaking efforts, but rather they 
conceived the summit as a logical extension of the 
Lome peace process and as a way to inject it with 
needed momentum.  Obasanjo, however, would have none 
of it.  Instead, he inferred the French proposal was 
Wade's idea because Wade was unhappy with Eyadema. The 
French need to support the Lome process, not displace 
it, he stressed.  Obasanjo said would he raise this 
objection with Wade when they meet on December 16. 
 
 
4.  (C) Obasanjo said a number of regional leaders had 
called him to ask that he engage on Cote d'Ivoire. 
The Ivorian Prime Minister had also visited Abuja to 
ask that he intercede.  Obasanjo said he had agreed, 
and that first he was going to Kara to try to heal the 
rift between Wade and Edayema.  Wade and Kufuor would 
join him there.  Eyadema, he said, felt very badly 
about the distance that had developed between himself 
and Wade.  From Kara, Obasanjo said he and the three 
other leaders would go to Cote d'Ivoire to meet 
Gbagbo.  They would tell Gbagbo that ending the 
rebellion would necessitate political compromise 
because the essential problems were political not 
military. The region would help if he wanted it; if 
not, the region would stand aside. Obasanjo 
emphasized, however, that if Gbagbo refused this offer 
of assistance, Gbagbo himself would lose. 
 
 
5.  (C) I told the President that my impression was 
the real leaders of the rebellion were not those who 
were negotiating in Lome.  Obasanjo agreed.  He 
recounted telling Eyadema he was wasting his time 
negotiating with "sergeants" in Lome; instead, he 
would have to "go behind the masks" and find out who 
the real leaders might be, but agreed that Ouattara, 
Bedie, and Guei's successor all needed to be at the 
table. 
 
 
6.  (C) As our conversation ended, I told Obasanjo 
that we recognized the domestic imperatives he faces, 
but his engagement on Cote d' Ivoire could be 
instrumental.  Obasanjo said Nigeria is willing to 
engage and is even willing to send troops "under the 
right conditions."  However, Nigeria would only engage 
if asked; even then, it would want to avoid the 
perception of being the region's primary policeman. 
 
 
7. (C) Obasanjo promised to brief me on his return to 
Abuja. 
 
 
8. (C) Comment: The timing of the French initiative is 
unfortunate from the Nigerian perspective.  The idea 
comes just as the Nigerians are revving up to assume a 
more active role in the mediation process.  In the 
back of his mind, Obasanjo probably feels the Paris 
summit was intended, at least in part, to limit 
Nigeria's role and to underscore that France not 
Nigeria or even ECOWAS remains the main underwriter of 
security in Francophone West Africa. Second, despite 
Obasanjo's "gratefulness" to the French for brokering 
the meeting with Biya, Paris is not 
the GON's favorite foreign capital at the moment. 
Obasanjo still smarts from the ICJ decision on Bakassi 
that many Nigerians believe the French played an 
unhelpful role in crafting. He clearly does not want 
to be seen as legitimizing the French by returning to 
the scene of the notorious September 5 meeting where 
he is reported to have agreed to implement the ICJ 
ruling(the GON denies he made the commitment). Right 
now, a trip to Paris might not play well with the 
Nigerian public. 
JETER