US embassy cable - 05THEHAGUE3304

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 003304 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/12/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, MARR, NL, AF, NATO 
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/ISAF: MOVING FORWARD AT A SNAIL'S PACE 
 
REF: A. THE HAGUE 3240 AND PREVIOUS 
 
     B. BLAKEMAN/FRIED/VOLKER 12/9/05 E-MAILS 
 
Classified By: Charge D'Affaires Chat Blakeman, reasons 1.4 (b,d) 
 
1. (C) Summary:  The Dutch Cabinet has delayed taking a 
decision on a proposed ISAF III Dutch deployment until 
December 19.  Senior government officials will seek to use 
this time to convince remaining Cabinet members (primarily 
junior coalition partner D-66 ministers) and to build support 
for the mission in Parliament.  Parliamentary leaders have 
been briefed on the details of the mission, but the major 
opposition party remains skeptical.  Even if Cabinet makes a 
positive decision on December 19, parliamentary consideration 
of the proposal will likely require several weeks, and 
approval remains uncertain.  Senior government figures are 
cautiously optimistic, but warn that the system needs to play 
itself out; attempting to force a quick decision will almost 
certainly lead to failure.  End summary. 
 
CABINET DELAYS DECISION...AGAIN 
------------------------------- 
 
2. (C)  On December 9, the Dutch Cabinet considered for the 
second time the proposed ISAF III PRT deployment to Oruzgan 
province and -- again -- delayed taking any decision. 
According to Rob Swartbol, senior foreign policy advisor to 
PM Balkenende, Ministers Pechtold (Government Reform and 
Kingdom Affairs; D-66) and Brinkhorst (Economic Affairs, 
D-66) remained unconvinced despite positive briefings by 
Ministers Kamp (Defense, VVD) and Bot (Foreign Affairs, CDA) 
and CHOD Berlijn.  Swartbol said that the Cabinet would 
revisit the issue at a special meeting on December 19. 
 
3. (C) In a subsequent discussion with Charge, Hugo Siblesz 
(MFA POLDIR) sought to put a positive spin on the 
postponement.  He stressed that the tone of discussion inside 
the Cabinet was improving and said he was "reasonably 
optimistic" the deployment would eventually go through.  He 
denied that the Dutch were looking for additional concessions 
from NATO or the U.S., emphasizing that the key issues in 
play are now almost exclusively domestic.  The Cabinet 
decision to delay would provide some additional time to build 
support for a deployment in parliament, he stressed. 
 
4. (C) Kamp and Berlijn similarly emphasized the need for 
more time to build public and parliamentary support in 
separate discussions with DATT on December 10.  Berlijn noted 
that he had personally briefed the senior leadership of all 
major parties (including PvdA, the largest opposition party) 
and saw positive movement from "all but one."  Berlijn 
observed that bringing PvdA on board was necessary to ensure 
a two-year deployment through the May 2007 Dutch elections; 
without PvdA support at this stage, a post-election PvdA-led 
government would feel little compunction about pulling the 
plug on the operation.  Kamp was equally adamant that a 
parliamentary "super-majority," including the PvdA, was 
necessary for the deployment to go forward.  Both Kamp and 
Berlijn predicted that the PvdA could be brought around in 
time. 
 
5. (C) On December 12, Rob de Groot (Director of the Security 
Affairs Department, MFA) told POLCOUNS that the MFA and MOD 
"working level" were optimistic that Cabinet would make a 
positive decision on December 19.  On that basis, the 
ministries were coordinating a strategy for dealing with 
Parliament.  Since Parliament goes into recess on December 
21, de Groot predicted that hearings on the deployment might 
not even begin until mid-January.  De Groot stressed that 
putting some distance between the Cabinet's decision and 
Parliamentary consideration was not necessarily a bad thing, 
as it would give the government time to prepare a convincing 
case and perhaps allow emotions to cool.  He noted that some 
steps, such as sending certain Dutch troops to Canada for 
training, could proceed without parliamentary approval. 
PARLIAMENT GAMES 
---------------- 
 
6. (C) Parliamentary contacts polled informally over the past 
week made clear that the deployment still faces stiff 
opposition in the Second Chamber.  Bert Koenders (PvdA 
Foreign Affairs Spokesman) told POLCOUNS on December 9 that 
he remains "highly critical" of the proposed mission despite 
having received a personal briefing from Berlijn.  Koenders 
stressed that he is not convinced Dutch troops will be able 
to carry out reconstruction work in a hostile environment, 
and expressed skepticism about measures to keep OEF and ISAF 
missions separate.  Lousewies van der Laan (D-66 Foreign 
Affairs Spokesman) separately told POLCOUNS not to 
underestimate the level of concern among D-66 members 
regarding the "secret flights/renditions" revelations, which 
are now linked -- rightly or wrongly -- to the deployment 
decision.  Despite their skepticism, however, neither 
Koenders nor van der Laan ruled out the possibility that 
their factions might eventually vote in favor of a deployment 
-- although both indicated they would vote against it if a 
decision had to be taken today. 
 
7. (C) A firm supporter of the mission, Hans van Baalen (VVD 
Foreign Affairs Spokesman), predicted to POLCOUNS that the 
government would get a "slim" majority in Parliament without 
PvdA support, but worried that it would not proceed on that 
basis.  He noted that while the PvdA leadership -- including 
Koenders -- can support the deployment intellectually, the 
party's "old-left" rank and file will be much more difficult 
to bring around.  The last thing any party wants going into 
an election, he noted, is a major division between the 
leadership and the base. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
8. (C) Getting a decision in a consensus-based society like 
the Netherlands is slow and painful at the best of times -- 
and these are bad times.  The Balkenende Cabinet has 
historically low polling numbers and is already widely viewed 
as a "lame duck" administration.  The PvdA stands poised to 
dominate the upcoming elections, but also faces serious 
divisions between its old- and new-left wings -- as evidenced 
by the leadership's embarrassing failure to secure a positive 
party vote on the EU Constitutional Treaty last June.  In 
this environment, it is practically impossible to separate 
politics from policy.  That said, the Dutch have made 
difficult choices in tough times before, and the leading 
proponents of the deployment -- PM Balkenende, FM Bot, and DM 
Kamp -- all think they can secure a positive decision given 
more time.  The one certainty is that a rushed decision will 
be negative.  However frustrating, allowing the Dutch system 
to play itself out -- and resisting the temptation to force a 
quick decision -- may be our best option for securing Dutch 
participation in ISAF III. 
BLAKEMAN