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| Identifier: | 05TBILISI3226 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 05TBILISI3226 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Tbilisi |
| Created: | 2005-12-12 13:11:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | PGOV PREL GG Abkhazia |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L TBILISI 003226 SIPDIS DEPT FOR DAS BRYZA, EUR/CACEN AND EUR/SNEC E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/12/2015 TAGS: PGOV, PREL, GG, Abkhazia SUBJECT: ABKHAZIA: THE NEED FOR CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOHN F. TEFFT. REASONS: 1.4 (B) AND (D). 1. (C) Summary: During a December 6 and 7 visit to Abkhazia, the Abkhaz and Georgians agreed ad ref to a draft of the joint declaration on security guarantees and the return of internally displaced persons, the European Commission launched a program of economic rehabilitation in the conflict areas, and Ambassador Tefft met with a range of de facto officials. In every meeting, Ambassador emphasized that the U.S. supports the territorial integrity of Georgia and the peaceful resolution of the conflict. The Abkhaz stated their desire for independence and their concern over the militant rhetoric of some Georgian leaders. They welcomed increased assistance from the U.S. and increased exposure to American values and culture. They praised the planned USAID-funded joint Abkhaz-Georgian study tour to the U.S. End summary. --------------------------------------------- -------- EC Commits 4 Million Euros to Rehabilitation Projects --------------------------------------------- -------- 2. (C) On December 6 and 7 Ambassador, accompanied by Poloff, traveled to Abkhazia to attend the first meeting of the Steering Committee of a joint EC-UNDP-UNOMIG Rehabilitation Program in the conflict zone and to hold other official meetings. Representatives of the Friends of the Secretary General (FSG) -- UK, Germany, France and Russia -- were also present for the meeting. The program plans to restore basic services such as electricity, public health, water sanitation, waste management and agricultural development on both sides of the conflict over the next two to three years. Total funding will be 4 million Euros. 3. (C) State Minister for Conflict Resolution Giorgi Khaindrava led the Georgian delegation to the meeting - marking the first time many Georgians had been to Abkhazia since the war ended in 1993 - and de facto foreign minister Sergey Shamba led the Abkhaz delegation. Both Khaindrava and Shamba noted that economic rehabilitation would help lay the foundation upon which confidence could be built between the sides. Khaindrava emphasized that the Georgian position of support of the program reflects its cooperative approach to resolving the conflict. Shamba said the sides were close to agreement on the joint declaration on the return of internally displaced persons (IDPs). --------------------------------------------- ---------- Bagapsh Says Everything Flows from Economic Development --------------------------------------------- ---------- 4. (C) Following the UN meeting, the FSG met de facto president Bagapsh, together with de facto prime minister Ankvab and other de facto officials. Speaking on behalf of the FSG, German Chair Ambassador Schramm encouraged the sides to come to agreement on the joint statement on security guarantees and on the return of IDPs, the latest draft of which had just been delivered to the Abkhaz. Schramm noted the deteriorating human rights situation in Gali and urged the Abkhaz to follow through on commitments to open a human rights office and allow the deployment of civilian police there. 5. (C) Bagapsh said he was also concerned about Gali. He claimed the worsening situation is the result of actions by certain people with an interest in creating an unstable situation there. He pointed to former Georgian militia fighters, who he claimed recently appeared in the region. He claimed that there was an explosion of criminality and abduction only after these individuals arrived and began making public statements. Bagapsh said the Abkhaz would not allow the situation to spiral out of control or let anyone else accomplish this goal. 6. (C) Bagapsh expressed concern about what he considered the militarization of Georgia and pointed specifically to the opening of a Georgian military base in Senaki, located on the border with Abkhazia. He highlighted Saakashvili's speech to a Georgian Youth Camp last summer where Saakashvili emotionally emphasized the importance of returning Abkhazia. Bagapsh said South Ossetian leader Kokoity had reported a similar trend in South Ossetia: the Georgians had placed a military hospital and MOI troops close to the border area. This, he said, is increasing tensions there. 7. (C) Bagapsh said the Abkhaz are committed to a peaceful negotiation of the conflict. With regard to the human rights office and police force in Gali, he said the issue "is not crossed off the agenda." He said he thought it would be resolved step-by-step and suggested a package deal involving economic incentives. He asked how the Abkhaz could speak of human rights when Gali is in a state of economic collapse. With regard to the recent Abkhaz law on citizenship, Bagapsh said that his statement was misconstrued and aimed at removing only the criminal element there. 8. (C) Ambassador Tefft said he was glad to hear Bagapsh did not rule out opening a human rights office and encouraged Bagapsh to build upon the positive statements made by Khaindrava and Shamba. He raised concerns over the new citizenship law. Bagapsh claimed he was misquoted and that his remarks applied only to criminals in Gali. Ambassador asked where the Abkhaz and Georgians might find common ground. Bagapsh responded with a list including energy, railway, highways, and sea/air connections. He concluded that everything flows from economic development. --------------------------------------------- ---------------- Shamba: Argues for Independence, but Open to U.S. Cooperation --------------------------------------------- ----------------- 9. (C) De facto foreign minister Sergey Shamba made the case for Abkhaz independence. He claimed that not a single politician would consider joining Georgia today. He said the economic embargo and militant rhetoric from Georgia make it impossible to change public opinion. Ambassador said the U.S. supports the territorial integrity of Georgia and that great leaders lead their publics toward peaceful solutions. Shamba agreed that war would not be in the interest of Abkhazia or Georgia. This, he said, could be the match that lights the Caucasus. 10. (C) Ambassador said the U.S. is open to doing more with Abkhazia. He offered as an example a visit by an American Bluegrass Band next year. Shamba welcomed the idea and cited the popularity of American film, culture and music. He said he hoped to see a more active American presence in Abkhazia and more such opportunities, including especially for Abkhaz youth. Referring to the planned joint study tour to U.S., Shamba asked if all 12 candidates (instead of 10) could attend. Ambassador said he would consult with the AID Director in Tbilisi. --------------------------------------------- ------------- NGO leaders: U.S. and Others Pushing Abkhaz Toward Russia --------------------------------------------- ------------- 11. (C) Ambassador met with a group of NGO leaders, including many representatives from Natella Akaba's Association of Women of Abkhazia. The leaders reaffirmed the Abkhaz position on independence and claimed that the West is pushing Abkhazia toward Russia as they may not travel Abkhazia except through Russia and by taking Russian citizenship. They said they were free to have connections with NGO leaders in Georgia but public opinion prevents much interaction. 12. (C) They expressed many concerns also raised by Bagapsh, including about the situation in Gali and the belief that they Georgian militia fighters were behind them. The leaders also reiterated Abkhaz concerns about the militarization of Georgia. 90% of Abkhaz, one said simply, think Georgia is preparing for war. They expressed concern over statements made by Saakashvili, Burjanadze and others about returning Abkhazia to Georgia. 13. (C) They defended the Abkhaz citizenship law by saying that a Georgian who does not want Abkhaz citizenship may be a resident in Abkhazia. They acknowledged that the law allows dual Abkhaz-Russian citizenship but not Abkhaz-Georgian. They said that it would not be possible to consider dual Abkhaz-Georgian citizenship as long as Abkhazia remains in a state of war with Georgia. --------------------------------------------- ---------- Dinner with Both Sides: Agreement to Joint Declaration --------------------------------------------- ---------- 14. (C) Khaindrava and Bagapsh unexpectedly joined a dinner hosted by Shamba that evening. SRSG Tagliavini as well as the British and German representatives of the FSG and members of Shamba's staff also joined. At the dinner, which followed an internal meeting of the de fact Abkhaz authorities, Tagliavini announced that there was ad ref agreement to the latest draft of the joint declaration on security guarantees. --------------------------------------------- ---------- Ankvab: Widen Connections between Georgians and Abkhaz --------------------------------------------- ---------- 15. (C) In a private meeting with Ambassador and Poloff, de facto prime minister Alexander Ankvab briefed on the poor economics of Abkhazia. Out of a budget of 644 million Rubles ($25.7 million), 25% goes to defense. Shipments of the biggest export, citrus, are down from 110,000 metric tons before the war to 35,000 metric tons today. He explained Russian investment as a result: $25 million in mandarin processing, $15 million in wine production, and $25.6 million to pave the road north of Sukhumi. He said the Russians also pay about $1 million dollars in pensions to 26,000 of the 51,000 pensioners in Abkhazia. 16. (C) Ankvab provided a long list of the challenges he faces as a result of destroyed or out of date infrastructure. He pointed to serious problems with electricity, water supply, waste management, telecommunications, and public transport. He said there is no ability to care for the sick, elderly and mentally ill, no medical care in the villages, and 163 secondary schools need repair. He said he could go on. 17. (C) Still, Ankvab made the case for independence, saying the Abkhaz do not belong to anyone and it is a natural right to be free. Ankvab said Georgia made a strategic mistake on August 14, 1992, when Georgia attacked just as the Abkhaz parliament was about to agree to a federation with Georgia. He said the history of Georgia had compromised the idea of a common life together and much more time needed to pass before finding common ground. When asked how to get there, Ankvab suggested widening the connection between Georgia and Abkhazia through railway and other projects. --------------------------------------------- ------------ Bagapsh: Leaves Open a Small Possibility for Negotiation --------------------------------------------- ------------ 18. (C) In a private meeting with Ambassador and Poloff, de facto president Sergey Bagapsh said the Abkhaz hoped for peaceful coexistence with Georgia. He said that Abkhazia does not plan to go with Russia or with Georgia. Instead, he said, Abkhazia wants to build a state that is part of Europe. He argued for developing the economy as a way to achieve more contacts with Georgians. He said he is concerned about the situation in Gali and thought a statement by the FSG might be useful. Bagapsh also expressed concern about Saakashvili's militant rhetoric. He said a war with Abkhazia would ignite the region. 19. (C) Ambassador said that the U.S. supports the territorial integrity of Georgia and has publicly and privately said to Georgia that the U.S. supports only the peaceful resolution of the conflict. Ambassador noted in particular the tremendous gulf between the way each side interprets the actions of the other. He encouraged Bagapsh to continue with confidence-building measures and said the U.S. would look for ways to build bridges between the Abkhaz and Georgians. 20. (C) In response to Ambassador's question about the citizenship law and the human rights office, Bagapsh defended the citizenship law by asserting that criminals were hiding in Gali under the protection of Georgian passports. He did not see a need for a human rights office but implied this issue would be resolved in time. With regard to agreement with Georgians, Bagapsh left the door open for negotiations with Georgia, saying that the Abkhaz are ready to listen but that time was required to heal the wounds of the 1990s. --------------------------------------------- -- Ashuba: Abkhaz Want to Meet European Standards --------------------------------------------- -- 21. (C) de facto parliamentary head Nugzar Ashuba said the Abkhaz are trying to meet European standards and hoped even to adopt European legislation. He lamented that due to a lack of direct ties to Europeans they model themselves on St. Petersburg, which had ties to the European Parliament. Ashuba made no apologies for not allowing dual Abkhaz-Georgian citizenship. He said that the only reason the law allows dual citizenship with Russia is practical: without a Russian passport the Abkhaz could not travel. As soon as the world recognizes our independence, he said, we will change the law. He acknowledged that a Georgian without Abkhaz citizenship would not have the right to participate in politics or referenda. ------- COMMENT ------- 22. (C) The Abkhaz we spoke to exhibited no desire to be under the thumb of Russia any more than they want to be a part of Georgia. Although every interlocutor expressed the Abkhaz desire for independence, they implicitly accepted that final status needed to be negotiated with Georgia. Nor did they attempt to disguise the economic pressure they labor under. The de facto president, prime minister and foreign minister all emphasized the need for time and confidence- building measures (particularly in the economic field) to resolve the problem. They did not deliver legalistic lectures and sought to convey an openness to more U.S. contacts. End comment. TEFFT
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