US embassy cable - 05COLOMBO2076

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 002076 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SA/INS, USPACOM FOR FPA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/12/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PTER, PGOV, CE, LTTE - Peace Process 
SUBJECT: PEACE PROCESS: AKASHI VISITS, OFFERS TO HOST 
CEASEFIRE TALKS; RAJAPAKSE UPSET WITH NORWEGIANS; NORWEGIAN 
AMBASSADOR TALKS TOUGH TO TIGERS 
 
REF: (A) COLOMBO 2054 (B) COLOMBO 2003 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey J. Lunstead for reasons 1.4 (b) and ( 
d). 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY: Japanese Special Envoy Akashi found President 
Rajapakse eager to take up ceasefire implementation talks and 
willing to use a venue outside of Sri Lanka.  Akashi offered 
Japan for the first round. Rajapakse was upset at reported 
comments of Norwegian Envoy Eric Solheim that Norway would 
take up its facilitator role only if certain "conditions" 
were met.  Norwegian Ambassador Brattskar has had frank 
discussion with both sides and warned the Tigers Norway will 
not act as facilitator during a low intensity war.  Norway 
awaits GSL approval of dates for a political-level visit 
before facilitation efforts can start.  Akashi is focused on 
statement which would come from Dec 19 Co-Chairs meeting; we 
tried to get him to think about more basic issue of Co-Chairs 
role in changed Sri Lankan situation. END SUMMARY 
 
2. (U) Japanese Special Envoy Yasushi Akashi visited Sri 
Lanka December 8-11 in anticipation of Dec 19 Co-Chairs 
meeting.  Akashi met with Ambassador Lunstead on Dec 9, then 
met with entire Co-Chairs group on Dec 10 before his 
departure.  Akashi met most of the Colombo-based players and 
traveled to the Eastern area of Ampara; at the request of the 
GSL he did not go to Kilinocchi for meetings with the LTTE. 
 
3. (C) At his Dec 9 meeting with President Rajapakse, Akashi 
found the President extremely upset with comments from 
Norwegian Special Envoy Eric Solheim reported in the press 
that Norway would be willing to take up its facilitation role 
if both sides met certain (unspecified) "conditions." 
Rajapakse viewed this as an insult to a sovereign country. 
Aside from this, Rajapakse made points similar to those he 
has made to Ambassador and Co-Chairs (reftels): 
 
--his highest priority is the peace process; 
--he is willing to consider a "high degree of devolution of 
powers," citing India as an example; 
--he believes Norway should not be both facilitator and head 
of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM), and muses about 
other countries joining the SLMM; 
--he wants to start talks on cease-fire implementation, and 
is willing to hold them outside of Sri Lanka if the Tigers 
insist. 
 
On the latter point, Akashi said that Japan was willing to 
host the first round of ceasefire implementation talks, an 
offer which he made public at his pre-departure press 
conference.  Akashi also noted that after musing on SLMM 
expansion, Rajapakse had said he would like the Co-Chairs to 
discuss the issue.  Akashi said that "when they (the GSL) 
don't have an answer, they want one from us." 
 
5. (C) Norwegian Ambassador Hans Brattskar said that at his 
Dec 7 meeting with Rajapakse, after asking Norway to continue 
as facilitator, the President had said: "So, when do you 
start?"  Brattskar interpreted this as the President handing 
the ball to Norway and asking them to run with it, thereby 
taking the pressure off himself to move forward.   Brattskar 
explained to Rajapakse that it was not that simple, both 
sides had to agree and the conditions needed to be right. 
For one, Norway expected that the GSL would not publicly 
criticize Norway and question its impartiality.  Before 
anything happened, Norway expected to have a "political-level 
visit" by Special Envoy Eric Solheim.  Solheim was ready to 
visit the week of December 12, but the GSL had not yet given 
a positive signal. 
 
6. (C) Brattskar visited Kilinocchi Dec 9 and met with the 
LTTE's Tamilchelvan.  Brattskar expressed disappointment 
about the Tamil boycott of the Presidential election; 
Tamilchelvan denied the Tigers enforced it and said it was 
the "peoples' will." Brattskar raised the Jaffna claymore 
mine attacks on the Sri Lankan Army and Tamilchelvan denied 
responsibility, putting it onto "the people" or a "third 
force."  Brattskar warned Tamilchelvan that Norway was 
willing to facilitate the peace process, but it would not be 
"observers of a low intensity war." 
7. (C) In their individual meeting, Ambassador asked Akashi 
what he expected at the Dec 19 Co-Chairs meeting.  Akashi 
predicted discussions on the outcome of the Sri Lankan 
election and an analysis of LTTE behavior, but focused on the 
meeting statement.  He said it would be important for the 
Co-Chairs not to side fully with the government, but to offer 
support if the GSL put forward viable suggestions.  He noted 
that any statement issued after the Co-Chairs meeting should 
be nuanced in language and tone so as not to fuel nationalism 
in the South, especially among the JVP and the Buddhist 
monk-based Jathika Hela Urumaya.  Ambassador returned to this 
issue at the larger Co-Chairs meeting, suggesting that the 
Dec 19 meeting should focus on the question of what the task 
of the Co-Chairs should be in the new situation in which: 
--the Government had rejected large parts of the former peace 
process and the Oslo Declarations acceptance of federalism 
(though seeming to be willing to accept a federal-type system 
in fact, if not in name), and 
 
--the LTTE had raised questions in Prabhakaran's Heroes Day 
speech and in Balasingham's follow-up speech about whether it 
wanted international community involvement, and, 
 
--LTTE actions such as the Jaffna and Eastern Province 
attacks called into doubt their attitude toward the entire 
peace process. 
 
8. (C) Ambassador continued that the GSL's sole desire from 
the Co-Chairs was to put pressure on the LTTE.  It was 
important to try to find ways to motivate the Tigers, but the 
Co-Chairs had to be clear that they supported the Peace 
Process, not one party to the process.  In this regard, it 
might be better to issue a short statement expressing support 
for the Peace Process and urging adherence to the ceasefire, 
rather than the usual laundry list of items, thus sending a 
message to both sides that it was not just business as usual. 
 Akashi was a bit taken aback by this idea, but EC Ambassador 
Wilson was enthusiastic.  Akashi noted that he intended to 
visit LTTE theoretician Balasingham in London on his way to 
Brussels. 
 
9.  (C) COMMENT: President Rajapakse's invitation to Norway 
to resume its role as facilitator is of course welcome, but 
the flap over Solheim's comments (which were not new) makes 
it clear the issue is not settled yet.  Norwegian toughness 
towards the LTTE is welcome.  We expect the Norwegians, the 
GSL and the LTTE to agree eventually on the parameters of 
Norwegian involvement.  We believe Co-Chairs need to do some 
back to basics thinking in the Dec 19 meeting and should 
consider a shorter rather than longer statement.  We will 
have more thoughts on this in our Co-Chairs Scenesetter. 
 
LUNSTEAD