US embassy cable - 05ABUDHABI4983

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ABU DHABI 004983 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR S/CT - RHONDA SHORE, ED SALAZAR 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PTER, ASEC, AE 
SUBJECT: UAE: 2005 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORTS ON TERRORISM 
 
REF: STATE 193439 
 
1. (U) This is the UAE Mission's unclassified submission for 
the 2005 Country Reports on Terrorism.  We will transmit to 
the Department a classified addendum septel.  The information 
in this report is divided into the four broad categories 
suggested in the provided style guide, and the septel 
addendum will be keyed to these same subject headings. 
 
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General Assessment 
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2. (U) There were no acts of terrorism against or affecting 
U.S. citizens or facilities in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) 
during 2005.  The UAE continued to provide staunch assistance 
and cooperation to the global war against terrorism. 
 
3. (U) The UAE Government publicly condemned the terror 
attacks in Amman, Sharm al-Sheikh, London, and Baghdad.  In 
December, Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed 
al-Nahyan strongly denounced terrorists, saying they had no 
loyalty to their countries.  The Ministry of Justice, Islamic 
Affairs, and Endowment drafted Friday prayer sermon guidance 
and was thus able to issue timely condemnations of terrorist 
acts and also emphasize the virtues of moderate Islam.  The 
Ministry required all 1,500 mosques that deliver sermons to 
record them each Friday to ensure that imams adhere to 
prescribed guidelines and to prevent extremist preaching. 
All Sunni imams are employees of either the individual 
emirate or of the Ministry of Justice, Islamic Affairs, and 
Endowment.  The Ministry of Education continued to implement 
reforms to limit extremist influence in the schools and to 
modernize the curriculum.  Teachers deemed extremists were 
quietly dismissed or given non-teaching positions. 
 
4. (U) In December, the Supreme Council, the top policy 
making body in the country, decided to place all security 
agencies under a newly established National Security Council. 
 The council's decision follows the UAE Government's adoption 
in August 2004 of an antiterrorism law defining terrorist 
crimes and punishments, and specifically criminalizing the 
funding of terrorist organizations.  The UAE also undertook 
several security measures along its land border and at sea to 
deter terrorists from reaching UAE soil. 
 
5. (U) In March, the Container Security Initiative (CSI), 
became operational at Port Rashid and Jebel Ali in the 
Emirate of Dubai.  CSI has five officers co-located with the 
Dubai Customs Intelligence Unit at Port Rashid.  CSI is aimed 
at screening shipping containers that pass through Dubai 
ports that are destined for the United States that pose a 
security threat.  On average, CSI reviews approximately 250 
bills of lading each week, resulting in 15-20 non-intrusive 
inspections of U.S.-bound containers.  These examinations are 
conducted jointly with Dubai Customs officers.  In addition, 
Dubai Customs has requested that each and every container 
that originates in Iran be designated for inspection by the 
CSI team.  Cooperation with Dubai Customs in this area has 
been outstanding and the Dubai CSI operation is a model 
representative of the program.  On the consular/immigration 
side, the Department of Homeland Security recently 
established a Visa Security Unit in the UAE with plans for 
some outreach with UAE officials. 
 
6. (U) In suppressing terrorist financing, the UAE Central 
Bank continued to enforce anti-money laundering regulations 
aggressively.  Tightened oversight and reporting requirements 
for domestic financial markets resulted in a stronger legal 
and regulatory framework to deter abuse of the UAE financial 
system.  The Central Bank provided training programs to 
financial institutions on money laundering and terrorist 
financing.  In April, the Central Bank hosted the third 
international hawala (informal money remittance and exchange 
businesses) conference.  The Central Bank investigated 
financial transactions and froze accounts in response to UN 
resolutions and internal investigations, as well as 
registering approximately 160 hawala dealers to date.  The US 
Government has provided the UAE with anti-terrorism and 
anti-money laundering training, as well as technical 
assistance for bankers, prosecutors, judges, and police. 
 
7. (U) On June 6, the UAE Cabinet of Ministers approved 
accession to two U.N. conventions on terrorism, the 1999 
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism 
and the 1997 Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist 
Bombings.  The federal Supreme Ruling Council is expected to 
formally ratify the conventions.  The UAE is currently a 
party to eight of the 12 international conventions and 
protocols relating to terrorism and is considering acceding 
to the final two: the 1988 Convention on the Safety of 
Maritime Navigation and the 1988 Protocol on the Safety of 
Fixed Platforms. 
 
8. (SBU) The U.S. and UAE began negotiating terms of a Mutual 
Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT), but progress was stalled 
because of UAE insistence to conduct negotiations on an 
extradition treaty simultaneously.  The UAE Constitution 
prevents the extradition of UAE nationals, and U.S. policy is 
to not sign extradition treaties with countries that do not 
extradite their own citizens.  While the UAE has cooperated 
with the U.S. in rendering fugitives in the past, that policy 
has now changed and U.S. extradition requests were completely 
unsuccessful in 2005. 
 
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Sanctuary (Safe Haven) Assessment 
--------------------------------- 
 
9. (U) The UAE extended no support for international 
terrorism, terrorists, or terror groups, nor made any public 
statements in support of a terrorist-supporting country on a 
terrorism issue in 2005.  There are no areas in the UAE where 
terrorists are relatively free to operate. 
 
10. (U) As we reported in the 2004 Country Reports on 
Terrorism, UAE law enforcement agencies have the authority to 
intercept wire, oral and electronic communications, subject 
to limitations imposed by prosecution guidelines in the 
courts.  Law enforcement authorities can initiate 
surveillance and investigation of suspected 
terrorists/terrorist facilitators based on intelligence 
information, and that information can be used as evidence in 
court.  In antiterrorism cases, the State Security Department 
has investigative authority and prosecutors have 
prosecutorial authority.  There is no special examining 
magistrate with special powers in the antiterrorism area. 
Intelligence is permitted as evidence in a court.  In the 
event there are legal restrictions in this area, the best 
work-around is deportation if the suspect is non-Emirati. 
According to the 2004 anti-terrorism law, suspected 
terrorists/terrorist facilitators can be held for two weeks, 
with a two-week extension.  Then, extensions of one month can 
be added incrementally, which is tantamount to being held 
indefinitely.  This is true when a case is pending and during 
trial.  Law enforcement agencies have access to telephones 
and to a lesser extent email, and if the technical capability 
is there, access to the suspected terrorist is recorded. 
There are no weekend passes for suspected terrorists to leave 
jail, and foreign government service de-briefings are not 
allowed.  The detaining authority collects photographs and 
fingerprints, but not DNA samples. 
 
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Terrorist Groups 
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11. (U) There are no known indigenous Emirati terrorist 
organizations. 
 
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Foreign Government Cooperation 
------------------------------ 
 
12. (U) The UAE continued to show firm resolve in cooperating 
with the U.S. government to identify, control, and restrict 
funding to, terrorists or terrorist organizations.  The UAE 
Government has requested and received training from the U.S. 
In January, May and September, DS/ATA hosted UAE law 
enforcement officers for various training programs in 
counterterrorism and diplomatic security.  In September, 
representatives from the U.S. Federal Protective Service 
provided physical security assessments of public facilities 
in order to identify further training needs.  In December, 
four UAE police officers participated in DS/ATA training in 
New York and Washington, D.C., on the antiterrorism response 
to terror incidents in high-rise buildings. 
 
13. (U) U.S.-UAE export control cooperation efforts have also 
been strong.  The UAE recognizes the need to stop the 
proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and related 
materials.  The U.S. Government has been training UAE 
officials on export controls/nonproliferation with the goal 
of attaining unilateral UAE adherence to MTCR and other 
nonproliferation regimes.  In Dubai, State Department and 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) officials conducted a 
training seminar for Abu Dhabi, Dubai, and northern Emirates 
customs officials and police. 
QUINN