US embassy cable - 05AMMAN9553

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 009553 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/05/2015 
TAGS: PREL, KDEM, IZ, JO 
SUBJECT: IRAQ SUNNI OUTREACH: AMMAN MEETING WITH MUTLAK 
LIST CANDIDATE ALI AL-SAJRI 
 
Classified By: DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION DANIEL RUBINSTEIN, REASONS: 1.4 
(B &D) 
 
1.  (C) "Sons of United Iraq Movement" Secretary General Ali 
Sajri told emboff December 1 he is confident that he and 
others from his party list in Salal ad-Din will be elected in 
this week's election in Iraq.  Sajri, who heads Saleh 
Mutlak,s National Assembly candidate list in the Salah 
ad-Din Governorate, noted that while he is currently running 
with Mutlak, he later plans to join up with Adnan Dulaimi 
after the election, and ultimately join a coalition with Iyad 
Allawi.  Sajri said that he will press Mutlak to do the same, 
but will join with Allawi "whatever Saleh does."  Al-Sajri 
asked that we press Iraq,s nationalist/democratic political 
leadership, especially Sunnis, to stop attacking each other 
and recognize the need for cooperation and unity.  Sajri 
claimed that even if an Allawi-led coalition takes control, 
he himself would demand no position in the next government. 
 
Calls for "Two-Track" Approach to Sunni Outreach 
------------------------------------------ 
 
2.  (C) Sajri praised the outcome of the recent Arab League 
reconciliation conference in Cairo.  He argued that we and 
others supporting a democratic Iraq should continue outreach 
efforts to Harith al-Dhari and his associates, but stressed 
that the Sunni nationalist bloc is highly fragmented; several 
Sunni insurgent groups are not under the control of any of 
the current group of Sunni leaders.  Sajri urged that we 
pursue a two-track approach to Sunni outreach, continuing to 
work with al-Dhari and his ilk, while separately expanding 
political contacts and talks with more local figures within 
the individual governorates.   "The key is reaching the 
people," he added. 
 
Need for Political Attention to "Pro-Iraq" Southerners 
----------------------------------- 
 
3.  (C) Sajri pled that greater attention be paid by Allawi, 
Sunni nationalists, and the USG to "pro-Iraq" forces in the 
south.  He cited Nasiriyyah as one area where he believed a 
large number of Sh,ia could be won over to vote for Allawi 
or similar candidates.  He related a meeting he recently 
attended with several Nasiriyyah Sh,ia tribal figures whom 
he claimed openly complained about the "Iranian occupation," 
and quoted one tribal Sheikh as bemoaning that "an Eastern 
wind is carrying us, whether we agree or not." 
 
Skeptical of Masha,an al-Jabouri 
---------------------------- 
 
4.  (C) Sajri was skeptical of his fellow Salah ad-Din native 
Masha,an al-Jabouri, and especially the latter's claim to 
control a 21,000-man local militia, under Iraqi MOD aegis. 
Sajri claimed that Jabouri,s payroll is packed with 
non-members, and that many of its cadres complain that their 
salaries are not being paid.  Sajri also alleged that 
Jabouri,s militia is heavily engaged in black market 
activities.  Note: al-Jabouri openly boasted to Emboff in 
Amman last August that he has put many ghost soldiers, 
including young children of Imams, on his 
infrastructure-protection militia payroll, as part of a 
larger political co-optation strategy.  End Note. 
 
Bio Background 
--------------------- 
 
5.  (C) Sajri, a Sunni arab, was born near Beiji in 1969; his 
father, a sheikh of the Albu Sagar and part of the Janabi 
clan, was executed by Saddam,s regime in 1982.  Sajri 
subsequently fled to Jordan, where he is a successful 
businessman and cigarette manufacturer.  Although opposed to 
Saddam, Sajri apparently was not involved with the political 
opposition before the war.  Al-Sajri expressed appreciation 
for U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Khalilzad,s activities, 
observing that he "is working in the right way."  Al-Sajri 
left Amman on December 2 for a week of politicking in Iraq, 
but expressed willingness to meet again after his return. 
For political and security reasons he expressed reservations 
about meeting with USG representatives in Iraq, but promised 
to revisit this issue "after the election." 
 
6.  (C) Sajri claims to be personally pro-Western, but 
according to Emboff Iraqi contact Husam Ghazali (strictly 
protect), Sajri's brother joined the insurgency and was 
killed in 2004  Note: Ghazalee, a long time friend of Sajri, 
added that Sajri was not close to this brother and considered 
him a "fool" for joining the insurgency.  End Note.  Sajri,s 
tribal ties, recent local business activities, and family 
links to the insurgency have made him well known in the 
Tikrit and Beiji areas, according to Ghazali. 
 
7.  (C) Embassy Baghdad Comment: It is important to note that 
expats like Sajri have an uncertain political weight in Iraq, 
and have generally not faired very well in elections.  End 
Embassy Baghdad Comment. 
 
8.  (U) This cable was cleared by Embassy Baghdad. 
HALE