US embassy cable - 05BAGHDAD4935

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 004935 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/11/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PTER, PINS, KDEM, IZ, Security 
SUBJECT: RAMADI SECURITY COMMITTEE DEBATES A DIVISION FOR 
ANBAR 
 
REF: A) BAGHDAD 4788 B) BAGHDAD 4830 
 
Classified By: Robert S. Ford, Political Counselor for reasons 1.4 (b), 
 (d). 
 
1. (C) Summary and Comment.  In a lively and emotional debate 
in Ramadi, ex-military officials -- backed by sheikhs and 
technocrats -- argued forcefully for the creation of an 
entirely new Iraqi Army Division for Anbar.  Rejecting 
suggestions to enlist and thereby change the character of the 
Minister of Defense's 'Anbar Division' (the 7th), committee 
members fell back on sectarian-based suspicion and distrust 
of those from outside the province.  Nonetheless, the 
engagement is progressing well, as both sides clarified their 
positions and scheduled multiple and frequent follow-up 
meetings, to include the U.S. Ambassador and Minister of 
Defense.  End Summary. 
 
2. (C) Ramadi engagement continues apace after the November 
28 watershed conference (Ref A).  The group designated to 
continue negotiations with the CF at the well-attended event 
met CF and PolOff on December 1 (Ref B), and a smaller group 
met to discuss 'military' issues on December 6.  Key members 
of the group failed to appear at the last two meetings, but 
Imams Dhaher (Anbar Sunni Endowment) and Thamir (Anbar Muslim 
Ulema Council) both reappeared at the December 5 Provincial 
Reconstruction and Development Committee meeting, signaling 
their continued engagement. 
 
Ex-Military Officers Dominate "Ramadi Military Committee" 
------------------------------------- 
 
3. (C) Former General Sa'ab Menfi al-Rawi focused the debate 
on the question of an army division 'for Anbar.'  He argued 
passionately that Anbar seeks only equitable treatment with 
their brothers from the other (and smaller provinces), whom 
Sa'ab believes were able to form their own divisions.  PolOff 
countered that Minister of Defense Sadoun Dulaime had on 
multiple occasions confirmed that the 7th Division was the 
'division for Anbar.'  Sa'ab, who carries a packet of papers 
governing the formation of an Anbari-selected unit claims he 
negotiated with former Minister of Defense Hazam Sha'lan, 
rejected the 7th Division as 'corrupted' by the Shia central 
government.  The ex-general lamented, "How can the 6,500 
Anbari former military officers sit home while officers are 
imported from other parts of the country?"  This is a 
situation they will never accept, he warned. 
 
"Create a New Division, Then We'll Join" 
------------------------------------- 
 
4. (C) The debate, while impassioned, became circular. 
Ramadi CF and ISF military commanders and PolOff argued that 
Anbar can best chart and color Iraqi Security Forces by 
enlisting en masse.  1st Division, 1st Brigade IA Commander 
Colonel Abdul Haider declared his unit required over 750 
replacements immediately.  Sa'ab, at times supported by 
former artillery general Abd Ali, steadfastly refused to 
endorse any person from Anbar enlisting until a new division 
was created for the province.  PolOff confirmed that all 
present were united in the goal of reducing CF presence in 
Anbar's cities and that the method forward was to create a 
strong and capable Iraqi Army in parallel with a Anbar Police 
Force.  All agreed; the outstanding issue in dispute is 
definition of the mechanism to stand up Iraqi Army elements 
in Anbar.  Sa'ab continued to insist that Baghdad officials 
had nearly completed staffing the 7th Division, and claimed 
that the officers they had selected (from outside the 
province) could neither understand the environment in which 
they would serve, nor 'would their hearts ache' should they 
commit errors in their duties. 
 
Wearing Down with Facts 
----------------------- 
 
5. (C) PolOff stressed there was little likelihood the 
Ministry of Defense would consider creating yet another 
division, when some question whether Iraq required the 10 
divisions it already has on the books.  Sa'ab claimed that 
the people of Anbar (not just himself) who sought 'ownership' 
of a division were simply demanding the same rights as 
others. He was alluding to Basra's formation of its own unit. 
 A local professor, Dr. Abood al Jumaily, seconded the 
general's proposal, outlining initial steps to create the 
division, and then expedite the training of the soldiers and 
officers, many of whom would need minimal schooling given 
their professional military backgrounds.  CF Advisor for 
Anbar un-named officer and the ISF confirmed that the 
Ministry had assigned nearly 70 percent of the enlisted 
personnel for the 7th Division, but reported that the 
majority of the officer corps billets are as yet unfilled. 
Abd Ali insisted that not one officer in the 7th Division 
(which has not yet raised its colors), from platoon leader to 
company commander, is from Anbar.  Sa'ab commented bitterly, 
"I'm not going to send my two sons to these people."  "These 
people", he added, "are not here for the good of Anbar." 
Sheikh Anwar acknowledged that the local youth are not 
joining the ISF and changing this pattern would help the 
province. 
 
6. (C) Comment.  On the surface, it may appear illogical to 
create an entirely new division to placate radicals' hurt 
feelings that their plan for the roll-out of the 7th Division 
was ignored by Baghdad.  It is especially the case with the 
former regime elements such as the generals, who abruptly 
lost their status and leadership roles, that much of their 
dialogue is firmly rooted in emotional rather than logical 
arguments.  Nonetheless, in a post-meeting sidebar, 1st 
Division's Colonel Abdul Haidar voiced support for the views 
of the Ramadi generals.  In short, Haidar suggested allowing 
the locals to design and recruit their own (new) division, 
then later merge it with the remnants of the 7th.  This 
symbolic gesture, he opined, would go far to dampening the 
Ramadi insurgency.  One of the benefits of such frank and 
open dialogue is that we are now in a position to focus 
negotiations on finer, crucial points in the committee's 
upcoming meetings with Minister of Defense Dulaime on 
December 12 in Ramadi.  End Comment. 
 
7. (C) Ramadi Military Committee Participants: 
 
Ex-Military Officers: 
BGen Mohammed Al Rawi (Sa,ab) (Ret.) 
BGen Abd Ali (Ret) 
 
Tribal Leaders: 
Sheikh Anwar Kharbit 
Sheikh Adil Abd Al Razaq Kharbit 
Sheikh Khalid 
 
Technocrats/Local Officials 
Dr. Aboud   al Jumaily, lecturer at the Agricultural College 
Mr. Sa,aeed, local businessman 
Eng. Hamid, Ramadi City Council member 
 
Iraqi Security Forces: 
---------------------- 
1st Iraqi Army (7th Brigade) Colonel Haider 
 
Provincial Government: 
---------------------- 
Governor Ma'moon Sami Rasheed (al Alwani) 
Provincial Council Chairman Khudair Abdel Jabar 
 
Coalition Forces: 
----------------- 
Assistant Division Commander General Williams 
2BCT Commander Colonel Gronski 
Colonel Raymond Coia, Anbar ISF Coordinator 
6th Civil Affairs Group Governate Support Team Col Burdine 
3-7 Brigade Commander LtCol Turner 
PP3 (Police Advisor) Major Rice 
2MarDiv FAO Capt Aziz 
SET Officer Lane D. Bahl 
 
 
KHALILZAD