US embassy cable - 02COLOMBO2312

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 002312 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS, LONDON FOR POL/RIEDEL; NSC FOR 
E. MILLARD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/16/2012 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PTER, PINR, PARM, CE, LTTE - Peace Process, External Relations 
SUBJECT: GSL MINISTOR MORAGODA SAYS INDIANS MAD AT JAPANESE 
AND WORRIED ABOUT US ROLE IN NEPAL 
 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR E. ASHLEY WILLS.  REASONS:  1.5 B, D. 
 
1.  (C)  SUMMARY:  GSL Minister Milinda Moragoda told me over 
the weekend that the Indians are "really mad" over the 
attempts by the Japanese to involve themselves in Sri Lanka's 
negotiation to end the war.  Moragoda said Indian Foreign 
Secretary Sibal, who visited Colombo last week, was 
 
SIPDIS 
"comfortable" with U.S. interest and activities in Sri Lanka 
but "very worried" about American military support to the 
Government of Nepal.  Moragoda also indicated that Indian 
Secretary to the PM Brajesh Mishra had deliberately slowed 
 
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down the GOI's move toward signing an ACSA with the U.S.G. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (C)  Moragoda called me over the weekend and asked for a 
quick meeting before his trip this week to New Delhi and 
Tokyo.  We met at Jefferson House Sunday, December 15. 
 
Resentment of the Japanese 
 
3.  (C)  Moragoda reported that in his visits to New Delhi 
before and after the last round of talks in Oslo early in 
December, and again when Indian Foreign Secretary Sibal 
visited Colombo last week, he had heard "an earful" about the 
GOI's unhappiness with Japanese attempts to involve 
themselves in Sri Lanka's negotiation to end the war.  In his 
meetings with Brajesh Mishra in the PMO, Foreign Minister 
Sinha and Foreign Secretary Sibal, Moragoda found the Indians 
"really mad" at alleged Japanese presumption.  Moragoda 
indicated that the Indians expressed general displeasure at 
Japan's "insinuating" itself into a process being handled 
"competently" by the Norwegians. 
 
4.  (C)  As more specific examples of the Indian attitude, 
Moragoda told me the GOJ had apparently proposed assigning 
Japanese monitors to the Scandanavian-staffed Sri Lanka 
Monitoring Mission.  When the Indians were consulted, they 
nixed the proposal.  Similarly, according to Moragoda, the 
Japanese Foreign Minister had proposed stopping in Bangkok in 
early January on her way to an official visit to Colombo. 
She first proposed a side meeting with the GSL and LTTE 
delegations in Bangkok, then backed off a bit and suggested a 
cocktail.  The GOI, which the GSL informed of the proposals, 
again objected, apparently in strong terms.  And Foreign 
Secretary Sibal apparently expressed unhappiness over the 
 
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decision to allow the Japanese to host a round of the peace 
talks early next year.  In the latter case, apparently, the 
Indians were not consulted until after the decision was made 
and announced publicly. 
 
5.  (C)  I probed Moragoda a bit about why the Indians were 
reacting so viscerally.  He said he'd heard that the GOI was 
"deeply annoyed" by Japanese opposition to an Indian motion 
within the IAEA to draw attention to Pakistan's illicit 
nuclear cooperation with North Korea.  But there were other, 
less proximate reasons as well.  Mishra called the Japanese 
"artless" and alleged that the GOJ was "heedless of vital 
Indian security interests."  Foreign Minister Sinha, 
meanwhile, asked rhetorically "who is Japan to get involved 
in our region?"  The general view, according to Moragoda, was 
that the Indians felt the Japanese were "overstepping". 
 
More Tolerance for Us 
 
6.  (C)  By contrast, Moragoda found the Indians more 
"comfortable" with the US role in Sri Lanka.  "We have a 
dialogue with the Americans," Moragoda quoted Sibal, "and 
although we may not agree on everything, we at least 
consult."  Moragoda claimed Mishra, Sinha and Sibal all felt 
at ease with U.S. actions in Sri Lanka but also expressed the 
need to be kept fully informed, by the GSL and the U.S.G., 
concerning our actions here. 
 
7.  (C)  There was less ease in New Delhi about our policy in 
Nepal, according to Moragoda.  He said Sibal had been quite 
explicit on this point.  "The Americans tend toward military 
solutions," he quoted Sibal.  In Nepal's case, Sibal thought 
this a big mistake.  Moragoda said he decried our decision to 
sell sophisticated weapons to an "unsophisticated" Nepalese 
military.  These weapons, the Indians feared, would end up 
sooner or later, probably sooner, being captured by the 
Maoists, who would in turn use them themselves or, even 
worse, sell them to any of several separatist groups 
operating in India. 
 
8.  (C)  Although New Delhi was generally positive about the 
U.S., Moragoda reported, he cited one exception:  our attempt 
to sign an ACSA with the GOI.  This had come to Mishra's 
attention, Moragoda told me, and he had deliberately ordered 
the Indian bureaucracy to slow down its move toward signing 
an ACSA with the U.S.  Moragoda did not know if the Indians 
would eventually sign. 
COMMENT 
 
9.  (C)  It did not surprise me that the Indians resent the 
moves by the Japanese to involve themselves in Sri Lanka. 
The Indians may have to reconcile themselves to our role 
because we are the alpha dog, but the Japanese will find 
themselves barked at and bitten by the Indians until they 
show respect for Delhi's status.  It would probably help 
matters if the Japanese Foreign Minister or at least Special 
Envoy Akashi were to visit New Delhi soon. 
WILLS