US embassy cable - 05PARIS8373

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 008373 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/09/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, ASEC, EAID, TO, GH, IV, FR, UNSC 
SUBJECT: A CONVERSATION WITH CHIRAC'S AFRICA ADVISER 
 
REF: BEIJING 19704 
 
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Josiah B. Rosenblatt.  Reas 
ons 1.4b,d 
 
1.  (C) Summary:  Michel de Bonnecorse, head of the "Africa 
Cell" at the Elysee Palace that advises the French President, 
described the 12/2-12/4 Africa-France Summit in Bamako as a 
strategic, historic project, encouraged a high-level USG 
presence for the January meeting of the International Working 
Group on Cote d'Ivoire, reported that a Central African 
nation, possibly Congo-Brazzaville, may take over the AU 
presidency in 2006, and urged the USG to offer some minimal 
assistance to CAR.  In a follow-up phone call, Bonnecorse's 
deputy conveyed the French understanding that the AU had 
overturned a decision taken at the Africa-France Summit to 
force a vote in New York on the AU proposal for Security 
Council reform.  End Summary. 
 
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Africa-France Summit 
-------------------- 
 
2.  (C) In a 6 December courtesy call by Africa Watcher, 
Michel de Bonnecorse, head of the "Africa Cell" at the Elysee 
Palace that advises French President Chirac, downplayed the 
lack of direct deliverables from the Africa-France Summit. He 
termed the summit "a work in continuity," without surprises, 
consonant with the overall long-term French strategy of 
empowering Africans so that France could assume a less 
prominent tutelary role.  Bonnecorse was dismissive of French 
media criticism regarding Chirac's congratulatory message to 
Gabon President Bongo during the summit on his "brilliant" 
reelection, remarking that the Chirac was just being polite. 
 
3.  (C) Like UK PM Blair, Chirac sought to draw attention to 
the need for development for Africa, hence the Bamako appeal 
for the Russian G-8 presidency to retain an African focus at 
the 2006 St. Petersburg summit, Bonnecorse commented.  There 
was a risk for Africa of severe marginalization and of 
joining economic "globalization only through the back door," 
e.g. through illicit international trafficking like 
prostitution and arms deals.  Bonnecorse observed that France 
and the U.S. do not share common views on how to augment 
development aid.  Free-market ("liberal") economies tended to 
diminish their foreign assistance over time, he argued, hence 
the need for creative financing initiatives.  When Africa 
Watcher commented on the unfavorable reception by the USG and 
others to Chirac's proposed one-to-forty euro development tax 
on international airline tickets, Bonnecorse remarked 
defensively that governmental participation would be 
voluntary.  He suggested, however, that a tobacco tax might 
fare better. 
 
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Cote d'Ivoire:  How We Can Help 
------------------------------- 
 
4.  (C) Bonnecorse hoped the USG would continue to be helpful 
in addressing the Cote d'Ivoire crisis.  In particular, he 
hoped that i) the USG should dispatch a high level 
representative to the next meeting of the International 
Working Group in Abidjan, which he thought would take place 
10 January 2006; ii) that the USG and France would agree on a 
sanctions list; iii) that the USG would support short-term 
troop transfers, if needed, from UNMIL to UNOCI. 
 
5.  (C) The naming of a PM opened a new phase for Cote 
d'Ivoire that, Bonnecorse hoped, would culminate in elections 
within ten months.  If Gbagbo emerged the victor in free and 
fair elections, then France, like others, would work with 
him; however, his departure from power would be preferable. 
A Soro presidency was also not desirable.  In the immediate 
term, it was imperative to bolster newly named PM Konan Banny 
and augment his authority.  On paper the presidency in Cote 
d'Ivoire takes precedence and "governs all," Bonnecorse 
regretted.  He suggested it may ultimately be necessary to 
rewrite the national constitution, possibly through the 
direct influence of the UNSC. 
 
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African Union Presidency:  Congo-Brazzaville in the Wings? 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
6.  (C) Asked for his take on who would succeed Nigeria as AU 
President, Bonnecorse replied he understood there was 
"absolutely" no chance that Sudan would take over at the 2006 
Khartoum AU Summit.  Indeed, he claimed there was a tacit 
understanding that the presidency should now devolve to a 
Francophone state after the prolonged Nigerian tenure. 
Bonnecorse expected a Central African nation, a CEMAC member, 
would soon emerge, possibly Congo-Brazzaville, to take the 
helm of the AU for a one-year term.  In 2007 he predicted the 
AU would honor Ghana with the AU presidency to mark the final 
year of President Kufuor's mandate and the 60th anniversary 
of Ghana's independence. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
AU and UNSC Reform:  North Africans Stall Action 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
7.  (C) Bonnecorse admitted he was unaware of any AU decision 
taken at Bamako to push for a vote on its UNGA resolution on 
SC reform (reftel).  Subsequently, his office called twice 
with supplementary information confirming the report. 
Jacques de Labriolle, Bonnecorse's deputy at the Elysee and a 
former Fellow-of-Hope in Washington, first indicated on 7 
December that, yes, the AU working committee on SC reform had 
indeed decided, 6 against 5, on a vote in New York.  But on 8 
December Labriolle called back to report that the AU 
committee decision had since been overruled at ministerial 
level.  Algeria and Egypt, leading the opposition, had 
insisted that there be either consensus or at least a 
two-thirds majority before any decision.  Labriolle did not 
know if this would entail a later vote in the committee or by 
the AU in its entirety. 
 
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Somalia:  Deep Pessimism 
------------------------ 
 
8.  (C) While officially France heralded Somalia's attendance 
at the Africa-France Summit as a watershed, a return to the 
fold after more than a decade's absence, Bonnecorse admitted 
he found Transitional Federal Government PM Ghedi 
unimpressive and unable to answer the simplest questions. 
Bonnecorse, who was the French representative to Operation 
Restore Hope from 1992-1993 as well as ambassador to Kenya 
from 1990-1993, said he was deeply pessimistic about 
Somalia's future.  The most that could be hoped for, he 
thought, was the unification of Mogadishu.  Somaliland was a 
brighter story, he volunteered, but it would never link up to 
a greater Somalia. 
 
-------------------------------- 
Togo:  Elections in June or July 
-------------------------------- 
 
9.  (C) Bonnecorse anticipated parliamentary elections would 
go forward in Togo in June or July 2006.  With Togolese 
opposition already certain that elections would be rigged, 
maximum transparency was necessary.  Such parliamentary 
elections were a first step, not a panacea, and would only 
realign power "a l'africaine," by which he explained that 
parliament would have a voice, but Faure would still hold 95% 
of the cards. 
 
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Central African Republic:  Engagement Needed 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
10.  (C)  Bonnecorse made a plea for USG assistance to the 
CAR.  Even a little would go a long way, he urged.  CAR was 
desperately poor, though it does have potential mineral 
wealth; indeed, the diamond trade was spawning an illicit 
arms traffic.  France was addressing the same plea to the 
Japanese.  Without greater international engagement, CAR 
risked becoming a playing field of the Chinese, whose only 
real rival would be Libya, Bonnecorse claimed. 
 
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Comment:  A Kinder, Gentler Africa Cell? 
---------------------------------------- 
 
11.  (C) Comment:  The Elysee Africa Cell has a historic 
notoriety.  Bonnecorse would appear a modest and subdued 
successor to predecessors like Jacques Foccart and 
Jean-Christophe Mitterand, the architects of a "Francafrique" 
linked to the genius of Total and the genocidaires of Rwanda. 
 Ambassador to Morocco from 1995-2001 -- a job described at 
the Quai as the consummate "position of trust" -- Bonnecorse 
has been Chirac's personal Africa adviser since 2002.  While 
the Quai d'Orsay handles day-to-day business, the Africa 
Cell, however discreetly, still appears to keep the whiphand 
on situations, such as Cote d'Ivoire, of direct relevance to 
French prestige or Chirac's image and network of contacts. 
End Comment. 
 
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm 
 
Stapleton