US embassy cable - 05BAGHDAD4918

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 004918 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/09/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, KDEM, IZ, Elections 
SUBJECT: ANBAR ELECTIONS PLANNING PROCEEDS SLOWLY BUT SURELY 
 
Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROBERT S. FORD, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) 
AND (D) 
 
1. (C)  The IECI, MNF-I, and MoD met December 4 at IECI 
Baghdad headquarters to define the operational plan for 
holding elections in Anbar province; details continue to be 
worked.  The MoD rejected an IECI plan to use tribes to 
provide security in western Anbar.  A Special Police Commando 
Brigade has been introduced into Ramadi to provide Iraqi 
security support to polling centers in the city. (MNF-I 
Comment:  The Special Police Commando Brigade has been 
introduced mainly to support counterinsurgency operations. 
The earliest they could get there was coincident with the 
election.  They will help with election, but the election was 
not the reason for the brigade's deployment.  End Comment.) 
The non-secure environment has challenged efforts to 
implement a more ambitious plan designed to encourage and 
facilitate greater Sunni voter turnout.  In comparison to the 
operations plan for the October referendum, the likely 
outcome for December 15 in Anbar will be a limited increase 
in polling sites (and some shifts in location to respond to 
local preferences), and a modest increase in the number of 
local polling employees.  The IECI will also implement an 
informal policy to permit Anbar residents to vote at any 
polling center rather than insist voters must cast their 
ballots at sites where their names are registered.  This 
policy, which was also applied during the referendum, is 
designed to respond to Sunni concerns and ensure that those 
persons displaced by fighting, or fearful of visiting certain 
locations, have an opportunity to vote. 
 
2. (C)  General Hikmat of the IAF also joined the December 4 
meeting.  The IECI's Chief Operations Officer, Dr. Ali 
Abdul-Jabbar, who has been consulting with Anbaris on 
security arrangements, told General Hikmat that the principal 
problem is the mistrust by Anbar residents of ISF.  Yet on 
December 3 the Minister of Defense met with the IECI and 
rejected the commission's proposal for tribes to provide 
security for polling sites west of Ramadi, an arrangement 
similar to the model used successfully in Falluja during the 
referendum.  Defense Minister al-Dulaimi reportedly insisted 
that the Iraqi Army be responsible for security.  Unable to 
get permissions for tribal security, the IECI sought MNF-I 
support to expand the number of sites in the West.  MNF-I is 
currently reviewing the feasibility of adding more locations 
in the West, but MNF-I resources alone are insufficient to 
meet the IECI goal.  Because MNF-I must transport poll 
workers out West, the IECI will use staff from Baghdad in 
this area, rather than from Anbar (hiring, training, and 
vetting staff from Anbar was deemed not feasible).  (MNF-I 
Comment: We will be supporting about 8 new sites in addition 
to the 31 previously agreed to.  The blame should not be 
placed on MoD but on  poor IECI planning for Al Anbar. 
Presence of the ISF in the referendum was not why the people 
did not vote.  They didn't vote because the Imans told them 
not to and because of intimidation.  End Comment.) 
 
3. (C)  With regard to the city of Ramadi, the IECI proposed 
a larger number of sites than those locations already 
committed to by MNF-I that the military is currently 
reviewing.  This proposal, which would require Quick Response 
Force (QRF) support and the transport of election materials 
to the additional sites, would increase MNF-I exposure. The 
MoI has also sent the Wolf Brigade to Ramadi to fill in gaps 
in local police and supplement Iraqi security on December 15. 
 In a step designed to alleviate tension between Anbaris and 
the ISF, the IECI has arranged for unarmed tribal leaders be 
present at polling sites in Fallujah and Ramadi.  The IECI is 
also working with local leaders to arrange for local staff to 
manage the polls in the two cities.  (MNF-I Comment:  The 
Wolf Brigade is also in Al-Anbar  for other reasons and 
arrived in time to support the election.  MNF-I has always 
planned to transport materials and workers -- and is awaiting 
the IECI's word on where this should be done.  End Comment.) 
 
 
4. (C)  Comment:  IECI International Commissioner Craig 
Jenness has advised all sides that some increase in security 
risk is tolerable if the effort results in facilitating Sunni 
participation.  However, the difficulties of operating in 
Anbar (e.g., no cell phones and limited vehicular movement), 
the organizational immaturity of the IECI, the late 
introduction of MoD views, and the forced reliance on MoI 
imports have undercut efforts to implement a bold plan.  It 
is unfortunate that the MoD could not accept the result of 
the IECI's lengthy effort to negotiate with Anbari tribes a 
satisfactory security arrangement for western Anbar.  But the 
tardy submission of the IECI plan to the MoD left little room 
for maneuver.  If the Commission had approached the Ministry 
in October, better planning might have been possible.  At 
this point, it is hard to predict voter turn-out in Ramadi 
and western Anbar.  The good news is the strong interest in 
participation, but ongoing security problems and 
corresponding responses necessitate realistic expectations 
for December 15.  Jenness told poloff he greatly appreciated 
the flexibility, commitment, and patience of the Marines in 
supporting the electoral process in Anbar.   End Comment. 
KHALILZAD