US embassy cable - 02ANKARA8976

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TURKEY POST-COPENHAGEN

Identifier: 02ANKARA8976
Wikileaks: View 02ANKARA8976 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Ankara
Created: 2002-12-13 17:26:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PGOV PREL ECON TU
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 008976 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
CENTCOM AND EUCOM: PLEASE PASS TO POLADS AND J-5 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/04/2012 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, ECON, TU 
SUBJECT: TURKEY POST-COPENHAGEN 
 
REF: ANKARA 8881 
 
 
Classified by CDA Robert S. Deutsch.  Reason: 1.5:(b)(d) 
 
 
1. (C) Summary:  Turkey is reacting with disappointment and 
resignation to the EU's decision at the Dec. 12-13 Copenhagen 
summit: 1) to review Turkey's EU accession bid in December 
2004, withholding a definite date to start formal accession 
talks; and 2) to admit Cyprus as a member before a settlement 
has been reached on the island.  At the same time, the Turks 
are beginning to walk back from some of their more dire 
pronouncements of catastrophe in the event things didn't go 
exactly as they hoped.  Indeed, while the outcome of 
Copenhagen is short of Turkey's over-inflated expectations, 
it marks a real improvement in Turkey's prospects for 
eventual membership.  Our task will be to help the GOT avoid 
getting bogged down in a search for scapegoats -- including 
the U.S., despite strong USG support for Turkey's cause.  Our 
public and private statements therefore, should exude 
confidence that the results -- while not everything Turkey 
wanted -- reinforce Turkey's inevitable move toward EU.  End 
summary. 
 
 
---------------------------------------- 
Reaction: More Determination, "No Anger" 
---------------------------------------- 
 
 
2. (U) Speaking at a joint press conference from Copenhagen 
Dec. 13, AK Chairman R. Tayyip Erdogan and P.M. Gul conveyed 
disappointment but determination to continue along the EU 
path. 
 
 
-- Gul adopted a low-key approach.  While offering obliquely 
that "some new conditions were added to the Copenhagen 
Criteria,"  Gul reiterated that Turkey had done everything in 
its power to press for an early date for formal EU accession 
talks.  Noting that Turkey had "many potentialities" in 
foreign policy, he asserted that "the place of the 
(pro-)European perspective will be preserved," and that his 
Government remains firmly on the path to reform.  "Our target 
is definite." 
 
 
-- Erdogan noted that Turkey had been seeking to begin formal 
accession talks with the EU in 2003, but that the EU "delayed 
this a little...We will start accession talks in 2004" on the 
basis of the Copenhagen Criteria; any other condition...is 
out of the question."  He added that "anger is unacceptable 
in politics." 
 
 
-------------- 
The Blame Game 
-------------- 
 
 
3. (C) In the run-up to Copenhagen, the Turks painted 
themselves into a corner by adopting a maximalist demand for 
a 2003 date to begin formal accession talks with the EU -- 
and by raising the specter of a "train wreck" if Cyprus was 
admitted to the EU prior to a "just" settlement.  Senior MFA 
officials began to warn us stridently against presenting 
Turkey with a "fait accompli" on Cyprus, terming the UNSYG's 
plan as unacceptably flawed.  Meanwhile, the AK Party came to 
power, decrying the traditional, "pointlessly hawkish" Cyprus 
stance, and the foot-dragging on EU-related political and 
human rights reform that characterized earlier governments. 
Nevertheless, by early December, after receiving what MFA 
officials described as "education" of quick learners on 
Cyprus and other issues, AK began to take the position that 
Cyprus could be solved only with a "positive" outcome from 
the EU summit -- defined as a clear, early date for the start 
of EU talks.  A certain bullying posture entered some of the 
exchanges between Turkey and EU members. 
 
 
4. (C) Far from helping the Turks achieve their aims, such 
tactics only tarnished the solid improvement in Turkey's EU 
prospects that actually came out of the summit: a date for 
review and a promise of negotiations if Turkey's reforms 
continue and are implemented (unthinkable had the Ecevit 
Government still been in power).  Turkey's tactics have also 
left it in an awkward position regarding and EU deal it said 
24 hours ago was not acceptable, and a Republic of Cyprus in 
the EU in a manner the GOT has been describing for months as 
disastrous. 
 
 
------------- 
Scapegoating? 
------------- 
 
 
5. (C) Press reports in the days before the summit suggested 
Turkey would uphold national honor in the event of 
"humiliation" at Copenhagen by taking "punitive" action 
against select European countries.  Meanwhile, the GOT -- 
politicians and bureaucrats -- pushed hard for strong USG 
support of its interests regarding the EU and Cyprus.  Even 
before the dust settled at Copenhagen, Turks began to cast 
about for scapegoats.  These include the USG.  One columnist, 
known for reflecting the views of senior State officials, 
suggested that USG support for Turkey in the run-up to the 
summit was "counterproductive" and had only antagonized 
Europeans. 
 
 
---------- 
What To Do 
---------- 
 
 
6. (C) We will continue stressing to the Turks, particularly 
the AK Government/Party, that they need to continue 
accentuating the positive aspects of the outcome of 
Copenhagen.  AK at T-2 is spinning the results in a moderate 
fashion (though Bulent Arinc, the President of the Turkish 
Grand National Assembly and a senior AK member, called the 
2004 date "not positive").  We need to support that 
direction.  In the days before the summit, AK officials 
privately asserted to us that their aggressive approach 
regarding an EU date was "only tactics."  The Gul Government 
and Erdogan see EU ties as essential: 1) in their bid to 
change the political status quo and counter resistance from 
an entrenched State Establishment; and 2) to justifying 
reform to that Establishment as both a normative and 
"strategic" imperative for Turkey.  They are already 
signaling a willingness to move ahead. 
 
 
-- AK can take much credit, for pushing Copenhagen Criteria 
reforms hard and right out of the gate (ref A).  Indeed, such 
progress would have been unthinkable had AK not replaced the 
Ecevit Government on Nov. 18. 
 
 
-- Financial markets can accept an outcome along lines of 
that proposed by French and Germans.  Although disappointed, 
investors see it as confirmation that Turkey will be anchored 
to the EU. 
DEUTSCH 

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