US embassy cable - 05BAGHDAD4915

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ANBAR ELECTIONS PLANNING PROCEEDS SLOWLY BUT SURELY

Identifier: 05BAGHDAD4915
Wikileaks: View 05BAGHDAD4915 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Baghdad
Created: 2005-12-09 12:49:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PGOV KDEM IZ Elections
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 004915 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/09/15 
TAGS: PGOV, KDEM, IZ, Elections 
SUBJECT: ANBAR ELECTIONS PLANNING PROCEEDS SLOWLY BUT SURELY 
 
Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROBERT S. FORD, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) 
AND (D). 
 
1. (C)  The IECI, CF, and MOD met December 4 to finalize a 
conceptual framework and to continue to work out the 
operational details for holding elections in Anbar province. 
In comparison to the October referendum, the likely outcome 
will be a limited increase in polling sites (and some shifts 
in location to respond to local preferences), and a modest 
increase in the number of local polling employees, although 
security concerns will prevent implementation of an expansive 
plan.  The IECI will also implement an informal policy of 
permitting Anbar residents to vote at any polling center, 
rather than insist voters must cast their ballots at sites 
where their names are registered.  This policy, which was 
applied during the referendum, is designed to respond to 
Sunni concerns that those persons displaced by fighting or 
fearful of visiting certain locations have an opportunity to 
vote. 
 
2. (C)  Prior to the meeting with CF, the IECI met the 
evening of December 3 with the Minister of Defense, who 
rejected an IECI proposal to ask tribes to provide security 
for polling sites west of Ramadi.  Defense Minister 
al-Dulaimi reportedly insisted that the Iraqi Army be 
responsible for security.  IAF General Hikmat joined the 
December 4 meeting between CF and IECI, offering additional 
IAF if necessary.  This exchange between the MOD and IECI 
slowed down the planning.  The IECI's chief of operations, 
who has been consulting with Anbaris on security 
arrangements, told General Hikmat that the principal problem 
is the mistrust by Anbar residents of ISF.  To alleviate this 
tension, the IECI has proposed that unarmed tribal leaders be 
present at polling sites in Fallujah and Ramadi. 
 
3. (C) Given the MoD's position, the IECI has backed away 
from its plan to allow tribes to provide security west of 
Ramadi, in an arrangement similar to the model used 
successfully in Falluja during the referendum.  The IECI is 
now seeking CF support to expand the number of sites it can 
support in the west.  The military is currently reviewing the 
feasibility of adding more locations in the west, but CF 
resources alone are insufficient to meet the IECI goal.  With 
regard to the city of Ramadi, the IECI also proposed a larger 
number of sites than those locations already committed to by 
CF.   The military is reviewing the feasibility of this IECI 
proposal for Ramadi; this proposal, which would require Quick 
Response Force (QRF) support and the transport of election 
materials to the additional sites, would increase CF exposure. 
 
4. (C)  Comment:  IECI International Commissioner Craig 
Jenness has advised the parties that some increase in 
security risk is tolerable if the result facilitates Sunni 
participation, but the ongoing difficulties of operating in 
Anbar, IECI ineffectiveness, and the late introduction of MOD 
views have undercut efforts to implement a bold plan. 
Jenness told poloff he greatly appreciated the flexibility, 
commitment, and patience of the Marines in supporting the 
electoral process in Anbar.    It is unfortunate that the MOD 
rejected the result of the IECI's lengthy effort to negotiate 
with Anbari tribes a satisfactory security arrangement for 
western Anbar.  But the tardy submission of the IECI plan to 
the MOD left little room for maneuver.  At this point, it is 
hard to predict voter turn-out in Ramadi and western Anbar. 
The good news is the strong interest in participation, but 
ongoing operational limitations necessitate realistic 
expectations for December 15.  End Comment. 
KHALILZAD 

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