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| Identifier: | 05BAGHDAD4915 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 05BAGHDAD4915 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Baghdad |
| Created: | 2005-12-09 12:49:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | PGOV KDEM IZ Elections |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 004915 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/09/15 TAGS: PGOV, KDEM, IZ, Elections SUBJECT: ANBAR ELECTIONS PLANNING PROCEEDS SLOWLY BUT SURELY Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROBERT S. FORD, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). 1. (C) The IECI, CF, and MOD met December 4 to finalize a conceptual framework and to continue to work out the operational details for holding elections in Anbar province. In comparison to the October referendum, the likely outcome will be a limited increase in polling sites (and some shifts in location to respond to local preferences), and a modest increase in the number of local polling employees, although security concerns will prevent implementation of an expansive plan. The IECI will also implement an informal policy of permitting Anbar residents to vote at any polling center, rather than insist voters must cast their ballots at sites where their names are registered. This policy, which was applied during the referendum, is designed to respond to Sunni concerns that those persons displaced by fighting or fearful of visiting certain locations have an opportunity to vote. 2. (C) Prior to the meeting with CF, the IECI met the evening of December 3 with the Minister of Defense, who rejected an IECI proposal to ask tribes to provide security for polling sites west of Ramadi. Defense Minister al-Dulaimi reportedly insisted that the Iraqi Army be responsible for security. IAF General Hikmat joined the December 4 meeting between CF and IECI, offering additional IAF if necessary. This exchange between the MOD and IECI slowed down the planning. The IECI's chief of operations, who has been consulting with Anbaris on security arrangements, told General Hikmat that the principal problem is the mistrust by Anbar residents of ISF. To alleviate this tension, the IECI has proposed that unarmed tribal leaders be present at polling sites in Fallujah and Ramadi. 3. (C) Given the MoD's position, the IECI has backed away from its plan to allow tribes to provide security west of Ramadi, in an arrangement similar to the model used successfully in Falluja during the referendum. The IECI is now seeking CF support to expand the number of sites it can support in the west. The military is currently reviewing the feasibility of adding more locations in the west, but CF resources alone are insufficient to meet the IECI goal. With regard to the city of Ramadi, the IECI also proposed a larger number of sites than those locations already committed to by CF. The military is reviewing the feasibility of this IECI proposal for Ramadi; this proposal, which would require Quick Response Force (QRF) support and the transport of election materials to the additional sites, would increase CF exposure. 4. (C) Comment: IECI International Commissioner Craig Jenness has advised the parties that some increase in security risk is tolerable if the result facilitates Sunni participation, but the ongoing difficulties of operating in Anbar, IECI ineffectiveness, and the late introduction of MOD views have undercut efforts to implement a bold plan. Jenness told poloff he greatly appreciated the flexibility, commitment, and patience of the Marines in supporting the electoral process in Anbar. It is unfortunate that the MOD rejected the result of the IECI's lengthy effort to negotiate with Anbari tribes a satisfactory security arrangement for western Anbar. But the tardy submission of the IECI plan to the MOD left little room for maneuver. At this point, it is hard to predict voter turn-out in Ramadi and western Anbar. The good news is the strong interest in participation, but ongoing operational limitations necessitate realistic expectations for December 15. End Comment. KHALILZAD
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