US embassy cable - 05ADDISABABA4075

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PM MELES AND PARLIAMENTARY OPPOSITION AGREE TO DIALOGUE

Identifier: 05ADDISABABA4075
Wikileaks: View 05ADDISABABA4075 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Addis Ababa
Created: 2005-12-09 10:41:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PGOV PREL PHUM ET ELEC
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 004075 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AF FOR A/S FRAZER FROM VICKI HUDDLESTON 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/09/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PHUM, ET, ELEC 
SUBJECT: PM MELES AND PARLIAMENTARY OPPOSITION AGREE TO 
DIALOGUE 
 
 
Classified By: CDA Vicki Huddleston for reason 1.4 (b,d) 
 
1. (C) Summary: PM Meles told me in a meeting on Dec. 9 that 
he would personally participate in the new round of political 
dialogue with Parliamentary opposition leaders, which would 
begin with three days of talks Dec. 12-14.  While initially 
limited to leaders of the UEDF and OFDM, the PM hoped that 
representatives of MPs elected under the CUD banner could be 
included as soon as the group chose new leadership.  CUD 
leaders currently imprisoned are a matter for the courts to 
handle, he added.  The eight-point agenda agreed during the 
October political dialogue -- which covered several "rule of 
law issues", the Parliament, the media and the National 
Electoral Board (NEB) -- would form the basis of discussion. 
Meles saw issues falling into two categories: 1) 
constitutional obligations, such as an effective Parliament 
or an independent NEB, and 2) discretionary measures that 
might increase political space, such as giving opposition 
leaders chairmanships of Parliamentary committees, or 
consulting them on nominees to the NEB.  The PM also signaled 
political unrest in Oromiya and the role of the OLF in 
Ethiopian politics would constitute an important side agenda 
of the discussions.  Meles said British Amb. Dewar and I 
would be included in the initial session of talks on Dec. 12, 
but that thereafter the international community would merely 
be briefed and invited to weigh in on "issues of principle." 
While potential pitfalls abound, this new round of dialogue 
offers the best way forward for achieving all the goals 
expressed in the U.S.-EU statement of Nov. 6.  End Summary. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
New Dialogue Takes Up Where Last One Left Off -- Minus CUD 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
 
2. (C)  On December 8, UK Ambassador Bob Dewar and I met with 
PM Meles to provide him with a readout of our meeting, 
including the Troika, with opposition parliamentarians.  I 
related to him that Dr. Beyene and Dr. Merera of the United 
Ethiopian Democratic Forces (UEDF) and Bulcha Demeksa of the 
Oromo Federal Democratic Movement (OFDM) were serious and 
constructive in their response to his offer to initiate 
discussions based on the eight-point agenda previously agreed 
during the last phase of dialogue involving the UEDF, CUD 
leaders and the EPRDF in October. I told him that they 
accepted the government's four agenda items regarding 
adherence to the constitution and disassociation from all 
political forces that promote violence.  I indicated that 
UEDF and OFDM would like to discuss: 1) rule of law, 
 
SIPDIS 
especially the Oromo region and arrests and deaths of 
opposition members; 2) a review of Parliamentary rules and 
increasing political space; 3) NEB capacity-building and the 
naming of a new board; and 4) an independent and responsible 
media.  Prime Minister Meles responded that he is pleased to 
talk with the opposition as long as it is a real dialogue and 
not one designed to play to the gallery. 
 
3. (C) Meles said that Bulcha should be included in this new 
dialogue.  (He was not present in the previous one.)  The PM 
indicated that he would like to include a leader from the 
sixty CUD MPs in Parliament, but as yet they were not 
properly organized.  However, when these Parliamentarians 
were ready (presumably under a new name, as CUD will be 
charged as a criminal organization) he would be willing to 
include them in this dialogue, or in a separate one.  I 
replied that the UEDF leaders had also suggested including 
CUD representatives as soon as possible. 
 
------------------------------------- 
International Community Role Limited 
------------------------------------- 
 
4. (C) As to the presence of mediators of observers from the 
international community, the PM said it would be beneficial 
for the US and UK to observe Monday's opening discussion, if 
for no other reason than to make it clear that Ethiopia's 
friends can help, but cannot determine the course of 
Ethiopian democracy.  "This a dialogue between Ethiopians and 
cannot be a show," Meles said. He added that the EPRDF's 
policy was not directed at maintaining foreign aid; the EPRDF 
was weak in the face of powerful ideas -- not when confronted 
with blackmail.  Ethiopia wanted as many friends as possible, 
but those friends cannot go beyond international standards 
and interfere, Meles said.  If they did so, dialogue would 
not be worthwhile.  International friends have a legimate 
stake in the principles of governance, not in making life 
easier for the opposition leaders.  Therefore international 
mediators would not necessary but we -- Ambassador Dewar and 
myself -- would be kept informed of progress.  The process 
would be rather like a donor governance project which the 
government must carry out, but keep donors aware of progress, 
the PM said.  (Note: Opposition leaders plan to ask that the 
U.S. and U.K. remain engaged as observers.) 
 
-------------------------- 
The OLF Factor Looms Large 
-------------------------- 
 
5. (C)  Meles indicated that he was especially interested in 
the agenda item raised by Bulcha and Merera regarding the 
rule of law in Oromiya  The PM said he had met with leaders 
of the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) in Bonn and they had 
expressed interest in joining Parliament via one of the 
existing parties (likely the ONC of Merera or the OFDM of 
Bulcha).  He had told the OLF that they could pursue this 
course of action with the Parliamentary parties outside of 
Ethiopia.  However, the OLF had become illegal again by 
calling for insurrection, and yet continued to use the same 
Parliamentary party.  The issue was extremely delicate, as 
Meles said he did not want to close off possibilities.  This 
is a question of "seeing but not seeing" the Parliamentary 
opposition party as a front organization.   Bulcha had little 
"plausible deniability" that he was already acting as a front 
for the OLF, and Merera would find it difficult to make the 
case.  The PM said he would review these issues privately 
with Bulcha and Merera.   "As for the OLF, they had blown up 
the bridge. They may change their views and if so, we will 
play.  But the ball is in their court." 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
Issues: Some Constitutional, Some Discretionary 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
6.  (C) The way in which the dialogue/discussion would be 
carried out, Meles said, is by reviewing two categories, as 
follows: 
 
         -- Category One:  Constitutional obligations that 
both sides must agree to and carry out.  For example, it is 
the government's responsibility to assure a Parliamentary 
democracy that meets international standards, but whether it 
provides the opposition with additional political space is 
category two.  I suggested and the PM agreed that an 
effective NEB would be category one, but consulting with the 
opposition on new board members would be category two. 
 
         -- Category Two:  Issues that are not constitutional 
obligations, but rather part of civic duty.  These issues are 
also important and should be discussed, e.g. Parliamentary 
practices that could be helpful as part of the give and take, 
but which were not a constitutional obligation.  This 
category would require negotiation and "haggling" among 
parties, Meles said. 
 
---------------------------------- 
CUD Not Present, But Not Forgotten 
---------------------------------- 
 
7.  (C) Ambassador Dewar stated that ideally CUD leaders 
detained would participate in a dialogue and the courts would 
recognized Dr. Merera as President of the party he founded 
(the ONC).  Dewar also pressed for a mediator. (Neither of 
these issues were criteria presented to the US and Troika, 
but Bob and I agreed they should be raised.  In fact, the 
Parliamentary opposition in our earlier meeting specifically 
rejected EU Ambassador Clark's warning that dialogue without 
the CUD was dangerous, saying that the gains they make will 
be for all the opposition.)  Meles responded that it would be 
excellent to gain agreement on category one issues, but it 
was equally important to create an environment for category 
two issues, at which point Ethiopian mediators might be used. 
(According to the Austrian ambassador, Meles had recently met 
with a well connected group of elders.  He may be planning to 
include them at some stage.)  As for the CUD leaders in 
detention, Meles reiterated that that was now a legal issue 
and would be settled by the courts.  Those CUD MPs not in 
Parliament but not detained had three choices: to join 
Parliament; not to join, but to remain on a legal path; or to 
follow an illegal course and be detained.  As for the NEB's 
decision that Merera was no longer the leader of the ONC, 
Meles was disappointed in Merera, who must sort this out via 
the legal system and not ask for favors. (While this argument 
is technically defensible, the government was clearly 
complicit in spinning up internal ONC opposition to Merera.) 
8.  (C)  I told the PM that I was pleased that he would 
participate personally in this round of dialogue, and that it 
might have helped us succeed during the first dialogue if he 
had been more directly involved.  The PM replied that 
previous dialogue could not have succeeded because it was 
"rotten at the core" (note: presumably due to the CUD's 
perceived hidden agenda.)  This time around, however, he 
wanted to participate and would be available to do so Dec. 
12-14, prior to his departure for Khartoum.  Meles said he 
would not participate in the entire dialogue, and would 
eventually turn it over to "the previous negotiator" (former 
Information Minister Bereket Simon.)  He said that he hoped 
all parties would put all their cards on the table. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
Comment: Climate Appears Propitious for Renewed Dialogue 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
9.  This is new dialogue is a welcome development.  Both the 
Prime Minister and Opposition appear to be going into it in 
good faith and in a constructive spirit.  UEDF leader Beyene 
Petros struck a note of caution during a follow-up breakfast 
with me on Dec. 9, however, telling me and other dialogue 
participants that Meles has used past discussions like this 
merely to size up his opponents and probe their weaknesses, 
rather than to advance democracy.  Dr. Merera also noted that 
the GOE had talked a lot about delivering progress while 
actually delivering little.  Bulcha Demeksa and Merera are 
clearly wondering how the PM will handle the issue of the 
OLF.  Nonetheless, the current dialogue appears to offer the 
best way forward for achieving all the goals expressed in the 
U.S.-EU statement of Nov. 6. 
HUDDLESTON 

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