US embassy cable - 05BANGKOK7573

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 007573 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, EAP/MLS, S/CT 
PACOM FOR FPA (HUSO) 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/27/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PTER, PREL, TH, Southern Thailand 
SUBJECT: SOUTHERN VIOLENCE: LABELING THE MILITANTS "BRN-C" 
 
REF: BANGKOK 6595 (NOTAL) 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce. Reason 1.4 (d,b) 
 
1.  (C)  SUMMARY/COMMENT: Thai officials and foreign 
observers have struggled to identify the militant movement 
responsible for the resurgent violence in far southern 
Thailand that has claimed over 1,000 lives since January 
2004.  The initial government response -- to blame criminals 
or local political feuds -- has gradually given way to the 
reality that an undefined movement is seeking to undermine 
state control.  This cable outlines the growing consensus 
among Thai and foreign observers that a core group of native 
militants -- labeled the "BRN-C" -- is tapping into a much 
wider and looser network of disaffected youth, recruited 
through Islamic "pondok" schools, to carry out the attacks. 
 
2.  (C)  Defining what exactly constitutes the "BRN-C" 
remains difficult.  Militant cells in far southern Thailand 
are amorphous and have a difficult-to-characterize 
organizational structure.  The identifiable organization that 
does exist appears to be based at the village level, has no 
identifiable leadership, and has failed to publicize its 
goals.  The BRN-C, a faction of an old insurgent group from 
the 1960s, may have supplanted or absorbed other leading 
separatist groups.  Because of its largely unstructured 
nature, the reach of the BRN-C is probably limited and should 
not be overemphasized when looking at the reasons behind the 
resurgent violence.  Many ordinary citizens in the South who 
remain deeply estranged from the Central Thai government 
after decades of neglect are still willing to work through 
the system rather than support militants, e.g., by voting in 
elections, taking an interest in local bread-and-butter 
issues, etc.  END SUMMARY/COMMENT 
 
HOW ARE THE MILITANTS ORGANIZED? 
------------------------------- 
 
3.  (C)  Militant cells in far southern Thailand are 
amorphous and have an organizational structure that is 
disparate and difficult to characterize.  The identifiable 
organization that does exist appears to be based primarily at 
the village "grassroots" level.  The groups have no clearly 
identifiable leadership or credible "spokesman in exile," and 
have not articulated any demands.  Some speculate that this 
"silence" is a designed security measure.  However, it is 
more likely a reflection of a lack of overarching leadership 
or clear objectives.  Coordinated violence (as opposed to the 
more common isolated daily incidents) appears to be directed 
through a loose network.  Recruited individuals -- almost 
always young Malay-Muslim males tapped at Islamic schools 
("pondoks") are contacted by cell phone or word of mouth, 
given instructions for an attack, and afterward return to 
home life.  Contacts between individuals appears to be the 
basis of organization rather than membership in a formal 
group. 
 
4.  (C)  That said, there is growing consensus among the 
media and other observers of far southern Thailand that much 
of this organized violence across provinces is being directed 
by a core group often called the Barisan Revolusi Nasional 
Coordinate (BRN-C).  Thai government sources are generally in 
agreement, with officials often citing the group -- both 
publicly and privately -- as the source of organized attacks 
in the region.  Anthony Davis, the long-time resident Thai 
analyst for Jane's Defence Weekly, told poloffs that he and 
many of his contacts in the Thai security services believe 
that the BRN-C is providing guidance for the disparate cells 
and has become the primary facilitator of the organized 
violence afflicting far southern Thailand. 
 
5.  (C)  This may be an oversimplification of a less 
organized and more fluid system of violence, and the "BRN-C" 
may be turning into a convenient label for a far more complex 
and fluid situation on the ground.  Some observers speculate 
that the BRN-C may be little more than a name given to what 
are largely independent cells, who are working autonomously 
except on the rarest of occasions.  Others argue that Thai 
security forces -- desperate for an identifiable enemy to 
fight or parlay with -- might be overstating the capabilities 
of the BRN-C. 
WHAT IS THE BRN-C? 
------------------ 
 
6.  (C)  The BRN-C of the 1990's was a faction of the 
original Barisan Revolusi Nasional Coordinate (BRN) founded 
in 1961 which has long called for an independent Pattani 
state.  The core members of what is now called BRN-C are 
probably an amalgamation of committed individual militant 
members from different separatist groups.  Membership is not 
exclusive and committed militants might be members of other 
groups as well.  Tony Davis and staff members of the Centre 
for Humanitarian Dialogue (HDC - see reftel) report that the 
BRN-C's leadership is based in the northern Malaysian town of 
Kota Baru, but has operational cells in the southern Thai 
provinces of Narathiwat, Yala, and Pattani.  Davis and HDC 
claim that Malaysian authorities are aware of the presence of 
the BRN-C leadership in Malaysia. 
 
7.  (SBU)  The original BRN was formed in response to RTG 
efforts to nationalize traditional pondok Islamic schools in 
the early 1960's.  The Thai government has long viewed 
pondoks as the key component of their policy of assimilation 
and has had various programs over the past decades to 
register and force Thai national curriculum into the schools. 
 For Muslims in the South, the pondoks are seen as preserves 
of their ethnic Malay cultural identity and are a central 
feature of village life.  The Thai national curriculum -- 
with its strong Buddhist overtones -- is seen as a direct 
affront to their culture and religion.  The BRN-C reportedly 
focuses on the pondoks for organization and recruitment 
activities, targeting teenagers and young men at the schools. 
 An Amcit academic noted that these youths -- who have few 
prospects for employment after their education is complete -- 
have a stronger sense of Muslim identity than past 
generations and a growing sense of anger at their perceived 
mistreatment by the central Thai government. 
 
HOW LARGE IS THE BRN-C? 
----------------------- 
 
8.  (C)  While there is growing consensus that members of the 
BRN-C are probably the organizing element behind the 
coordinated attacks which have occurred in the South over the 
past several years, there is little information available on 
the group's size.  The number of active members of the group 
is probably very small -- perhaps only a few hundred members 
-- and this core group probably does not take a direct role 
in all the coordinated incidents.  Instead, the BRN-C appears 
to be able to multiply its forces by calling on individual 
Malay-Muslim youths, tapped at pondoks, and organized at the 
village level as an auxiliary for larger attacks.  These 
youths are given instructions to carry out individual attacks 
and do not appear to have any knowledge of cell structures or 
a larger organization. 
 
WHAT HAPPENED TO THE OTHER SEPARATIST GROUPS? 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
9.  (C)  Other leading separatist groups do not appear to be 
playing a lead role in the major incidents in the South, or 
have been absorbed or supplanted by the BRN-C. (NOTE: This 
does not mean that the factionalization of the separatist 
groups, witnessed in 1970s and 1980s, has ended. END NOTE) 
Bersatu -- the supposed "umbrella" organization of southern 
separatist groups -- and its exiled leader Wan Khadir Che Man 
have no known involvement in operational attacks in the 
South.  A noted Thai journalist with close contacts in the 
Muslim South told poloffs that Wan Khadir "would be killed" 
if he returned to Thailand by young militants who consider 
him a "sell-out."  Another observer described the Pattani 
Islamic Mujahideen Movement (GMIP) as basically a criminal 
organization -- committing violence or providing expertise 
for profit either for separatist objectives or on behalf of 
criminal gangs.  Most observers call the Pattani United 
Liberation Organization (PULO), often the most vocal of 
separatist groups, "just a web-page," with little involvement 
or knowledge of operational attacks.  However there are 
reports that one of PULO's exiled faction leaders, Shamsuddin 
Khan, may have contacts with BRN-C (reftel). 
COMMENT: OLD GRIEVANCES STILL CENTER OF SOUTHERN VIOLENCE 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
 
10.  (C)  Over the past several years Southern Thailand has 
experienced a series of organized attacks which many 
observers attribute to what looks like the most credible 
operational separatist group in the South: the BRN-C. 
However, these incidents are only one part of a larger 
situation that includes other violence (daily shootings, 
arson, etc.) which is probably not the work of an organized 
militant group, but the result of crime or simply angry 
people acting alone.  There is no shortage of reasons for 
local Malay-Muslims to decry decades of "injustices" from 
corrupt and inept Thai officials and security forces.  But in 
our view, BRN-C should not be made out to be a larger than 
life organization.  What the BRN-C has apparently been able 
to do is harness widespread frustration and anger to 
manipulate and mobilize parts of the Southern Thailand 
Malay-Muslim population -- especially the angry young males. 
 
11.  (C)  We should also be careful not to overstate the 
importance of BRN-C for another important reason: most 
southern Thais themselves don't credit BRN-C or other 
separatist groups for being the primary source of the 
violence.  When asked who is behind the violence most 
southerners blame criminals, internecine struggles between 
the police and army related to smuggling and other illicit 
activities, manipulative politicians -- and sometimes the 
U.S. Government -- more that separatist militants.  Put 
simply, the BRN-C lacks street credibility.  Unlike the GAM 
in Indonesia or the MILF in the Philippines, amorphous 
southern Thai separatists are not seen as spokesman for, or 
defenders of, the larger community.  The separatists are not 
providing services to locals and are not a serving as the 
political voice of local aspirations.  As the 76 percent 
local participation rate in last February's national election 
demonstrates, most southern Thais remain part of the process 
in Thailand, no matter how disaffected they fell or how much 
they dislike the current administration.  They do not seem 
inclined to support the aspirations of the small, violent 
minority who are members of hard-core militant groups such as 
the BRN-C. 
 
12.  (C)  While it would be a mistake to dismiss the ability 
of the BRN-C to perpetrate violent acts, the organization is 
not the powerful "silent hand" controlling the violence as 
depicted in some accounts.  This is good news in the sense 
that there is still not an overarching political movement in 
the South demanding autonomy or independence or otherwise 
confronting the RTG on behalf of Southern Thailand's Malay 
Muslims.  However, it is bad news because the loose 
organization of the militants makes it extremely difficult 
for the RTG to successfully disable the actual perpetrators 
of the violence.  Even if PM Thaksin were to design and 
employ an effective short, mid, and long-term strategy to 
address underlying local grievances -- and he continues to 
grasp for such a strategy -- it will take years for the 
policy to take effect and to have an impact on ingrained 
mindsets.  In the best case scenario, an enlightened 
government policy would ameliorate the violence somewhat (and 
reduce opportunities for exploitation by outside terrorists 
and extremists), but some level of tension and unrest would 
continue -- as it has for most of the past 100 years.  END 
COMMENT 
BOYCE