US embassy cable - 05BANDARSERIBEGAWAN597

C O N F I D E N T I A L  BANDAR SERI BEGAWAN 000597 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/09/2030 
TAGS:  MARR, PARM, PREL, BX, MY, SN 
SUBJECT: SINGAPOREAN VIEW OF BRUNEIAN ADHERENCE TO PSI, 
BRUNEI'S FUTURE LEADERSHIP 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Emil Skodon for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
1.  (C)  Summary:  The Singaporean High Commissioner believes 
Malaysia,s coolness toward the Proliferation Security 
Initiative may be causing Brunei to delay a decision on 
adherence to PSI principles, in accordance with Brunei,s 
desire to avoid taking a stand on any issue on which its two 
closest ASEAN partners (Singapore and Malaysia) do not agree. 
 He said that Crown Prince Billah acquitted himself well 
during meetings with Singaporean leaders earlier this year. 
The High Commissioner recommended a USG invitation to the 
Crown Prince and more U.S. military training at the Bruneian 
Jungle Warfare Center that is extensively used by 
Singapore,s Armed Forces, implying that an active USG role 
in Brunei would be in Singapore,s strategic interest.  End 
Summary. 
 
2.  (C)  Ambassador discussed Brunei-Singapore relations and 
other subjects with outgoing Singaporean High Commissioner 
Hirubalan, who is slated to depart Bandar Seri Begawan in 
December to take up his new post as Singapore,s Ambassador 
to Saudi Arabia.  (Ambassador Skodon and High Commissioner 
Hirubalan had worked together previously when the Ambassador 
was posted to Singapore in the mid-90,s.) 
 
3.  (C)  Brunei-Singapore-Malaysia Relations and PSI: 
Hirubalan said that Brunei-Singapore relations were excellent 
and cooperation was good in a range of areas, although the 
Government of Brunei (GOB) was careful to maintain a balance 
between Singapore and Malaysia, the two ASEAN countries with 
whom it had the closest relationships.  For example, Brunei 
was usually not shy about staking out its own positions on 
issues being discussed within ASEAN, with the exception of 
those on which Singapore and Malaysia differed.  In such 
cases, the GOB would reserve judgment until Singapore and 
Kuala Lumpur had worked out a compromise, out of concern for 
offending one or the other by appearing to take sides. 
According to Hirubalan, this might explain why the GOB had 
not yet decided to endorse PSI principles.  The Government of 
Singapore (GOS) had talked to the Bruneians about signing on 
to PSI and believed that they were now favorably inclined, 
but were holding back due to a desire not to be in conflict 
with Kuala Lumpur, which they perceived as cool to PSI. 
 
4.  (C)  Future Leadership and the Crown Prince:  Hirubalan 
said the GOS recognized the importance of personal 
relationships in its dealings with Brunei, and so had an 
active program to pair its rising government officials in 
two-way exchanges with what it described as &Third 
Generation8 GOB leaders.  In practice, this usually meant 
Singaporeans in their 30,s were paired with Bruneians in 
their 40,s.  The High Commissioner disagreed with the common 
view that Crown Prince Billah was not now and might never be 
fully capable of taking over the throne from his father.  He 
warned GOS ministers not to be condescending to the Crown 
Prince but to engage him in substantive discussions, and when 
that advice was followed Billah acquitted himself well. 
During the Crown Prince,s visit to Singapore in March of 
this year at the invitation of Defense Minister Teo, for 
example, he held his own in private meetings with Minister 
Mentor Lee, Senior Minister Goh, and Prime Minister Lee. 
Hirubalan recommended that the USG look for an opportunity to 
issue an invitation for a visit by the Crown Prince, perhaps 
from SecDef Rumsfeld.  Even if the invitation was not 
accepted, both Billah and the Sultan would appreciate the 
gesture and so become more well-disposed toward the U.S. 
 
5.  (C)  Security Relations:  GOS Armed Forces sent about 
6,000 troops a year through the GOB Jungle Warfare Center in 
the Temburong District, according to the High Commissioner. 
This was considered very high quality training, and within 
the ranks of Singapore,s ground forces was seen as essential 
for career advancement.  Hirubalan recommended that the U.S. 
military, possibly Special Forces Command, look to establish 
a regular training schedule at the Center as well.  In 
addition to the worthwhile training that could be gained, 
such a move would send a valuable political signal about the 
level of U.S. involvement in the region.  (Comment: 
Embassy,s Singapore-based DATT has in fact requested visits 
to the Temburong site through his Singapore military contacts 
in the past, but has never received a direct response.  End 
Comment.) 
 
6.  (C)  Brunei,s Long-Term Stability:  The High 
Commissioner did not see any near-term threats to Bruneian 
stability, thanks to the GOB policy of maintaining what 
amounted to a welfare state, its good leadership, and 
effective internal controls such as the requirement that all 
Friday sermons in Brunei,s mosques be pre-approved by the 
authorities.  He wondered if that would remain true, however, 
if a natural disaster or terrorist attack were to shut off 
oil production for several months.  Bruneians were accustomed 
to having their needs met by the GOB and gave it their 
loyalty in return, but if the GOB could no longer keep up its 
end of the bargain due to sudden disruption in oil and gas 
revenue, &there was no fallback.8  Hirubalan thought that 
the answer to this potential dilemma was greater popular 
participation in government.  That would help create more 
national solidarity among Bruneians than if they just 
continued as passive recipients of government largesse.  He 
thought that recent moves to expand the importance of 
elections to village councils and the roles played by those 
elected officials could be a positive step in this direction, 
if the GOB followed through on its good intentions. 
 
7.  (C)  Regional Organizations:  Hirubalan was unsure where 
the East Asia Summit (EAS) might lead and confirmed that 
Beijing appeared to be becoming less enthused about the EAS 
as it realized that the inclusion of Australia and India 
would lessen its prospects for dictating the Summit agenda. 
The PRC could fall back to the ASEAN 3 and ARF as preferred 
regional forums, although it was not happy about the central 
role played by ASEAN in those gatherings.  Hirubalan said it 
remained the firm Singaporean view that ASEAN had to remain 
as the primary organizer because it was the only participant 
that was not perceived as a threat by any of the others. 
 
8.  (C)  Comment:  High Commissioner Hirubalan,s pointed 
questions during the conversation about USG goals and 
objectives in Brunei and his unsolicited recommendations 
about measures to improve U.S.-Brunei relations implied that 
the GOS believes a stronger U.S. role in Brunei to be in 
Singapore,s strategic regional interests.  End Comment. 
 
 
SKODON