US embassy cable - 05HARARE1663

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HARARE 001663 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AF/S FOR B. NEULING 
SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR C. COURVILLE 
STATE PASS USAID FOR M. COPSON 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/08/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PREL, ZI, Humanitarian Situation, UN 
SUBJECT: UN ENVOY WRESTLES CONCESSIONS FROM MUGABE 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i. Eric T Schultz under Section 1.4 
 b/d 
 
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Summary 
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1.  (C) UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs 
and Emergency Relief Coordinator Jan Egeland visited Zimbabwe 
December 4-7 to survey the ongoing humanitarian crisis and to 
press the GOZ for better cooperation.  In his public remarks 
Egeland was relatively upbeat, claiming good UN/GOZ 
cooperation on HIV/AIDs and food assistance.  However, he 
strongly backed the Tibaijuka report and reiterated UN 
criticism of Operation Murambatsvina.  In his private 
briefing for the diplomatic corps, Egeland said his basic 
message to the GOZ would be the need for major policy changes 
that would facilitate donor assistance. 
 
2.  (C) UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs (OCHA) Assistant Director Agnes Asekenye-Oonyu, who 
has been in Zimbabwe for the past three months, gave post an 
inside look at Egeland,s meeting with President Mugabe. 
According to Asekenye-Oonyu, Mugabe had conceded to Egeland 
that Zimbabwe had humanitarian problems and needed 
assistance.  Egeland had subsequently pressed, and Mugabe had 
agreed, to make political and humanitarian concessions, 
including opening a dialogue with Western donors, to pave the 
way for a visit by UN Secretary General Annan.  Egeland will 
draft his report for Annan and, as Post understands, brief 
the Security Council on December 19.  End Summary. 
 
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Egeland Publicly Applauds GOZ Cooperation, Quietly Pushes for 
More 
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3.  (SBU) In his December 6 press conference, UN humanitarian 
chief Egeland said he was pleased with his four-day visit to 
Zimbabwe in which he had briefed local diplomats, toured 
several UN and NGO operations in Harare and Bulawayo, and met 
with President Mugabe.  Egeland commended the GOZ for its 
cooperation on HIV/AIDS and food assistance.  The envoy 
publicly declared his meetings with Mugabe and members of his 
Cabinet a success.  Egeland, however, said the GOZ and the UN 
had disagreed on the merits of Operation Murambatsvina, which 
he called &the worst possible thing to come at the worst 
possible time.8  Egeland reiterated UN support for the 
Tibaijuka report and said that the government,s refusal to 
accept tents for those who had been displaced by the 
operation had only exacerbated the situation. 
 
4.  (C) In a private meeting with diplomats from the donor 
countries on December 5, Egeland said his basic message to 
the GOZ would be the need for major policy changes that would 
facilitate donor assistance.  Egeland acknowledged the 
difficult environment for assistance efforts, especially for 
NGOs, which he hoped his visit would help improve.  He also 
decried the &social meltdown8 that had occurred in 
Zimbabwe, which he attributed primarily to HIV/ADIS and 
drought, though he acknowledged that GOZ policies had also 
played a role.  With one exception (France) the donors 
responded by noting that the primary cause of Zimbabwe,s 
current crisis were the GOZ,s failed policies.  Egeland took 
the point, but pressed donors to give priority to providing 
assistance, such as shelter for those made homeless by 
Murambatsvina, rather than quibbling over the type of shelter 
or how the people had come to be homeless. 
 
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A &Frank and Productive8 Meeting with Mugabe 
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5.  (C) Egeland said little publicly about his two-and-a-half 
hour meeting with Mugabe on December 6, noting only that it 
was &frank and productive8 and that the two had made 
progress on many fronts, including easing humanitarian 
access.  OCHA Assistant Director Agnes Asekenye-Oonyu on 
December 7 gave Charge an inside look at the high level 
meeting, which she described as constructive but at times 
quite contentious.  According to Asekenye-Oonyu, instead of 
the usual lecture on the &causes8 of Zimbabwe,s 
humanitarian crisis (e.g. &illegal8 western sanctions and 
drought), she said Mugabe listened to the UN envoy,s 
assessment of the situation and its causes.  Mugabe then 
conceded that his government had made mistakes that had led 
to the crisis and that the country needed assistance. 
 
6.  (C) Asekenye-Oonyu said Egeland had told Mugabe that 
Annan,s proposed trip, which she said was now planned for 
March, was dependent on Zimbabwe &making an attitude 
change8 and reengaging with Western donors, especially the 
US and UK.  Mugabe said he was open to such a dialogue and 
would tone down the rhetoric and follow up with the Norwegian 
Ambassador in Harare regarding the parameters for possible 
talks.  (N.B. The reference to the Norwegian Ambassador, who 
arrived in Zimbabwe only in September, is a surprise.  Thomas 
Dahl, the Norwegian Embassy first secretary, on December 6 
told poloff that the jet-lagged Egeland and his Ambassador 
had had a private dinner the night before, which chiefly 
centered on reminiscing about Egeland,s time as deputy 
minister of foreign affairs in Oslo and had addressed little 
of substance.) 
 
7.  (C) According to Asekenye-Oonyu, Egeland had also pressed 
Mugabe to improve the operating environment for humanitarian 
NGOs.  Mugabe highlighted the MOU his government had signed 
with WFP in late November as evidence that he was willing to 
engage donors on food assistance.  Egeland, however, noted 
that the GOZ,s classification of food production figures as 
a state secret hindered the humanitarian response.  Mugabe 
replied that this was nonsense and said he would speak to 
Minister of Agriculture Made about releasing the statistics. 
 
8.  (C) Asekenye-Oonyu said Egeland had also argued that aid 
groups faced a labyrinth of government approval that often 
delayed assistance for months and suggested that the 
government, along with UN and NGO representatives, form a 
one-stop-shop.  Although he accused NGOs of politicizing aid 
delivery, Mugabe accepted this proposal, saying he was 
unaware of the complicated approval process.  Mugabe told 
Egeland to call him personally if this initiative became 
stalled.  Asekenye-Oonyu said Egeland had subsequently asked 
UN Resident Representative Agostinho Zacarias for weekly 
updates on the GOZ,s progress.  She noted that in prior 
meetings with Egeland, Minister of Public Service Nicolas 
Goche and Minister of Health David Parirenyatwa had also 
accepted this proposal but that Egeland,s suggestion had 
prompted a violent reaction from Minister of Local Government 
Ignatius Chombo, who had threatened to block the meeting with 
Mugabe. 
 
9.  (C) Asekenye-Oonyu said the provision of shelter for the 
estimated 700,000 people left homeless by Operation 
Murambatsvina had been the most contentious issue.  It had 
prompted a 20-minute shouting match between Mugabe and 
Egeland.  Mugabe attacked UN Special Envoy Anna Tibaijuka and 
her report.  In return, Egeland pushed back, noting that he, 
the entire UN system, and Annan personally stood behind the 
report.  Urban renewal projects were okay, said Egeland, but 
only after new housing was already provided.  The UN envoy 
said he had visited victims of Murambatsvina and called their 
living conditions unacceptable.  Mugabe nonetheless defended 
his government,s rejection of tents to temporarily shelter 
those displaced, and said &tents are for Arabs.8 
 
10.  (C) Asekenye-Oonyu said that despite his outburst, 
Mugabe made two key concessions on shelter for 
Murambatsvina,s victims.  Mugabe promised to provide proper 
title to resettled victims, after Egeland noted that 
documents issued to date would not stand up in court, and 
Mugabe said the shelters would be allocated based on need. 
(N.B. Up to now, the GOZ has allocated new homes based on 
political, not humanitarian, considerations.)  The Charge 
asked how the UN would be able to ensure that this was the 
case.  Asekenye-Oonyu responded that the proposed UN shelter 
program would be separate from the government,s &Operation 
Garikai8 housing program and that a committee, which would 
include donors, would allocate the shelters.  She added that 
if the GOZ rejected this method of allocation the shelters 
would not be built. 
 
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The UN,s Next Steps 
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11.  (C) Asekenye-Oonyu told Charge that Egeland would write 
a report on his visit for the Secretary General and that he 
would likely address the UNSC at some point.  (N.B. We 
understand it will be December 19.)  She said Annan was 
planning to send Under-Secretary-General for Political 
Affairs Ibrahim Gambari to Zimbabwe in January to assess 
first hand the GOZ,s progress in fulfilling the commitments 
made to Egeland.  If there were not sufficient progress, 
Annan,s visit could be delayed or cancelled.  She added that 
Gambari was seen by the GOZ as too close to the U.S. 
 
12.  (C) Meanwhile, the UN presence in Zimbabwe will get a 
boost on New Year,s day when the OCHA field office here 
becomes permanent.  Asekenye-Oonyu said six international 
members and 21 locals would staff the office but that a 
director had yet to be named.  She herself was due to depart 
Harare December 8 to return to her job in New York.  She 
said, however, that she might be amenable to staying on in 
Zimbabwe.  A widely respected figure despite her brief tenure 
here, she said that even the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had 
lobbied Egeland to offer her an extension. 
 
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Comment 
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13.  (C) The GOZ,s actions over the next few months will 
determine the course of UN and donor engagement with 
Zimbabwe.  If Mugabe and the GOZ fail to honor their 
commitments to Egeland it will put not only Annan,s visit at 
risk but will also further complicate the efforts of the U.S. 
and other donors to provide assistance to Zimbabwe,s 
suffering people.  It may also, however, be the final straw 
that will rally international and perhaps even African 
criticism of the regime. 
SCHULTZ