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| Identifier: | 05ANKARA7200 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 05ANKARA7200 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Ankara |
| Created: | 2005-12-08 13:35:00 |
| Classification: | SECRET |
| Tags: | ASEC AMGT AMED CASC PTER TU |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T ANKARA 007200 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR DS/IP/EUR, DS/DSS/ITA, EUR/EX, EUR/SE, E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/08/2015 TAGS: ASEC, AMGT, AMED, CASC, PTER, TU SUBJECT: ANKARA EAC MEETING 12/7/2005 Classified By: Classified by DCM Nancy McEldowney; Reason 1.4 (c,d,g) 1. (U) Ambassador Wilson chaired the Emergency Action Committee (EAC) on 12/7/05 to discuss the mission's emergency preparedness. In attendance were representatives from each of the following sections/agencies: RSO, MGT, RMO, IMO, CON, DAO, POL, PAS, MSG, ECON, DEA, FBI, PMA, RAO, TSR, CLO, ODC, AFOSI, DET 1. 2. (SBU) Ambassador directed EAC discussion on three topics: Post contingency plans; threat profile; Avian Influenza (AI). EAC members summarized recent emergency preparedness measures taken by post, to include drills, contingency planning seminar, new alternate command post, and status of earthquake preparedness. The discussion concluded with several members offering suggestions that would enhance emergency preparedness, including closer coordination with the US Military facility at Incirlik and a mission-wide contingency exercise. These will be followed up on. RSO advised that the EAP update is due and will be coordinated with DS/SPC using the new web-based CEPA. 3. (S) RSO and RAO described the threat profile. While reporting of both indigenous and transnational terrorist activity is somewhat high, none is specifically targeting USG assets. It was noted that Kongra-Gel (PKK) has momentum and has the capacity to continue terrorist operations thru the winter, including in urban areas, if it so chooses. Additionally, there exists the potential that the PKK could move their targeting towards USG assets if the program to assist the Turkish Government in combatting PKK is successful. The increased transit thru Turkey of terrorists, now referred to as the Foreign Fighter Pipeline, was mentioned as well. RSO reminded members not to become complacent about security in this high threat environment, and to regularly discuss personal security with their EFMs. 4. (SBU) ECON summarized events during the previously-reported outbreak of AI in Turkey, and MGT and MED summarized post's preparations in the event of an AI pandemic. It was noted that important contacts were made during the outbreak which will be useful in the future. 5. (U) Meeting concluded with Ambassador thanking members for their participation and encouraging continous emergency preparedness planning. WILSON
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