US embassy cable - 05ANKARA7191

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ANKARA 007191 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/07/2015 
TAGS: PREL, MARR, MASS, TU, IZ, AF 
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR 10-16 DEC COUNTERPART VISIT OF 
COMMANDER TURKISH LAND FORCES, GEN YASAR BUYUKANIT TO CHIEF 
OF STAFF OF THE U.S. ARMY. 
 
REF: A. A. ANKARA 242 
 
     B. B. ANKARA 356 
 
Classified By: DCM NANCY MCELDOWNEY; REASONS: 1.4 (B) AND (D). 
 
 1. (S) Summary: This Counterpart Visit (CPV) by the 
Commander of the Turkish Land Forces, GEN Yasar Buyukanit, 
will be the most significant event in US-Turkish Army to Army 
relations in over half a decade.  The already slowing 
post-Cold War US-Turkish mil to mil relationship was derailed 
in 2003 with the Turkish Parliament's March 1st, "No vote" 
during OIF and the "Suleymaniye" or "July 4th incident" in 
Northern Iraq. Military relations further chilled when, due 
to Turkish perceptions that the US was going to withhold full 
honors from the TLFC Commander during his planned CPV to 
Washington in May 2003, the TLFC pulled out of the visit. 
October 2004 saw the first sign of a thaw in the relationship 
when, at the Conference of European Armies (CEA) GEN 
Buyukanit stated in his bilat with the CSA that he wanted to 
restore mil to mil relations to their traditionally strong 
state. At the same bilat he accepted the CSA's invitation to 
conduct this current CPV, and also invited the USAREUR 
Commander to conduct a March 05 visit to Turkey.  While 2005 
has seen some additional efforts towards increasing mil to 
mil relations, (SOCEUR intent to conduct a Special Forces 
JCET in 06, Joint Staff hosting Turkish Special Forces 
leadership in a DVOT in SEP 05, CG USAREUR's letter to GEN 
Buyukanit expressing intent to begin staff to staff 
exploration for engagement opportunities, conduct of HLDG in 
Ankara Nov 05), it is likely that this CPV will be the green 
light the TLFC needs to accelerate engagement.  Additionally, 
as GEN Buyukanit is currently in line to become Turkey's 
Chief of Defense in August 2006, his visit to the U.S. has 
enduring importance. End Summary. 
 
2. (S)  Army to Army engagement has diminished significantly 
since the end of the Cold War and has been virtually 
non-existent since OIF.  While the desire to restore mil to 
mil relations and explore engagement opportunities was 
expressed by GEN Buyukanit at the 2004 CEA as well as to GEN 
Bell during his visit to Turkey in March 2005, the pace has 
been, as expected, slow. While the CPV will unquestionably 
lay a foundation upon which more robust engagement can be 
built, actual execution will likely continue to be 
incremental as it is measured against resource restrictions 
within the TLFC and negative public reaction to continued 
terrorist operations in southeastern Turkey by the 
PKK/KONGRA-GEL, directed and supported from its safe havens 
in northern Iraq.  Correspondingly, lingering anti-US 
sentiment within the Turkish Armed Forces over OIF in general 
and the July 4th 2003 Suleymaniye incident in particular, 
will have some residual impact. 
 
3.  (S) With regard to resources, the 28th Mechanized (Peace 
Keeping) Brigade is the TLFC's showcase unit for conducting 
international operations and would likely be the first choice 
for any joint exercises.  However, its heavy commitments in 
EUFOR, KFOR and ISAF (a company/team each) will likely only 
increase in the future.  Command Post Exercise potential is 
still extremely viable with the recently completed state of 
the art Simulation Center now fully operational on the War 
College campus in Istanbul. The Turkish TRADOC Commander also 
expressed great interest in a proposed Counterpart visit to 
Ft. Monroe last year, but regretted when it became evident 
that the trip would be a self-invite rather than a CPV. 
 
4. (SBU) The TLFC has been seeking either Army Staff talks or 
that an Army Sub Working Group (ASWG) be established as a 
subset to either the Joint Staff Talks or the High Level 
Defense Group. The latest request for an ASWG was made at the 
November HLDG in Ankara.  Establishing an Army to Army 
dialogue, whether one of the Turks' proposals or something 
else, would provide a venue where TLFC's objectives with 
regard to interfacing with the US Army could be examined. As 
Turkey buys less US military hardware (the Army is to receive 
German tanks soon; no American company bid on the current 
Attack Helicopter tender), such a venue would allow us to 
explore new ways to ensure interoperability.  It would also 
provide opportunities to encourage Turkey to expand the 
 
ANKARA 00007191  002 OF 004 
 
 
number of its units trained and equipped for international 
peacekeeping operation. 
 
5. (S) While it is difficult to accurately gauge the depth of 
General Buyukanit,s feelings towards restoring the 
U.S.-Turkey mil to mil relationship, his enthusiasm to host 
GEN Bell in March 05 as well as his commitment to conduct 
this CPV likely serve as a reasonable barometer. The 
last-minute cancellation of his visit to USAREUR as GEN 
Bell's guest in September, as well as his replacement with 
his CoS, General Saygun, at the 2005 CEA probably do not 
reflect a change of heart with regard to the relationship, 
but rather the result of an externally imposed 
reprioritization of his calendar. (His staff assured us that 
his sending of General Saygun was intended to demonstrate the 
value he gave that visit.) Buyukanit, while charismatic, 
popular within the Army and adept at working the press, is 
also successful at playing his political cards close to his 
vest. Members of his staff assert to us that he strongly 
favors returning to a robust military relationship with the 
U.S.  He will also grip and grin with the best of them in 
meeting you. General Buyukanit's succession next summer as 
the CHOD has been the subject of much press speculation of 
late.  Editorials have appeared which suggest that the ruling 
Justice and Development Party (AKP) is seeking to retire 
General Buyukanit early due to his strong Kemalist views and 
anticipated opposition to the pro-Islam undertones of the 
current government.  The government subsequently denied it 
intends to tinker with the planned TGS succession. And while 
anonymous accusations of minor corruption on Buyukanit's part 
have appeared on a government web site, these do not appear 
to be significant or credible enough to impact his 
progression. 
 
TURKISH LAND FORCES 
------------------- 
 
6.  (C) The over 400,000 man Turkish Land Forces has since 
the late 1990s, when the current CHOD, General Ozkok, was its 
commander, been struggling to modernize both its equipment 
and organization. While the term  modernization, has 
traditionally meant to the TLF equipment acquisition, since 
2003 it has also encompassed some organizational and Command 
and Control transformation.  However, due to a combination of 
economic constraints and internal resistance progress has 
been halting at best.  The primary operational focus for the 
TLFC is currently its fight against the PKK/Kongra-Gel. 
While the TLFC concedes that they live in a rough 
neighborhood, they do not perceive any serious external 
threat at the moment, save the PKK/Kongra-Gel presence in 
Iraq. Their desire for US support in eradicating the PKK's 
safe havens in Northern Iraq and the right to conduct 
cross-border or hot pursuit operations is well known, as is 
the US position that was expressed during both the Sept. 05 
visit by General Jones and LTG Smith and during the November 
HLDG--i.e., such an action could prove destabilizing in Iraq. 
 However, the subject is likely to be brought up during this 
visit and is already planned to be the main focus of General 
Buyukanit's presentation at the American Enterprise Institute 
dinner on Dec. 14th. 
 
7. (C) The major transformation effort in the TLFC seems to 
take the shape of equipment acquisition, though also includes 
a weakly executed strength reduction initiative by the CHOD, 
General Ozkok.  In May 2004, he directed a 10% reduction of 
the Land Forces, to be realized by the abolishment of four 
brigades and the Aegean Army HQs in Izmir. While in the past 
there was some discussion of transforming the TAF into an all 
volunteer force, this is not likely to happen anytime soon, 
due to costs and the view within the TGS that conscription 
serves as a valuable socialization process.  The Minister of 
National Defense stated, in the foreseeable future there are 
no plans for an all volunteer army.  However, as a cost 
saving measure the TGS did already reduce the personnel 
strength of the armed forces by 17% by shortening the 
compulsory military service from 18 months to 15 months, thus 
also reducing the conscript personnel across the Turkish 
Armed Forces from 685,000 to 569,000. 
 
 
ANKARA 00007191  003 OF 004 
 
 
 
BEHIND THE SCENES SUPPORT FOR IRAQ 
---------------------------------- 
 
8. (SBU) Despite the unpopularity of the Iraq war, Turkey has 
provided significant logistical support to both Operation 
Iraqi Freedom and to OEF in Afghanistan.  Turkey has approved 
multiple requests for the use of Incirlik Air Base, 
including: a tanker refueling operation which has delivered 
28,132 gallons since operations began in 2003 and flown 2,578 
sorties; the transit of 8,500 US troops on rotation from Iraq 
from January through April 2004; and the establishment in May 
2005 of a logistics hub which allows 6 US military C-17 
aircraft to move the amount of cargo it took 9-10 military 
aircraft to move from Germany.  This hub has facilitated the 
movement of 48,957 tons of supplies since its inception; 
flown 1554 C-17 sorties; received 689 wide-body cargo 
aircraft; and houses 150 TDY support personnel.  Turkey also 
approved the use of hub flights for the emergency evacuation 
of US soldiers from Iraq. 
 
9. (SBU) The Habur Gate crossing from Turkey into Iraq has 
facilitated 25% of fuel shipments to Coalition forces in Iraq 
-- approximately 340,000 gallons of fuel every day, 
two-thirds of gasoline and diesel fuel shipments for the 
Iraqi people and three million gallons a day in humanitarian 
fuel shipments.  Significant shipments of food and water for 
coalition forces also pass over the border. 
 
10. (SBU) The Turkish government has also demonstrated its 
support through its public announcements of support for the 
January elections; provision of training in Turkey for Iraqi 
diplomats, political parties and (as part of the NATO 
training mission) for the Iraqi security forces; hosting a 
training week-end for Iraqi constitution drafters; and 
hosting a meeting of rival Tall Afar tribal leaders in August 
for a reconciliation dialogue; and bringing together various 
Sunni groups in Istanbul Dec. 4th to encourage participation 
in the political process (Ambassador Khalilzad participated 
in this effort). 
 
PARTNER IN GWOT 
--------------- 
 
11. (S) Beyond its support for Iraq, Turkey has provided 
valuable assistance and cooperation to GWOT.  On Aug. 8, 
Turkey completed its second International Security Assistance 
Force (ISAF) command (II and VII) in Afghanistan, which it 
held for six months and during which time it contributed over 
1,600 troops.  Additionally, it has maintained a company/team 
force as part of every ISAF rotation).  Turkey and France 
have agreed on a shared command of the ISAF Central Command 
in Kabul during the second half of 2006. Turkey also 
contributes to reconstruction and training efforts in 
Afghanistan.  It is involved in the reconstruction of schools 
and is exploring counter-narcotics training programs for 
Afghan police and alternative livelihood options for poppy 
farmers.  Following PM Erdogan's May visit to Afghanistan, he 
pledged an additional $50M in assistance to the country. 
 
12. (U)  Together with the US, Turkey coordinates military 
assistance to Georgia and Azerbaijan, improving their 
abilities to protect key energy transport routes.  Turkey 
subscribes to every nonproliferation arrangement it is 
eligible to join, including the Proliferation Security 
Initiative (PSI).  It will host the first PSI combined air, 
land and sea exercise in May 2006. 
 
 
IRAN AND SYRIA - DIFFERENT MEANS TO THE SAME END 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
13. (S) Turkey's watchword for both Syria and Iran is 
"engagement."  While the government states that it shares our 
goal of a nuclear weapons-free Iran, it doesn't want to 
jeopardize its nascent trade development opportunities, 
including energy, or its renewed intelligence exchange with 
Iran on the PKK.  According to TGS, Turkey and Iran began 
sharing intelligence this summer on the PKK, holding regular 
 
ANKARA 00007191  004 OF 004 
 
 
meetings at the border.  As of September, Iran had turned 
over 40 suspected PKK members or sympathizers.  Turkey touts 
its support for the EU-3 dialogue and Turkish 
officials stress to us the need to maintain dialogue and to 
identify a diplomatic solution.  The equivocal response by PM 
Erdogan and the MFA to President Ahmadinejad's Oct. 25 
statement about Israel, combined with Ankara's all-out 
reception of Iranian FM Mottaki earlier this month, 
demonstrate that Turkey is trying to walk both sides of the 
line on Iran.  Turkey's tact toward Syria is the same. 
Turkish military officials have characterized Syria as a 
scared cat that could lash out if "backed into a corner." 
They and others in the government stress the need to support 
Assad, who they claim is a reformer at heart, against those 
Ba'athist dinosaurs in the regime who seek to undermine him 
and regularly urge US engagement. 
 
DEFENSE INDUSTRY COOPERATION WEAK 
--------------------------------- 
 
14. (SBU) Historically the strongest area of our bilateral 
relationship, the bilateral security cooperation relationship 
is declining significantly.  Under Turkey's current policy, 
being implemented by the Undersecretariat for Defense 
Industries (SSM), the emphasis is on Direct Commercial Sales 
at the expense of Foreign Military Sales and American 
companies are having difficulty competing.  The last 
significant commercial tender won by a U.S. firm was the 2002 
win by Boeing for an Air Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) 
system.  (Note: Boeing recently delivered a letter 
threatening to take legal action against SSM over protracted 
contract disputes and just signed the Critical Design Review 
this month. End Note.)  In early 2004, SSM cancelled three 
tenders (UAVs, Main Battle Tanks and ATAK Helicopter).  Last 
month MOD finalized an agreement with Germany to acquire 294 
Leopard II A4 Main Battle tanks. A second UAV tender was won 
by the Israelis weeks before PM Erdogan's spring 2005 visit 
to Israel. 
 
15. (SBU) The revised attack helicopter tender (Note: The 
first tender was issued in 1995 and won by Bell Textron.  SSM 
cancelled it over technology transfer issues.  End Note.) 
issued in February 2005 was the first to contain new 
"standard" terms and condition.  The three US firms that took 
the tender (Bell, Boeing, Sikorsky) found the new T&Cs so 
onerous that Bell immediately dropped out of contention and 
Sikorsky soon after.  Boeing invested considerable time and 
energy to try and work through its concerns with SSM but, 
even after several contract revisions and two postponements 
of the bid due date, was unable to justify participation.  On 
Oct. 13, Boeing notified SSM that it would not submit a bid. 
 
16. (SBU) SSM's stated goal is to develop an indigenous 
capability to supply sophisticated components for integration 
into foreign products, beginning with the attack helicopter, 
and has outlined an aggressive timetable to do so.  To meet 
that schedule, SSM requires companies to sign up 
unconditionally to all T&Cs and to confirm at the time of bid 
submission the supplier's government's willingness to allow 
transfer of the required technology.  DUSD Suzanne Patrick 
and State DAS Greg Suchan explained to SSM in clear terms the 
USG limitations that prohibit such upfront guarantees but SSM 
has refused to revise the tender to remove that requirement. 
Sikorsky, which is considering participating in a tender for 
52 utility helicopters and, if it wins, establishing in 
Turkey a global production site for export models of its 
Black Hawk helicopter, will not bid if this condition is not 
removed.  ODC Chief MG Sutton has held extensive talks with 
Service Chiefs, DCHOD Kosaner and J-5 head LTG Zorlu about 
the negative impact of the SSM program on US participation in 
the Turkish defense market.  Across the board, they pledged 
their preference for US equipment but professed an inability 
-- or unwillingness -- to influence the process. 
WILSON