US embassy cable - 05NEWDELHI9245

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 NEW DELHI 009245 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/08/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, PREL, PHUM, PTER, KCRM, ASEC, SCUL, IN, NP, Counter-Terrorism 
SUBJECT: INDIA FACES GROWING NAXALITE MENACE 
 
REF: A. NEW DELHI 1274 
     B. CHENNAI 2761 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Geoff Pyatt, for Reasons 1.4 (B, D) 
 
1.  (C) Summary:  Despite India's rapidly expanding economy, 
Naxalite groups in poor rural areas and their educated urban 
sympathizers continue to spread and have extended their areas 
of influence into 12 states, proving they can launch 
spectacular attacks on government facilities.  The GOI has 
responded with the formation of an "interstate joint task 
force," to enable state governments to devise a coordinated 
response.  New Delhi has also committed 24 battalions of the 
Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) to counterinsurgency 
operations.  Embassy contacts and many commentators are 
skeptical that the new initiatives will accomplish very much, 
as they do little to address the persistent economic and 
social problems underlying Naxalism.  Indian economic 
development has missed large portions of the countryside. 
India's scheduled tribes (STs), and scheduled castes (SCs) 
who live in these remote areas, often face lives of 
desperation and view Naxalites as the only groups willing to 
defend them.  There is no chance Naxalites could threaten the 
Indian state, and the GOI is unlikely to eradicate Naxalism 
through police action.  The most likely prospect is a 
continuing and bloody stalemate.  To end the conflict, the 
GOI would have to convince Naxalites to renounce violence and 
embrace parliamentary politics.  This would entail ending 
violent attacks on those Naxalites who have already entered 
politics and enacting comprehensive land reform and other 
measures aimed at dismantling the rural feudal power 
structure than oppresses India's poorest citizens.  There is 
little sign that the GOI is willing to take such steps. 
India's Maoists are closely eyeing events in Nepal, and if 
their Nepali comrades eventually give up armed struggle, it 
could encourage the Naxalites to do the same.  Meanwhile in 
parts of the countryside the bloodletting continues.  End 
Summary. 
 
Naxal Activity Spreading 
------------------------ 
 
2.  (U)  The Indian Home Ministry in its 2004-2005 Annual 
Report documented the spread and continued success of the 
Naxalite insurgency.  According to the report, there are 
currently 9,300 full-time Naxalite fighters active in 118 
districts and spread across 12 Indian states (Chattisgarh, 
Karnataka, Orissa, Andhra Pradesh, Jharkhand, Bihar, Uttar 
Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Assam, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, 
Himachal Pradesh).  The insurgents are armed with 6,300 
factory-made weapons (mostly WWII era bolt action rifles, 
supplemented by a few automatic weapons).  The remainder are 
armed with "country-made" weapons, produced in rural gunshops 
of dubious reliability.  Counter-insurgency experts estimate 
that every one Naxalite fighter is supported by four "active 
sympathizers," who provide housing, food, money, weapons and 
other infrastructural support.  Just two years ago, Naxalites 
were active in only 9 states and 76 districts.  To date in 
2005 some 510 persons have been killed in Naxalite violence, 
including over 90 security force personnel.  The goal of the 
Naxalites is to create a "revolutionary corridor" from AP to 
Nepal, that will form the basis of a "liberated zone" 
governed by the Maoists (reftel).  They currently administer 
areas in Jharkhand and AP where there is no GOI control and 
which provide safe-haven for Naxalite combat units. 
 
3.  (U) Experts concur with the GOI assessment that while 
Naxalite activity has spread over a wider geographic area, 
the number of violent attacks has remained constant. 
Increased tactical sophistication and the use of more lethal 
improvised explosive devices (IEDs) has pushed up the 
security force death toll, however.  There have been a steady 
stream of Naxalite attacks throughout 2005.  Some of the most 
notable include: 
 
--November 2004 - 15 policemen killed in an Andhra Pradesh 
landmine attack. 
 
--February 2005 - 38 Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) 
killed in AP 
 
--June 2005 - approximately 500 Naxalites attack the UP 
village of Madhuban destroying buildings, capturing weapons 
and killing several local policemen 
 
--August 2005 - Naxalite murder of a member of the AP 
legislative assembly, his son and six others. 
 
--August 2005 - 22 CRPF members killed in a Chattisgarh 
explosives attack. 
 
--September 2005 - 15 police killed in Jharkhand 
 
--November 2005 - Naxalites attack a Jharkhand police 
Training Center killing policemen and capturing 185 weapons 
 
--November 2005 - an estimated 300 to 400 Naxalites attack 
the Jehanabad Prison in Bihar - killing several constables - 
freeing 341 inmates, including 20 members of the 
anti-Naxalite Ranvir Sena, whom they subsequently murdered. 
 
Reasons for the Spread 
---------------------- 
 
4.  (U) Aggressive counterinsurgency operations by State 
police forces, supplemented by 24 battalions of the CRPF 
deployed by New Delhi, have failed to halt the spread of 
Naxalite activity.  Experts agree that the Maoists are ahead 
of the game, adapting quickly to changed circumstances and 
growing in sophistication and capability since the September 
2004 formation of the Communist Party of India (Maoist).  The 
formation of the banned CPI(Maoist), with the merger of the 
Peoples' War Group (PWG) and the Maoist Communist Center 
(MCC), has increased Naxalite capabilities, enabled 
intelligence sharing between formerly disparate Naxalite 
groups, increased the Naxalite support network, and allowed 
formerly localized groups to operate across state boundaries. 
 The new party has implemented an extensive training program 
that has produced professional military-type cadres with 
improved tactics, better coordination, more sophisticated 
communication networks and better IEDs. 
 
5.  (C)  Although Naxalites claim to represent the interests 
of India's oppressed Scheduled Castes (STs) and Schedule 
Tribes (STs), the leadership is almost entirely from the 
upper castes, including some highly educated individuals. 
The same applies to the extensive Naxalite support network, 
including above-ground organizations of educated middle class 
persons from academia, the media and the legal profession. 
As globalization and economic liberalization (neo-liberalism) 
expand in India, some within the largely middle-class 
anti-globalization forces disparage the Left Front (LF), a 
group of Communist and Socialist Parties who espouse 
parliamentary democracy and support the ruling United 
Progressive Alliance (UPA) government from outside.  They 
feel that the Naxalites are the only "true" leftists, who 
stand up for the oppressed SCs and STs.  The Naxalite 
movement would not have been able to expand without this 
middle-class, above-ground support. 
 
New Delhi's Response 
-------------------- 
 
6.  (U) The Home Ministry, frustrated by the inability of 
Naxalite effected states to mount a coordinated response, on 
September 19 called the administrative heads, senior 
officials and Chief Ministers of the 12 states together in 
New Delhi.  The participants established an "interstate joint 
task force" to "facilitate coordinated and synergized 
anti-naxalite operations across state boundaries," and 
"strengthen intelligence networks."  Home Minister Shivraj 
Patil hailed the meeting, claiming that it would foster a 
"multi-track approach," rather than merely treating Naxalism 
as a law-enforcement problem.  Patil emphasized that the new 
approach would work to develop the local economies in the 
effected areas, ensure political and social justice for the 
SCs and STs, and "as a last resort" act against those 
Naxalites who continue to insist on committing acts of 
violence. 
 
An Opposition Viewpoint 
----------------------- 
 
7.  (C) Telegu Desam MP M. Jagannath represents an AP 
constituency with a large ST population in which Naxalites 
are quite active.  Although he is in the opposition, he 
supported many of the views expounded by Home Minister Patil, 
but urged the Indian state to go much further.  In a December 
2 conversation with Poloff, Jagannath emphasized that the 
Naxalite problem is inherently political, and cannot be 
solved with a purely law and order approach.  He pointed out 
that India's STs and SCs often live in the grip of feudalism, 
that in India's more backward areas the "feudals" are usually 
supported by the high castes, and local police do the bidding 
of the feudal/high caste nexus, leaving STs and SCs helpless. 
 India's rural underclass, he noted, face an unrelenting 
cycle of poverty, unemployment and atrocities, including the 
rape of wives and daughters.  Seeing no other option, the STs 
and SCs often turn to the Naxalites, who provide them the 
means to exact revenge and reverse their economic status. 
 
8.  (C) Jagannath urged the GOI to tackle the Naxalite 
problem by providing employment and subsidized loans to poor 
SCs and STs and investing in genuine rural development 
programs, including extensive land reforms aimed at breaking 
the back of the feudals.  Jagannath blamed the AP government 
for the breakdown of negotiations with the Naxalites there, 
pointing out that to show "progress" in the anti-Naxalite 
campaign, state police forces have picked up innocent 
tribals, murdered them and claimed they were Naxalites killed 
in "encounters." 
 
The View from the Left 
---------------------- 
 
9.  (C) Journalist and political activist AS Verma, himself a 
former Naxalite, told Poloff on December 2 that the GOI's 
September 19 meeting was little more than political theater 
and would do nothing to stop the spread of Naxalism.  He 
pointed out that LK Advani had pursued a similar policy as 
Home Minister in the previous NDA government, when Naxal 
activity was confined to only four states.  Verma accused the 
GOI of inherent hypocrisy, in that it claims that Naxalism is 
a "social problem," but then relies on a law and order 
solution.  In Verma's estimation, the UPA will rely more on 
the police than the NDA.  This is because the LF, which keeps 
the UPA in power, is a sworn enemy of the Naxalites, as the 
CPI(M) used harsh police methods to crush Naxalism in West 
Bengal. 
 
10.  (C) Verma urged the GOI to differentiate between 
revolutionaries and terrorists.  Terrorists, he emphasized, 
have no mass base, while Naxalites have a popular following 
throughout India.  The Naxalites, unlike terrorists, target 
their violence and do not engage in mass killing of 
innocents.  This was demonstrated in Jehanabad, when they 
warned civilians to remain indoors and assured them they 
would not face attack.  Verma emphasized that the GOI must 
stop jailing illegally leftist activists who speak out on 
behalf of STs/SCs, especially those that are landless 
laborers and poor peasants, and should release those 
currently in illegal detention.  Arguing that India is 
basically a "criminalized state," he noted that the left 
parties and Naxalites are the only parties in India that are 
not corrupt and entrenched with criminal mafias. 
 
11.  (C) Verma urged Poloff not to take Naxalite assertions 
of eternal class war at face value.  In his estimation, 
Naxalite violence is a bargaining tool and a means to an end, 
rather than an end in itself.  Saying that "this is not the 
1960's and there is no possibility of a violent overthrow of 
the Indian state," Verma insisted that the Naxalites want to 
see a negotiated settlement, an end to violence, and their 
acceptance as above-ground political parties.  The GOI should 
hurry this process along by declaring a cease-fire, and 
ending violent attacks against the Communist Party of India 
(Marxist-Leninist), the above-ground political party formed 
by former Naxalites. 
 
Comment - Naxalism as Prelude to Bargaining 
------------------------------------------- 
 
12.  (C) Naxalites cannot overthrow the government of India, 
and are unlikely ever to control more than a few remote areas 
of the country.  Likewise, the GOI is unlikely to eradicate 
Naxalism, as the crushing poverty, lingering feudalism and 
inherent discrimination of Indian society has nurtured 
desperation that finds its only outlet through violence. 
Without a radical change of tack by both sides, the most 
likely outcome is an extended stalemate that can only grow 
bloodier as the Naxalites acquire more sophistication and 
better weapons.  While the security forces can gain the upper 
hand in some Naxalite areas, they can expect to suffer 
reverses in others.  Three factors hold the key to an 
eventual solution: events in Nepal, the development of 
India's left parties, and the nature of Indian economic 
development. 
 
13.  (C) India's Naxalites are watching events in Nepal 
closely.  Nepal is a small and largely homogeneous state, 
with an entrenched feudal class, weak central government, and 
a desperately poor rural underclass, which provides much 
better conditions for a Maoist revolution than India.  If 
Nepal's Maoists eventually give up armed struggle and come to 
a negotiated settlement, it will provide the impetus to 
India's Maoists to do the same, as the chances for a Maoist 
victory in India are much less than in Nepal.  Some leftists, 
such as Verma, argue that Indian Maoists are well aware that 
they cannot win a class war, and intend to negotiate a 
settlement when conditions are right.  A negotiated outcome 
in Nepal would provide a further impetus. 
 
14.  (C) The Communist Party of India (Marxist) is India's 
leftist flagship and remains a committed enemy of the 
Naxalites.  CPI(M) General Secretary Prakash Karat dismisses 
the Naxalites as "adventurists" whose "politics rely on 
anarchic violence directed at individuals and ordinary 
people."  Karat argues that Naxalite violence only invites 
state repression, hurting the very people it intends to help. 
 He has pledged the CPI(M) to "counter politically and 
ideologically the false posturing of such 'revolutionary' 
activities."  The fledgling CPI(ML) is committed to bringing 
the Naxalites out of the underground and into parliamentary 
democracy, but faces opposition from both the LF and the GOI. 
 In order for India's Naxalites to renounce violence, the GOI 
would have treat the CPI(ML) as a legitimate political party 
and provide reformed Naxalites an opportunity to join and 
agitate on behalf of STs and SCs. 
 
15.  (C) Desperation often drives Naxalism.  The onus is on 
the GOI to demonstrate to India's have-nots that it is 
crafting an economic development program that is genuinely 
aimed at alleviating this desperate situation.  As long as 
India's political parties and elites are willing to accept 
the status quo and not take on feudal interests, the 
stalemate and the violence will continue. 
MULFORD