US embassy cable - 05BAGHDAD4892

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 004892 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/07/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, IZ, Kurdistan Islamic Union, Elections 
SUBJECT: KURDISTAN ISLAMIC UNION OFFICIALS ON  ELECTIONS; 
SPLIT FROM KURDISTAN ALLIANCE 
 
REF: BAGHDAD 4808 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Robert S. Ford 
for   Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY:  Over the course of two meetings with 
the Kurdistan Islamic Union (KIU), a Kurdish splinter 
group from the Kurdistan Alliance and the main rival 
to the dominant KDP and PUK parties in Kurdistan, 
members highlighted their allegedly non-sectarian, 
democratic and secular political agenda, and reviewed 
allegations of corruption and voter intimidation by 
the two main Kurdish parties.  PolOff strongly urged 
them to report instances of voter fraud and 
intimidation tactics to the IECI, and reminded them of 
U.S. opposition to expelling by force Arabs who were 
settled into Kirkuk.  END SUMMARY. 
 
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(U) Who is the KIU? 
------------------- 
 
2. (U) In consecutive meetings with TNA members 
affiliated with the Kurdistan Islamic Union (KIU) on 
December 4-5, PolOff discussed the KIU's split with 
the Kurdistan Alliance and its own goals for the 
election.  The KIU interlocutors were Fathel Haidar 
Kaka Ahmed, Pakiza Mustafa Ahmed (Chair of the Women, 
Children, and Family Committee), Rasul Mahmod Mohamed, 
Ahmed Wahab Majid (Constitution Committee member), 
Adel Noori Mohamed (KIU nominee for the next 
parliament), Dindar Najman Shafiq (leader of the KIU 
presence in the TNA), and Mullah Ahmad Sayd Penjweni. 
Fathel Ahmed, the group's spokeman during these 
meetings, explained to PolOff KIU's history of 
peaceful opposition to the KDP and PUK. 
 
3. (U) The KIU has been politically active since the 
1960s in the Kurdistan region, but did not register as 
a political party until 1994, where it was the only 
party to do so without a militia.  While an Islamic 
party whose references are the Islamic marja'iyah 
sources, Ahmed denied being a religious party. 
(Comment:  Ahmed explained that he was referring to 
the Sunni marja'iyah, which is doctrinal rather than 
invested in religious figures which he said is the 
case with the Shia marja'iyah.  End Comment.)  When 
pushed by PolOff to explain what that meant, Ahmed 
explained the KIU wanted a civilian government without 
oversight by religious authorities, based on the 
Constitution, strong democratic institutions, and an 
emphasis on a modern, moderate interpretation of 
Islam.  Other Islamist groups were attacking them for 
there non-sectarian beliefs, claimed Ahmed. 
 
3. (U) The KIU has historically rejected violence, and 
even under pressure from the two main Kurdish parties 
refused to get involved in the civil wars.  They 
primarily work on humanitarian projects in close 
cooperation with NGOs, such as the Islamic Relief 
Organization, and building schools and orphanages for 
the victims of Kurdish civil wars.  Ahmed stated that 
as a matter of principle the KIU did not discriminate 
on sectarian or ethnic lines. 
 
4. (U) In response to PolOff's query on funding 
sources, Ahmed responded that it was difficult for 
them.  Currently, they have no outside funding, but 
rely on investments in small projects and donations 
from their members.  A significant step forward was 
NDI's recent promise to print campaign banners for 
them.  Mullah Penjweni reported that the KIU had no 
more posters, since they kept being torn down or 
painted over.  (Comment:  One of the KIU's posters in 
Dohuk, that they said was repeatedly vandalized, show 
two hands - one Arab and one Kurdish - and the 
statement "The Wish of 561," KIU's list number.  End 
Comment.) 
 
----------------------------------------- 
(U) Splitting with the Kurdistan Alliance 
----------------------------------------- 
 
5. (U) Since 1992, the KIU has clashed with the KDP 
and the PUK in regional elections.  They have 
consistently garnered at least 20 percent of the votes 
in the region, according to Ahmed.  The KIU ranks 
second overall after the PUK in Sulymaniyah, second 
overall after the KDP in Dohuk, and third overall in 
the region.  Ahmed claimed that the KIU lost half of 
its membership last year when it reluctantly joined 
with the Kurdistan Alliance.  If the KIU had remained 
in the Alliance this year it would have lost the 
remaining half, he asserted.  He explained that there 
were two main reasons for the split from the KDP and 
PUK: the increased level of corruption in the KDP and 
PUK and the need to offer an alternative to the two 
main Kurdish parties. 
 
6. (C) In response to President Jalal Talabani's Chief 
of Staff Kamiran Karadaghi's statement that the KIU 
and other splinter parties would continue to vote with 
the Kurdistan Alliance in the future, Ahmed heatedly 
replied that while the KIU shared some of the same 
interests with the Alliance they would vote 
independently and according to their principles. (See 
reftel.) 
 
------------------------- 
(U) Election Fraud Likely 
------------------------- 
 
7. (C) The dominance of the KDP and the PUK, as well 
as the increased administrative and financial 
corruption in its ranks, meant the elections would 
almost certainly be rife with fraud and intimidation 
tactics, the KIU officials predicted.  Ahmed claimed 
that only half of the Kurds intended to vote in the 
December election.  PolOff replied that the Ambassador 
had raised the importance of running a free, fair and 
transparent election in Kurdistan with KDP leader 
Masud Barzani and President Talabani.  Ahmed countered 
that the PUK- and KDP-dominated media in Kurdistan 
made no mention of such warnings by the Ambassador 
during his visit.  He recommended the U.S. monitor the 
elections, especially in Ninewa province, to ensure 
they are credible. 
 
8. (C) When pressed for specific instances of 
intimidation by the main Kurdish parties, Ahmed stated 
that Kurdish authorities had been told anyone voting 
for the KIU would have his food rations withheld. 
Rasul Mohamed stated that last week a KIU candidate in 
Halabja and KIU-affiliated media assistant in 
Sulymaniyah were harassed in their homes by suspected 
Pesh Merga officers.  By December 5, they complained, 
at least eleven KIU members in the region had received 
letters containing a single bullet inside.  PolOff 
strongly urged them to report such events to the IECI 
Election Fraud hotline.  The IECI could not respond to 
allegations if they were not aware of them, PolOff 
continued, and every data point would build the case 
against the worst offenders. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
(U) KIU Positions on Key Kurdish Issues 
--------------------------------------- 
 
9. (C) On the scheduled merger between the Kurdistan 
Regional Governments (KRGs) in Erbil and Sulymaniyah, 
Ahmed opined that if that happened, there would 
actually be four governments in Kurdistan: the KDP and 
the PUK would split the main ministries of Finance, 
Defense, Interior, and Justice between them and each 
ministry would act as independent entities. 
Employment in any of the KRG government institutions 
and ministries require KDP or PUK party affiliation, 
he charged.  In addition, corruption is rampant 
throughout both the KRGs, he stated.  Concerns about 
merging the two governments result from fears that a 
merged KRG government would lead to a renewal of the 
KDP/PUK civil wars of the 1990s, opined Ahmed. (See 
reftel.)  Ahmed went on to state that any merger 
between the two main groups would only be supQficial. 
He doubted that the PUK would allow the KDP into 
Sulymaniyah, and vice versa. 
 
10. (C) Kurdish independence, while not a primary goal 
of the KIU, should nevertheless be an option, said 
Ahmed.  In language similar to that of the Kurdistan 
Alliance, Ahmed replied that the KIU preferred to stay 
in a united Iraq, but would retain their right to 
separate if they felt their needs were not being 
addressed fairly.  When PolOff queried whether 
absorbing Kirkuk into Kurdistan would be a 
precondition for independence, Ahmed replied that 
Kirkukis alone should decide whether they are part of 
Kurdistan.  KIU was only concerned that Article 58 of 
the TAL be implemented in its entirety.  As for the 
Iraqi Arabs transplanted to Kirkuk, the KIU was 
against forced removal, but stated that their identity 
cards should reflect their original province, rather 
than Kirkuk.  PolOff emphasized that expelling Arab 
settlers from Kirkuk was not authorized in Article 58, 
and stressed the need to respect the rights of all the 
ethnic minorities living in Kirkuk. 
 
11. (C) PolOff also raised the question of the KRG 
flying Kurdish flags outside of Kurdistan.  (We had 
heard reports from non-Kurdish minority groups that 
Kurdish officials would not allow Iraqi flags in some 
Pesh Merga-controlled parts of Ninewa and Kirkuk south 
of the Green Line.)  Ahmed stated that the PUK raised 
both Iraqi and Kurdish flags in their territory, but 
the KDP did not. Most of the ethnic minorities lived 
in KDP territories, he added. 
 
----------- 
(U) Comment 
----------- 
 
12. (C) The KIU represents an increasingly vocal 
Kurdish minority that resents the KDP and PUK for 
their corruption and perceived inability to fight for 
core Kurdish desires, such as independence, during the 
constitution negotiations.  As the largest party 
outside the main two, the KIU can provide us with 
independent perspectives of the internal politics in 
Kurdistan.  From these initial two meetings in 
Baghdad, it appears that the KIU may be a valuable 
interlocutor on the sometimes murky political 
landscape of the north. 
KHALILZAD