US embassy cable - 05BAGHDAD4891

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 004891 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/07/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PINS, KISL, KDEM, IZ, Ba'ath, Elections 
SUBJECT: SCIRI LEADER WARNS OF ELECTION FRAUD, BENDS  ON 
DE-BA'ATHIFICATION 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for reasons 
1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
 1. (C) SUMMARY: Over dinner with the Ambassador on 
November 29, SCIRI leader Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim and 
Interior Minister Bayan Jabr alleged the U.S. excludes 
Iraqi security forces from operations against 
insurgents and also warned of election fraud.  Hakim's 
aides noted that the constitutional requirement for a 
two-thirds majority vote on the next Presidency 
Council ensured that a broad coalition government will 
emerge.  Hakim reluctantly agreed with the Ambassador 
that electoral candidates identified by the De- 
Ba'athification Commission should be able to review 
the evidence against them before being removed from 
the election slates.  Hakim also agreed that 
provincial elections should be held several months 
after the December 15 national election.  Hakim said 
he welcomes the USG decision to engage Iran at the 
level of the Ambassador solely on matters relating to 
Iraq's security, and he volunteered to pass messages 
to further the dialogue.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2. (C) On November 29 at his residence, the Ambassador 
hosted SCIRI leader Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim, Interior 
Minister Bayan Jabr, and deputy SCIRI leader Humam al- 
Hammudi for dinner. 
 
3. (C) SECURITY STRATEGY:  Hakim expressed concern 
that Iraqis lack a clear leader they could rely on to 
improve security in Iraq.  Too many officials making 
decisions confuses the matter, he said.  The 
Ambassador and Minister Jabr both agreed that 
improving security in Baghdad would be key to 
stabilizing Iraq as a whole.  Jabr complained that too 
often he and Defense Minister Sa'adounDulaimi meet 
and agree on policies only to see implementation fall 
through at a lower level. 
 
4. (C) Jabr asserted that U.S. commanders also impede 
operations; as an example, he pointed to the 
deployment of a U.S. brigade to a heavily-populated 
area in Baghdad that should have included three times 
as many Iraqi forces -- but Iraqi advice was ignored, 
he said.  Hakim added that U.S. military commanders 
blocked a planned Iraqi operation in Diyala.  Jabr 
said he felt particularly hamstrung by allegations 
that he is a sectarian Shia leader, not an Iraqi one. 
(NOTE: He implied that this criticism came from both 
U.S. and Iraqi sides.  END NOTE.)  Such criticism has 
made him reluctant to dispatch his forces to Sunni 
areas, he said, particularly Ramadi.  Jabr added that 
Election Day security is now his top priority. 
 
5. (C) ELECTION FRAUD FEARS:  Looking ahead to the 
elections, Hakim told the Ambassador that he is 
concerned that fraud will occur when IECI workers plug 
their count into a computer program used to tally the 
seats.  He claimed that fraud of this nature cost the 
Shia Alliance some 20 seats in the January elections. 
(NOTE: We did not hear such an allegation last 
February.  END NOTE.)  UN SRSG Ashraf Qazi dropped in 
on the meeting and Hakim raised this concern directly 
with him, requesting a copy of the election software 
for review.  Qazi pledged to look into the matter and 
to arrange a meeting with SCIRI officials to discuss 
election preparations in detail.  Both Qazi and the 
Ambassador emphasized that the surest path to 
preventing fraud is sending monitors to polling 
centers.  Hamudi said the Shia Alliance has plans to 
dispatch some 7,000 monitors on Election Day, some of 
whom have benefited from National Democratic Institute 
training.  Qazi said the UN is requesting that the EU 
supply monitors for the vote.  Qazi also lamented that 
the security situation represents a significant 
obstacle. 
 
6. (C) SPECULATING ON THE NEXT GOVERNMENT: Despite 
entreaties from the Ambassador, Hakim declined to 
predict the shape of the next government or the 
election outcome.  Hammudi noted that the 
constitutional requirement for a two-thirds vote on 
the next Presidency Council ensures that a broad 
coalition government will emerge.  Hakim claimed that 
the Shia Alliance had been ready to include Ayad 
Allawi and his coalition in the transitional 
government, but he said Allawi rejected their offers. 
Hakim claimed that Allawi insisted on the prime 
ministership, and, when he could not attain it, chose 
total opposition over cooperation.  Jabr predicted 
Allawi would win only 15 seats in the coming election, 
with Chalabi winning 3-5. 
 
7. (C) DIALOGUE WITH IRAN:  Hakim welcomed the U.S. 
decision to engage Iran at the level of the Ambassador 
on matters relating to Iraq's security.  Hakim 
volunteered to pass messages to further the dialogue. 
He urged the U.S. to continue pursuing a policy of 
pressuring Syria in order to achieve control over the 
western border. 
 
8. (C) CAIRO IRAQI ACCORD CONFERENCE:  Hakim said he 
considers the Cairo Conference a success that will 
hamper the insurgency's ability to de-legitimize the 
Iraqi government.  Hammudi, who shook hands with 
Muslim Ulema Council leader Harith al-Dari during the 
conference, noted that Dari refused to acknowledge 
that Sunni and Shia share a religion.  Hammudi said 
his subsequent meeting with Grand Imam of Al-Azhar al- 
Tantawi was much better.  Hammudi defended the final 
statement from the Cairo Conference as a clear 
denunciation of all violence in Iraq.  When showed the 
exact text and the implication that attacks on 
Coalition Forces could be justified, Hammudi made no 
attempt to rebut.  Jabr agreed that this particular 
language had not been helpful. 
 
9. (C) DE-BA'ATHIFICATION OF CANDIDATES: The 
Ambassador told Hakim that candidates accused of being 
Ba'athists should have the opportunity to review the 
evidence against them before being purged from the 
candidate lists.  Hakim initially argued back.  He 
said the De-Ba'athification Commission had the 
authority to make such judgments on its own.  PolCouns 
observed that several of the 80 candidates thus far 
accused of being senior Ba'athists appeared to be 
innocent of the charge.  PolCouns asked Hammudi how 
his own constitution committee deputy, Adnan al- 
Janabi, could be a Ba'athist.  Hammudi expressed 
surprise that Janabi was on the list and claimed he 
was not.  When the Ambassador confirmed that Adnan al- 
Janabi is on the De-Baathification Commission's list, 
Hammudi and Hakim acknowledged that a review of the 
evidence would be a fair step before any action is 
taken. 
 
10. (C) PROVINCIAL ELECTION TIMING:  The Ambassador 
suggested that the provincial elections be put off 
until several months after the national elections. 
The proposed date of February 15 included in some 
draft legislation, he said, is too early for proper 
security measures to be planned.  Hakim agreed and 
said he considered conducting the provincial elections 
simultaneously with the referendum on constitutional 
amendments, which is scheduled for six months after 
the stand-up of the next National Assembly.  Jabr also 
was supportive of moving the election date back. 
(NOTE: On December 4, the TNA passed an amended 
version of the provincial elections law, which sets 
the elections for "two months after the formation of 
the new government."  END NOTE.) 
KHALILZAD