US embassy cable - 05ADDISABABA4044

Disclaimer: This site has been first put up 15 years ago. Since then I would probably do a couple things differently, but because I've noticed this site had been linked from news outlets, PhD theses and peer rewieved papers and because I really hate the concept of "digital dark age" I've decided to put it back up. There's no chance it can produce any harm now.

ERITREAN UNMEE EJECTIONS: THE VIEW FROM ADDIS

Identifier: 05ADDISABABA4044
Wikileaks: View 05ADDISABABA4044 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Addis Ababa
Created: 2005-12-07 13:33:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL KPKO MARR ET ER EE BORDER
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L ADDIS ABABA 004044 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AF FOR DAS YAMAMOTO, USUN FOR EMILY BRUNO FROM CHARGE 
HUDDLESTON 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/07/2015 
TAGS: PREL, KPKO, MARR, ET, ER, EE BORDER 
SUBJECT: ERITREAN UNMEE EJECTIONS: THE VIEW FROM ADDIS 
 
REF: ASMARA 01171 
 
Classified By: Charge Vicki Huddleston for reason 1.4 (b,d) 
 
1. (C) On December 7, NATO ambassadors met to review with 
UNMEE deputy Amb. Ennifar the Eritrean decision to order the 
withdrawal of US, Canadian, European and Russian staff from 
UNMEE within ten days.  Amidst considerable hand-wringing, 
there was consensus that -- as per reftel -- the 
international community should "do no harm."  There was also 
consensus on the Indian ambassador's point that it was 
essential to keep UNMEE in place as a buffer between the two 
military forces.  Most of those present remained convinced 
that neither nation wants war.  Ennifar said that he had met 
with State Minister Tekeda who again promised that Ethiopia 
would not start a conflict. 
 
2. (C) The French ambassador wondered if there was some way 
the international community could communicate to Isaias they 
would be unable to "save" Eritrea as they had in the past, as 
Ethiopia would march into Asmara.  I said that while we in 
the field would likely have limited influence on the UNSC's 
response to Eritrea's actions as they had much wider 
ramification than just the Eritrea and Ethiopia, I would 
certainly urge that the UN proceed cautiously given that 
there remains space for a resolution of this conflict. 
 
3. (C) I spoke separately Dec. 7 with Director of Europe and 
North America Grum, who said that he wouldn't be surprised if 
Isaias decided to allow UNMEE to return to full operations 24 
hours prior to the sanction deadline.  Isaias' rationale for 
ordering Westerners out, according to Grum, was to force 
Ethiopia to suspend plans to withdraw troops as ordered by 
the UNSC, and thus force the UN to sanction Ethiopia.  When 
asked if this meant that the GOE was still committed to 
re-deploying its troops to their December 2004 positions, 
Grum's answer was that Ethiopia would not be caught in 
Isaias' game. 
 
4. (C) COMMENT: My recommendation is that we continue with 
the diplomatic initiatives outlined by DAS Yamamoto during 
his recent visit to Addis Ababa.  END COMMENT 
HUDDLESTON 

Latest source of this page is cablebrowser-2, released 2011-10-04