US embassy cable - 05BANGKOK7527

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 007527 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT PASS EAP, EAP/MLA, S/CT 
PACOM FOR FPA (HUSO) 
NSC FOR MORROW 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/28/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PTER, TH, Southern Thailand 
SUBJECT: SOUTHERN VIOLENCE: RTG QUIETLY REACHES OUT TO 
SEPARATIST GROUPS 
 
REF: BANGKOK 7090 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce. Reason 1.4 (b,d) 
 
1.  (C)  SUMMARY:  The Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD) 
has been quietly meeting in northern Malaysia and in Europe 
with purported leadership figures from some of the prominent 
southern Thai separatist groups -- including the Barisan 
Revolusi Nasional Coordinate (BRN-C) -- in an attempt to 
facilitate a dialogue with the Thai government.  Prime 
Minister Thaksin has apparently given his approval for 
continued exploratory talks in Europe and has given one of 
his closest advisors responsibility for following the 
discussions.  The high-level interest of the RTG in exploring 
the possibility of some form of negotiated end to the 
southern conflict is a positive sign.  That being said, it 
seems unlikely to us that exiled separatist leaders have 
significant, if any, operational control over militants in 
the South.  It is also unclear to us how these groups would 
be positioned to address the central issue: widespread 
estrangement of southern Malay Muslims with the Thai 
government. END SUMMARY 
 
2.  (C)  The Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HDC,) also 
known as the Henri Dunant Centre, based in Geneva, has been 
working quietly in Thailand, northern Malaysia and Europe 
over the past year in an effort to identify possible 
interlocutors among Thai separatist groups.  They are 
attempting to establish a reliable dialogue partner for the 
Thai government and to facilitate talks between the 
separatist groups and the Thai government.  HDC also aims to 
encourage cooperation between the Malaysian and Thai 
governments to address their common challenge along the 
border. (NOTE: HDC's work is carried out very quietly. They 
requested that information about their activities be kept 
confidential. END NOTE) 
 
SIPDIS 
 
3.  (C)  HDC staff members involved in the project told 
emboffs that they had met with members of the Barisan 
Revolusi Nasional Coordinate (BRN-C), Pattani United 
Liberation Organization (PULO), the Pattani Islamic 
Mujahideen Movement (GMIP), and Wan Khadir Che Man, the 
leader of Bersatu -- a separatist "umbrella" organization. 
HDC noted that all of these groups made varying claims of 
responsibility for actions in southern Thailand.  However, 
BRN-C appeared to play the more central role (NOTE: Septel 
will detail how BRN-C is increasingly perceived to be the 
leading operational organization in the South. END NOTE). 
HDC confirmed press reports -- publicly denied by the RTG -- 
that Wan Kadir Che Man has been in direct contact with 
representatives of the Thai government. 
 
4.  (C)  HDC's primary interlocutor in Europe is Shamsuddin 
Khan, reportedly PULO's exiled leader.  Khan has apparently 
been attempting to bring the disparate elements of PULO and 
other separatist groups together.  He has been involved in 
previous "talks" with the RTG and was the primary 
interlocutor during a series of negotiations between the RTG 
and separatist groups which occurred in Cairo and Damascus in 
1994.  HDC senior staff members believe Khan "has open lines" 
to separatist groups and can legitimately speak on their 
behalf.  They claimed that the Thai National Intelligence 
Agency (NIA) agrees Khan could play a constructive role in a 
negotiation.  HDC is attempting to arrange a meeting in 
Geneva between Khan and a retired Thai Army General as early 
as this month.  Apparently the BRN-C leaders are unwilling to 
talk directly with RTG officials in Malaysia, but indicated 
that Khan would serve as their intermediary. 
 
5.  (C)  HDC staffers indicated that Prime Minister Thaksin 
is personally aware of their efforts and reported that 
Pansak Vinyaratn -- Thaksin's chief policy advisor -- 
approved ongoing exploratory talks.  Thaksin has reportedly 
tasked Pansak with handling contacts between HDC and the 
separatists. 
 
6.  (C)  COMMENT:  This is all good as far as it goes, but is 
unlikely to have an impact on the violence in the South any 
time soon.  We do not believe the exiled leaders involved in 
these discussions exercise operational control over the 
disparate militant cells who are actually carrying out 
attacks.  Furthermore, these exiled leaders represent an 
older generation of ethnic Malay separatist whose struggles 
of past decades mean little to a new generation of angry 
Malay youth.  Thaksin's support for HDC is a positive sign, 
showing that the PM is open to this kind of dialogue as part 
of a possible solution to problems in the South.  But 
valuable as dialogue may be in educating RTG officials on 
Thai Muslim attitudes and grievances, it does nothing to 
address fundamental causes of the conflict, particularly the 
deep-seated sense of "injustice" felt by the majority of 
Muslims in the far South.  END COMMENT 
BOYCE