US embassy cable - 05CAIRO9100

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 009100 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC STAFF FOR SINGH 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/04/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, KDEM, EG, Elections, Egyptian Politics 
SUBJECT: TAKING STOCK OF EGYPT'S ELECTIONS 
 
Classified by Ambassador Francis Ricciardone for reasons 1.4 
(b) and (d). 
 
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Summary 
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1. (C) After the relatively positive presidential elections, 
Egypt's  parliamentary elections were marred by a low 
turnout, vote-rigging, and violence -- but nonetheless 
signify a new stage in the country's political transition. 
Gains by Islamists and the role played by civil society 
testify to a significant expansion of political space. Some 
conclusions: 
 
--President Mubarak is managing political reform and so far 
allowing only slow, controlled change. 
 
--After exerting considerable influence in the presidential 
elections, Gamal Mubarak and the NDP reformers appear 
diminished; 
 
--The traditional opposition has been sidelined for now. 
 
--The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) is resurgent, but given the low 
turnout, neither it nor the NDP can claim a true mandate. 
 
--Civil society, in the form of organized, idealistic 
domestic monitors,  has asserted itself. 
 
Following is our assessment of Egypt's recent election 
season.  End summary. 
 
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Change is Happening but Mubarak in Driver's Seat 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
2. (C) Three rounds of parliamentary elections and Egypt's 
first-ever competitive presidential election clearly show 
that Egypt has reached an important juncture in a process of 
political transformation that began several years ago.  The 
parliamentary elections saw violence and clumsy efforts to 
rig the process, evidently limited to carefully targetted 
locales. They were also hampered by the Government refusal to 
reopen voter registration (ensuring a low turnout).  The 
gains by MB candidates (running as independents), the 
widespread presence of domestic monitors from civil society, 
and the relatively objective media coverage nonetheless 
reflect how far Egypt has come in the last year.  However, 
the secular, modernist opposition has been sidelined, for 
now.  Likewise, key reform-oriented members of the ruling 
NDP, who had aligned themselves with Gamal Mubarak, were 
mainly excluded from the party's candidate slate and now 
question their role in the party. 
 
3. (C)  The NDP appears in a potentially healthy internal 
simmer.  Reverting to old style tactics, it did only slightly 
better in these elections than they had in the 2000 elections 
(which had been considered a "wake up call" for the NDP 
because of its poor showing), as many of their candidates 
lost to NDP "renegade" independents or MBs running as 
independents.  The MB's success against all others (in the 
races they chose to compete) is the clearest indicator of 
progress in democratic processes scarcely imaginable even a 
year ago.  Although the MB has taken advantage of the 
democratic openings that the GOE, however reluctantly, has 
created, many observers remain skeptical about their 
commitment to real democracy. 
 
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The New Parliament 
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4. (C) Egypt's next parliament will be populated by a 
majority of veteran ruling party members, few of whom are 
distinguished by their commitment to genuine reform, and a 
freshly energized Islamist minority.  The NDP's majority will 
leave it in firm control of the legislative process. 
However, the MB, which has already won 75 seats (up from 16 
in the outgoing parliament, will have a pronounced influence 
on the tone and tenor of debate. 
 
5. (C) The secular opposition parties will play little or no 
role in the new parliament:  The Wafd, Egypt's "premier" 
opposition party, continued its steep descent into 
irrelevance, hobbled by inept and superannuated leadership. 
At best, the Wafd's spectacular humiliation in the 2005 
eletions could prompt a long overdue house cleaning.  Several 
other parties fit the same pattern.  In a different vein, the 
Ghad, the year-old secular modernist party, was 
systematically destroyed by internal factionalism exacerbated 
by a raft of government tactics, principally the 
politically-driven prosecution of its leader Ayman Nour (who 
nonetheless placed second to Mubarak, with 700,000 votes in 
the September presidential race). 
 
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Elections Don't Reflect Popular Choice 
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6.  (C) The MB's gains do not mean that a substantial 
majority of Egyptians support the MB and its aim to further 
Islamicize governance and society.  Egyptian voters were 
essentially given two choices:  On the one hand was a ruling 
party that despite considerable efforts to reform since 2000 
(mainly led by Gamal) appeared bereft of any discernable 
ideology and was saddled both with a well-earned reputation 
for corruption and a poor record of delivering jobs and 
services to the citizenry.  On the other hand was a 
well-organized political-religious movement with no record of 
governance to defend and an ability to appeal to the deeply 
held spiritual values of an alienated citizenry. 
 
7. (C) Further, the MB chose to run candidates in only 170 of 
the 444 races.  Although its success rate so far is better 
than 50 percent, it also chose to compete in races where its 
chances were best and used its considerable powers of 
organization to great effect in those races.  As Supreme 
Guide Mahdi Akef himself said in an interview in Al-Araby on 
November 27, the MB might have the backing of only 25 percent 
of the Egyptian electorate.  Domestic monitors have reported 
much lower turnout in many races, particularly in those where 
thugs scared voters from the polls or police blockaded 
access.  Some estimate that only 5 percent of the 30 percent 
of eligible voters who are registered bothered to vote. 
 
8. (C) Particularly in this context, the MB's parliamentary 
gains seem inevitable, and likely reflect no broad popular 
mandate for any party.  Many Egyptian voters we spoke with 
flatly told us that they voted for the MB simply to send the 
NDP a message. 
 
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Civil Society Empowered 
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9. (C) Civil society groups who took on domestic monitoring 
have defined an important place for themselves on Egypt's 
political stage.  While there were considerable problems with 
access, and isolated incidents of violence against monitors, 
the concept of domestic monitoring is now an accepted part of 
the political landscape and reflects the increasing 
confidence and institutional strength of activist NGOs.  Many 
of the volunteers are young and NGO contacts are excited at 
the new level of interest in participatory democracy that 
represents a desire to make government work, rather than tear 
things down--as had been the case in earlier spurts of 
activism. 
 
 
RICCIARDONE