US embassy cable - 05PRAGUE1688

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 PRAGUE 001688 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
PASS TO DAS MARK PEKALA, EUR/NCE FOR FICHTE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/05/2015 
TAGS: PREL, KDEM, PHUM, EUN, CU, PGOV, EZ 
SUBJECT: DAS MARK PEKALA FINDS COMMITTED ALLIES IN PRAGUE 
 
REF: PRAGUE 1601 
 
Classified By: Poloff Sarah C. Peck for reasons 1.4(b) and (d). 
 
1. (U) Action requests in paragraphs 25 and 26. 
 
2. (C) Summary. DAS Mark Pekala traveled to Prague November 
30-December 1 to meet with Czechs actively working to promote 
democracy and human rights in Cuba, Belarus, and elsewhere; 
and to discuss Czech policy priorities on neighboring 
countries, including Russia and in Eastern Europe, and the 
Balkans. The Czechs confirmed their commitment to improved 
transatlantic relations, support for the new U.S. focus on 
transformational diplomacy, and shared U.S.-Czech policy 
goals on countries in the region. Other topics discussed 
included Czech views on (1) flaws in EU policy on the 
Moldova/Transnistria conflict, (2) PM Jiri Paroubek's 
increasingly bold flirtation with the Communists ("playing 
with fire"), (3) supporting the opposition in Belarus 
(important to legitimize Milinkievich), and (4) the political 
cost of the visa waiver impasse (Czechs ask, is there 
anything the U.S. can give the Czechs in the short-term?). 
End summary. 
 
3. (SBU) During his visit, DAS Pekala met with Martin 
Povejsil, MFA Political Director; Jaromir Plisek, MFA 
Director General, Territorial Section I (including Russia and 
Eastern Europe); Gabriela Dlouha, MFA Coordinator of the 
Transition Promotion Unit; Jiri Pehe, political scientist, 
consultant to PM Jiri Paroubek, and Director of New York 
University in Prague; Helena Bambasova, MFA Director General, 
Territorial Section II (including the Americas); Edita Hrda, 
MFA Director of the Department of Americas; and others 
representing NGOs, think-tanks, business, and educational 
institutions (see paragraph 10). DAS Pekala was also 
interviewed by CT24, a 24-hour television news channel, and 
Mlada Fronta Dnes, a respected center right newspaper. The 
subject of DAS Pekala,s meetings included transatlantic 
relations, democracy promotion, Russia and Eastern Europe, 
Czech internal politics and Communists, visa waiver, and 
other issues (including a Czech-proposed meeting between FM 
Cyril Svoboda and Secretary Rice in Washington in early 
2006). 
 
----------------------- 
Transatlantic Relations 
----------------------- 
 
4. (SBU) DAS Pekala explained that for most of the twentieth 
century, U.S.-European relations were focused on Europe 
itself. In the twenty-first century, however, the focus has 
shifted outward. The organizing principle of the current 
transatlantic relationship is transformational diplomacy. 
Accordingly, the U.S. is seeking ways to work with its EU 
allies to promote democracy and human rights elsewhere. He 
asked the Czechs how the U.S. can better coordinate with the 
EU to achieve their common goals. 
 
5. (C) Plisek said the Czechs strive for common dialogue 
between the U.S. and the EU, and support the new focus on 
transformational diplomacy because it is consistent with the 
traditional Czech focus on human rights and good governance. 
The Czechs recently discussed transatlantic priorities 
internally, and concluded that U.S.-EU cooperation would be 
more successful if they jointly identified a limited number 
of high-priority issues on which to focus. The Czechs have 
not concluded their short list of proposed issues, but the 
following Czech foreign policy priorities provide a clue: 
according to Povejsil, their primary focus is on neighboring 
countries in Eastern Europe, Russia, and the Balkans. 
Additional priorities include Cuba and the Middle East. 
 
6. (C) When asked if the U.S.-EU relationship could be 
restructured to facilitate greater involvement of the new 
member states in EU policy-making, Povejsil said without 
elaboration that discussions between the U.S. and EU should 
be "more political." While he repeated his previous 
assessment that the smaller and newer member states would be 
better served by U.S.-EU dialogues with all 25 members 
(rather than in the U.S.-Troika format), he admitted this 
presented organizational challenges. Still, he urged the U.S. 
to find a way to involve all EU members in policy discussions 
because new members find it difficult to introduce topics of 
interest into transatlantic discussions. Hrda concurred that 
all members should be present at Troika meetings, even if 
 
PRAGUE 00001688  002 OF 005 
 
 
they cannot contribute. 
 
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Democracy Promotion 
------------------- 
 
7. (C) On democracy promotion, Bambasova echoed Povejsil,s 
suggestion that the U.S. and the EU should develop a list of 
countries on which to focus joint efforts. The Czechs are 
still finalizing their list, but Bambasova and Hrda expect 
the list will include Afghanistan, Sudan, Haiti, and Moldova, 
in addition to Belarus and Cuba. Povejsil also provided 
insight on how the Czechs promote their democracy initiatives 
within the EU. He said the Czechs typically focus on 
coordinating their efforts with older EU members (he 
mentioned Denmark, Netherlands, and Germany) because newer 
members tend to be weak. He conceded, however, that common 
experience makes it easier for new members to work together 
on some issues. 
 
8. (C) DCM encouraged Bambasova and Hrda to continue efforts 
to engage EU partners on difficult policy issues like Cuba. 
He said the Czechs are doing fine on substance, but wondered 
whether they would benefit from U.S. assistance on technical 
issues or strategic approaches to the EU. Hrda conceded the 
Czechs have had technical problems dealing with the EU. DCM 
offered any assistance the U.S. can provide along these 
lines, whether from Washington, Embassy Prague, or the U.S. 
mission to the EU. 
 
9. (C) Plisek mentioned the Czechs have encountered an 
unexpected problem when they assist countries like Belarus: 
there are no "pools of experts" that can implement plans 
proposed by NGOs. He explained that people with transition 
experience have moved on to form businesses or take positions 
in government and are not available for short-term consulting 
assignments in countries that need them. 
 
10. (U) DAS Pekala's meetings were followed by a working 
dinner with Czechs actively engaged in democracy promotion. 
Guests were Gabriela Dlouha, Czech MFA Transition Promotion 
Unit Coordinator; Kristyna Prunerova, People in Need staffer; 
Jan Bubenik, former MEP and Cuba activist; Oldrich Cerny, 
Executive Director of Forum 2000 (a think-tank), and former 
DG of the Czech Foreign Intelligence Service; and Vaclav 
Bartuska, professor at New York University in Prague, and 
former Director of the Havel Library. The discussion focused 
on Czech efforts in Cuba and Belarus (to be transmitted 
septel), and efforts to promote ethical business practices in 
the Czech Republic. 
 
------------------------- 
Russia and Eastern Europe 
------------------------- 
 
11. (C) Russia remains an important foreign policy priority 
for both the GOCR and the EU. Plisek assured DAS Pekala that 
the Czechs are not anti-Russian. The Czechs believe a common 
EU policy toward Russia is essential because a unified EU 
position, coordinated with the U.S. where possible, is the 
only thing that Russia takes seriously. On Russia's draft NGO 
law, the Czechs share U.S. concerns. Plisek thought that Tony 
Blair, in his official capacity as president of EU, should 
send a letter to Putin expressing concern and emphasizing 
that passage of the law would undermine Russia,s relations 
with the EU. 
 
12. (C) Turning to Ukraine, Povejsil cited that country as an 
example of successful U.S.-EU cooperation. The Czechs believe 
recent events in Ukraine signal expansion of its pro-West 
orientation. Czech FM Cyril Svoboda was scheduled to visit 
Ukraine December 5, 2005 on a mission to determine how the 
Czechs can facilitate further democratic reform. 
 
13. (C) After his visit to Ukraine, FM Svoboda plans to visit 
Moldova, where the Czechs are opening a new Embassy. Plisek 
said Moldova may have the most western orientation of the 
Eastern European countries, but warned that the Transnistria 
problem is dangerous. According to Plisek, the EU wants to 
avoid confrontation with Russia on the issue. Also, the 
Transnistrian President, Igor Smirnov, has created a "modern" 
facade that hides human rights abuses. Plisek stated that the 
EU approach to Moldova is flawed because it essentially 
treats Vladimir Voronin, the duly elected president of the 
Moldovan state, and Smirnov, the leader of the Transnistrian 
 
PRAGUE 00001688  003 OF 005 
 
 
breakaway "republic," as equals who ought to negotiate a 
solution. The GOCR sees one cause of the problem as an 
"imbalance of democratic standards" in the two regions, and 
will aim its bilateral assistance at improving the level of 
democracy and civil society on both sides of the Dniester 
River. 
 
14. (C) On Belarus, Povejsil said EU enlargement is the 
reason for EU's new focus on Belarus; that is, the new EU 
members have raised the profile of this issue within the EU. 
Belarus remains a primary focus for Czech democracy promotion 
efforts (see reftel). As a result of these efforts, the 
Lukashenko regime harasses the Czechs. The Czech Embassy is 
under constant surveillance and Czech diplomats have been 
expelled. Cooperation with the V4 in Belarus has been useful, 
however, as the Czechs now operate assistance efforts out of 
the Visegrad House. 
 
15. (C) On the upcoming election in Belarus, Povejsil 
predicted the election result is "likely to be the one that 
we fear." (Lukashenko claims he will get 74% of the vote.) 
Nevertheless, Plisek said the U.S. and the EU could help by 
taking steps to legitimize the opposition. Along these lines, 
the Czechs were among the first to publicly support Aleksandr 
Milinkievich, the commonly elected opposition candidate. Pehe 
had just visited opposition leaders in Belarus with former 
Ambassador Sasha Vondra and Czech NGO, People in Need. (He 
found Milinkievich impressive and focused.) The Czechs urged 
the U.S. and the EU to listen to the opposition, and provide 
as much requested assistance as possible. 
 
16. (C) Putin will most likely support Lukashenko. Plisek 
said the U.S. and the EU must somehow make the case that it 
is in Russia's interest to have democratic neighbors. The 
Russian presidency of both the G-8 and the Council of Europe 
present opportunities to achieve this goal. 
 
-------------------------------- 
Internal Politics and Communists 
-------------------------------- 
 
17. (C) During DAS Pekala's visit, an Iranian parliamentary 
delegation visited Prague at the invitation of the Communist 
party (KSCM). The delegation met with MFA Deputy Minister 
Jaroslav Basta December 2, and later, albeit briefly, with PM 
Jiri Paroubek at the Parliament. In the subsequent meeting 
with Bambasova and Hrda, DAS Pekala and DCM emphasized that 
non-proliferation is among the U.S.'s strongest priorities, 
and that the United States is concerned by recent visits by 
the DPRK and Iran. Bambasova said the MFA was also surprised 
by the Iranian visit, and did not support the meetings. She 
explained that Paroubek is an opportunist who will do 
anything to be re-elected. She concluded that Paroubek is 
"playing with fire." (Septel will provide details of the 
Iranian visit.) 
 
18. (C) Pehe provided some context on the Communist issue 
during his breakfast with DAS Pekala and POLEC Counselor. 
Pehe agreed working with KSCM is distasteful and problematic, 
not least because of its impact on foreign policy, e.g., the 
recent visits of the North Korean and Iranian delegations. 
Pehe also agreed close cooperation between Paroubek's Social 
Democrats and KSCM could lead to decreased emphasis on 
democracy promotion. However, he said the Communists do not 
pose a threat to democracy in the Czech Republic (discussed 
further in septel). Moreover, Paroubek himself is aware of 
the damage to Czech reputation that working openly with 
Communists would bring. Therefore, Paroubek says privately 
that a CSSD-ODS grand coalition is the most likely result of 
the election. That said, Pehe cautioned that Paroubek would 
work with Communists as necessary, most importantly to ensure 
Klaus is not re-elected as President, and also to keep ODS in 
line (as he is doing now to keep a tight leash on KDU). In 
any case, Pehe said he is convinced that it is too late to 
outlaw KSCM or ignore them. According to Pehe, the greater 
concern is rising nationalism in Central Europe, as witnessed 
by the recent Polish election and developments in Slovakia 
and Hungary. 
 
----------- 
Visa Waiver 
----------- 
 
19. (C) DAS Pekala raised the visa waiver issue with 
Bambasova. He said he understands the issue is emotional and 
 
PRAGUE 00001688  004 OF 005 
 
 
political (and significant), but emphasized the U.S. views 
the visa issue as primarily one of guaranteeing the security 
of U.S. borders. He urged the Czechs to do everything 
possible to make coordinated progress on the Visa Waiver Road 
Map. Bambasova confirmed that the GOCR is committed to the 
Road Map and is working in good faith in the BCWG. She also 
said it is obvious the Embassy is taking steps to make the 
visa application process more comfortable. However, she 
warned that the security issue angle does not play well with 
ordinary Czechs, and the visa waiver impasse is being used by 
Czech politicians to push their domestic agendas. She asked 
whether there is anything that can be offered to the Czech 
people in the short-term while the GOCR is pursuing the Road 
Map. She also noted that the EU is now involved in the issue. 
 
------------ 
Other Issues 
------------ 
 
20. (C) Turning to the Balkans, the Czechs confirmed that 
promoting stability in the region is an important policy 
priority for the Czechs. DAS Pekala said the EU and the U.S. 
should closely consult on policy in the region to ensure that 
what is done and said is productive. Plisek agreed. He said 
the Czechs have previously worked successfully with V4 
allies, and are using that model to coordinate efforts in the 
Balkans. He noted that the Czechs are disappointed that 
distinguished countrymen like Sasha Vondra have not been 
selected to serve as special envoys in places like Moldova or 
the Balkans. He proposed something like affirmative action 
designed to help promote Czechs to positions of leadership in 
the EU. 
 
21. (C) On new governments in Germany and Poland, Plisek said 
the Czechs are optimistic (and a little curious) about both 
countries. He also said that among the larger EU partners, 
Germany may be more sensitive to the concerns of Central 
Europeans. Accordingly, Germany may be willing to help new 
member states coordinate and push their positions in the EU. 
 
22. (C) On military issues, the Czech Parliament will vote in 
December on the troop mandates in Iraq and the Balkans. 
Plisek expected the mandate for Iraq to pass, but was 
concerned the Balkans may not get all the support requested. 
On Bosnia specifically, while the request will likely be 
approved, Plisek thought it would help if Ambassador Cabaniss 
speaks to ODS MP Peter Necas (the shadow Defense Minister). 
On the VERA passive surveillance detection system, DAS Pekala 
apologized for the U.S. delay, and said the U.S. has 
undertaken to do better in the future. Povejsil confirmed the 
Czechs cannot wait months for an answer. Finally, on the 
China arms embargo, Povejsil said that the Czechs continue to 
support the embargo, but they cannot block it alone. DAS 
Pekala offered to provide support, such as consultations with 
U.S. officials, if that could prove helpful. 
 
23. (C) On the proposed Svoboda meeting with Secretary Rice, 
Pekala said he would support such a visit, subject to the 
Secretary,s schedule. He thought a principal purpose of the 
 
SIPDIS 
meeting, among others, could be to discuss the Czech,s 
democracy promotion efforts in Belarus, Cuba and elsewhere. 
 
24. (C) Lastly, on RFE, Bambasova said it is obvious that the 
move to the new building will take place much later than 
expected. She recommended waiting to make any public 
statement about the delay until the building construction 
project is well underway. However, she thought the Ambassador 
could discuss the delay with the Finance Minister in the 
short-term if he desired. 
 
25. (C) Based on DAS Pekala's meetings, the following are 
suggestions for further Department consideration: (1) The 
Czechs have asked the U.S. to look for ways to include all 25 
EU member states in the transatlantic dialogue. They pointed 
to efforts at NATO as a successful model; (2) The Czechs have 
suggested that Tony Blair write a letter to Putin condemning 
the NGO law; and (3) the Czechs have asked whether the U.S. 
can offer anything to the Czechs to improve the visa waiver 
situation. 
 
26. (C) Comment. The Czech Republic is a small country with a 
strong desire to make a difference in places like Cuba, 
Belarus, and the Balkans. This desire should be nurtured 
because it is entirely consistent with the U.S. focus on 
transformational diplomacy. Ways the U.S. can support the 
 
PRAGUE 00001688  005 OF 005 
 
 
Czechs include (1) help them improve their strategic approach 
in the EU (possibly by helping them align their efforts with 
Germany, or providing strategy sessions with U.S. diplomats 
(and other partners) at the U.S. mission to the EU), (2) 
grant the requested Washington meeting between FM Svoboda and 
the Secretary (and have the Secretary encourage the Czechs to 
continue democracy promotion efforts), (3) support the 
candidacy of the Czech Republic for a seat on the UN 
Commission on Human Rights for a three-year term (the 
election takes place at the ECOSOC meeting in April 2006. The 
four candidates are the Czech Republic, Russia, Lithuania, 
and Poland); (4) continue to support the candidacy of 
prominent Czechs, such as former Ambassador to the U.S. Sasha 
Vondra, for positions of leadership in the EU; and (5) 
provide financial support to Czech NGO People in Need, the 
Czech MFA,s NGO partner, in Czech democracy promotion 
efforts in Cuba, Belarus, Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. 
 
27. (U) This cable was cleared by DAS Mark Pekala. 
CABANISS