US embassy cable - 02COLOMBO2293

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Sri Lanka: Muslim leader Rauf Hakeem's problems come into tighter focus

Identifier: 02COLOMBO2293
Wikileaks: View 02COLOMBO2293 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Colombo
Created: 2002-12-12 10:59:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PGOV PINR PINS CE Political Parties
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 002293 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS, AND INR/NESA; NSC FOR E. 
MILLARD 
 
E.O. 12958:  DECL: 12-12-12 
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, PINS, CE, Political Parties 
SUBJECT:  Sri Lanka:  Muslim leader Rauf Hakeem's 
problems come into tighter focus 
 
Refs:  Colombo 2277, and previous 
 
(U) Classified by Lewis Amselem, Deputy Chief of 
Mission.  Reasons 1.5 (b,d). 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY:  With his party fragmenting around him, 
Rauf Hakeem of the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC) 
finds himself in a very precarious position.  While he 
is respected in Colombo circles for his support of the 
peace process, Hakeem is considered a lightweight 
politician.  The fact that he is not from the east where 
a plurality of Sri Lankan Muslims live is also a serious 
liability.  With his political survival at stake, Hakeem 
has to make a comeback soon or face probable 
marginalization.  Another factor hurting Hakeem is the 
emerging view that it might not be bad for the peace 
process if he is cut out of the scene.  END SUMMARY. 
 
================ 
Hakeem in a Bind 
================ 
 
2.  (C) Rauf Hakeem, the leader of the SLMC, finds 
himself in a very precarious position.  (Note:  Hakeem 
also serves the governing coalition as Minister of Ports 
and Shipping.)  As reported in Reftels, his party has 
recently fragmented into hostile camps, one remaining 
loyal to his authority and the other rejecting him out 
of hand.  Both factions appear relatively evenly 
balanced, although Hakeem seems to be able to rely on 
the support of a bare majority of the party's 12 MPs and 
SLMC governing committee members. 
 
3.  (C) If the dispute is not settled in some way soon, 
Hakeem will be tested in coming weeks (and perhaps 
months) in the court system, as party dissidents 
continue their effort to remove him as party leader. 
(Note:  The next legal hearing is scheduled for 
December 13 in Colombo.  Party dissidents, who assert 
that Hakeem has abused his power, claim that they 
removed Hakeem as leader on December 1 per proper SLMC 
procedure.)  Aside from the legal case against him, 
Hakeem is also being challenged politically:  As 
reviewed in Reftels, he is under attack in the press by 
his rivals virtually every day.  In addition, we have 
been told by contacts that party dissidents are trying 
to rally the populace against Hakeem in Muslim areas in 
the Eastern Province.  (Note:  Hakeem has also been 
touring the east trying to garner support.) 
 
======================== 
A Lightweight Politician 
======================== 
 
4.  (C) It is not clear that Hakeem is up to the 
challenge he is facing.  Most contacts agree that Hakeem 
is polite, thoughtful, and intelligent.  In Colombo 
circles, the mild-mannered Hakeem is also respected for 
his support of the peace process.  (Note:  His main SLMC 
opponent, MP A.L.M. Athaulla, is basically against the 
GSL's peace initiative -- see below.)  That said, 
Hakeem's recent problems have solidified his reputation 
as being essentially a lightweight politician, lacking 
the leadership skills required to succeed in the rough- 
and-tumble world of Sri Lankan politics. 
 
5.  (C) In respect to leadership skills, Hakeem has also 
been compared unfavorably to the founder of the party, 
M.H.M. Ashraff, who died in a helicopter crash in 
October 2000.  (Note:  Hakeem assumed control of the 
party in early 2001, after winning a fierce leadership 
battle.)  Ashraff was seen as a strong, charismatic 
leader, who could reach out to the common man.  Hakeem, 
however, is widely seen as somewhat aloof and lacking in 
energy.  (Note:  In meetings with Mission officers, he 
sometimes appears listless.)  This lack of political 
verve and ability to articulate his views to the party 
faithful, coupled with his apparent inability to cut 
political deals, has left many observers wondering 
whether Hakeem has the tools to survive as SLMC leader. 
 
=================== 
The Eastern Problem 
=================== 
 
6.  (C) The fact that Hakeem is not from the east where 
a plurality of Sri Lankan Muslims live is also coming 
into clearer focus as a serious liability.  (Note: 
Hakeem, 42, is from central Sri Lanka, but has spent 
much of his life in Colombo.  Up to 40 percent of Sri 
Lanka's Muslims live in the Eastern Province.)  With the 
peace process focusing inexorably on possible GSL-Tamil 
Tiger power-sharing arrangements, the multi-ethnic east 
is correctly considered the thorniest issue needing 
settlement.  Many eastern Muslims simply do not trust 
Hakeem to negotiate for them, seeing him has too willing 
to compromise with the government and the Tigers. 
Indeed, Hakeem's pro-peace process views are generally 
at odds with those held by many eastern Muslims, who are 
deeply skeptical of Tamil Tiger intentions. 
 
7.  (C) In addition, Hakeem's personal characteristics 
--as touched on above--are off-putting to many 
easterners, who find him too urbane and totally unlike 
the roughhewn, "man-of-the-people" politicians they are 
used to dealing with.  (Note:  Hakeem, a natty dresser, 
is wealthy and was educated in Sri Lanka's best schools. 
Muslims in the east, however, are generally poorer than 
their co-religionists elsewhere in Sri Lanka.  Many of 
them are farmers and fishermen.)  Again, Hakeem's 
failings raise the specter of Ashraff, who was from the 
east, and was extremely popular with Muslims in that 
region. 
 
======= 
COMMENT 
======= 
 
8.  (C) With his political survival at stake, Hakeem has 
to make a comeback soon or face probable 
marginalization.  Thus far, the odds do not look good, 
although Hakeem has been in some tight spots before and 
gotten out of them.  (Note:  There remains the 
possibility that the two sides may work out some sort of 
settlement.  Prime Minister Wickremesinghe has weighed 
in, urging compromise.)  Another factor hurting Hakeem 
is the emerging view that it might not be bad for the 
peace process if he is cut out of the scene.  While this 
perspective is a bit ironic given Hakeem's pro-peace 
process stance, Hakeem is probably not the deus ex 
machina needed to bring eastern Muslims on board with 
the peace process.  The problem is finding someone who 
can play that role -- and it is not clear anyone in the 
Muslim community can.  END COMMENT. 
 
9.  (U) Minimize considered. 
 
WILLS 

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