US embassy cable - 05BAGHDAD4869

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 004869 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/06/2015 
TAGS: PREL, KDEM, IZ, Shia Islamists, Elections 
SUBJECT: MAYSAN POLITICAL LEADER DISCUSSES SHIA ELECTORAL 
POLITICS 
 
REF: BAGHDAD 4843 
 
Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROBERT S. FORD, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) 
AND (D). 
 
1. (C)  Summary:  A prominent tribal leader from Maysan, who 
won a TNA seat on the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA) list in 
January and has decided to join Ali al-Dabbagh's party as a 
candidate in this month's election, told poloff December 5 
that there are no policy differences between the UIA and 
Dabbagh's "Qualified Iraqis Party."  The difference between 
the two is "technical"; those with Dabbagh are perceived to 
be independent of the main political parties on the UIA.  He 
said Dabbagh's team is prepared to join the UIA block in the 
next government.  He also confirmed reports that individual 
Sadrists have joined Shia slates other than the UIA, and said 
Muqtadah al-Sadr would not issue a statement in support of 
the UIA.  He claimed election fraud would be limited to the 
actions of individuals, and downplayed reports of electoral 
violence.  (In a separate conversation December 5 with 
Dabbagh, however, the party leader expressed genuine concern 
about disruptive UIA electoral activities, which he fears 
will undermine the credibility of the election.)  Sharing 
other views, Saadoun argued that the marjaiyah maintained 
primary influence over the Shia south, stronger than the 
tribes, and dismissed the electoral prospects of Iyad Allawi. 
 He said the security situation in Maysan had improved once 
the Sadrists gained political power, and acknowledged 
increased Iranian influence since 2004.  End Summary. 
 
2. (C)  Shia Coalitions.  Poloff met December 5 with Shaykh 
Mohamed al-Saadoun, an al-Amarah resident and leader of the 
Saadoun tribe.  Saadoun, a UIA member of the current National 
Assembly, said he had joined Ali al-Dabbagh's new party and 
is the party's first candidate on Maysan's list.  He 
described the original UIA as 75 percent political party and 
25 percent independent.  For "technical reasons," the 
independent members had joined Dabbagh's "Qualified Iraqis 
Party" to run in the elections for the new government. 
Poloff asked him to define independent; did he mean 
independent from Iran?  Saadoun clarified that Dabbagh's 
group is independent from the political parties, but shares 
the same political program.  Dabbagh's party is prepared to 
join the UIA in the new government, and Saadoun predicted 
that the UIA would gain the largest share of Shia votes 
because it is well-known, identified with Sistani, and 
dominates the media.  But he predicted that Dabbagh's party 
would do well with voters who seek a change from the dominant 
Shia political parties, and predicted the Islamist Coalition 
(a group of Karbala-based religious politicians) would also 
pick up votes.  Saadoun said Dabbagh had chosen individuals 
like himself, who are personally prominent in their 
communities, in the 16 provinces where the party is running. 
 
3. (C)  Leader more critical.  List leader Dabagh has been 
far more critical of the Shia alliance in separate private 
conversations with poloff.  He accused the UIA of tearing 
down his campaign posters, and told poloff that the UIA has 
hired cars fitted with loudspeakers to patrol the streets of 
Karbala and make false announcements that Dabagh has 
withdrawn his candidacy and now backs the "555" (UIA) slate. 
Dabagh has rejected that notion in public.  He told poloff 
that he is trying to cast himself as a modern technocrat who 
can solve problems with economic development.  Still, he is 
discouraged, and said he expects extensive fraud and 
controversy after the elections.  "I'm very worried by what 
I'm seeing inside the (Shia) coalition," Dabagh told poloff. 
Poloff replied that he was worried, too.  Dabagh shot back, 
"You haven't seen what I've seen.  I'm ten times more worried 
than you.  I don't know what they're trying to build here." 
 
4. (C)  Sadr Role and Electoral Environment.  Saadoun, who 
was known to poloff to be sympathetic to Sadr in 2004, 
confirmed that Sadrists are running on lists other than the 
UIA, and said Muqtadah would not issue a statement in support 
of the UIA.  When asked if the fierce rivalry between 
Sadrists and the Badr organization in Maysan (as in other 
parts of the south) affected the campaign, he demurred, 
implying they were cooperating for the sake of the election. 
Asked to comment on the fact that an Allawi candidate in 
Maysan had been murdered on November 30 following a campaign 
event, Saadoun downplayed the incident, suggesting factors 
other than politics could have led to the killing.  He flatly 
dismissed Allawi's prospects in the south and asserted Allawi 
would fare poorly in Baghdad, as well.  He also rejected 
reported concerns about ballot-stuffing and other possible 
forms of electoral fraud, stating that he expected there 
would be incidents of individual fraud but not organized 
interference in the campaign. 
 
5. (C)   Maysan politics.  Saadoun, who played a helpful role 
in responding to the violent 2004 Sadr insurgency in Maysan, 
said stability in the province had increased following the 
January 2005 elections, when Sadr gained 16 seats in the 
provincial council, as well as the governor's seat and the 
head of the provincial council.  Once they gained a dominant 
position in the political process, he explained, they ceased 
fighting.  He commented that the Sadrist leaders of 2005 are 
older and better behaved than the radical youthful leaders of 
2003-2004.   Saadoun shared his view that the influence of 
tribal leaders is waning in the face of competing religious 
or political claims.  But to Maysan's Shia, he argued, the 
voice of the marjaiyah remained paramount.  For example, he 
said, if a marja' offers one view, and a tribal leader offers 
a contradictory view, the members of the tribe are likely to 
favor the marja'.  Saadoun also predicted that Abu Hatem's 
brother, former governor Riyadh al-Mohamedawi, would fail in 
the upcoming elections due to his past poor performance.  He 
complained about the ongoing chaos that characterizes the 
relationship between government entities in the provinces and 
the national ministries in Baghdad, particularly the unclear 
authorities of police chiefs. 
 
6. (C)  Comment:  There was a noticeable shift in Saadoun's 
exchange with poloff (who was assigned to Maysan in 2003-2004 
and is well-known to Saadoun), from an open discussion to a 
scripted dialogue once a TNA Sadr member sat down at the 
table uninvited and joined the discussion.  For example, 
early in the conversation Saadoun spoke freely to poloff 
about the tactical decisions among the various Shia parties 
in arranging the coalitions, including the presence of 
Sadrists on other lists, but moved to partisan statements 
about Allawi's list and electoral fraud once joined by his 
colleague.  Saadoun also told poloff early in the 
conversation that Iran's influence had increased in Maysan 
since 2004, but when asked later to describe the forms of 
influence, he claimed he had merely said there was an 
increase in public awareness of the Iranian role.  It appears 
that Saadoun -- who was not an exile or mujahid in Iran like 
many of Maysan's politicians affiliated with SCIRI, Badr, and 
al-Dawa -- has decided to ally with Sadr, and that local 
leaders like him are populating lists other than the UIA. 
This may explain why he does not share the apprehension 
expressed by Dabbagh about UIA conduct. 
KHALILZAD