US embassy cable - 05ISTANBUL2059

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ISTANBUL 002059 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/06/2025 
TAGS: PGOV, PINS, IZ, Istanbul 
SUBJECT: IRAQI SUNNI ARAB TEAM PRESENTS OLD GRIEVANCES TO 
AMBASSADOR IN TURKEY MEETING 
 
Classified By: (U) Classified by Consul General Deborah K. Jones, Reaso 
 
ns 1.4 (b,d). 
 
 
1.  (C) Summary:  At a December 4 meeting in Istanbul 
organized by the Turkish Foreign Ministry, a delegation of 
Iraqi Sunni Arab political figures told Ambassador Khalilzad 
that the "insurgents" want the political process in Iraq to 
succeed, but seek more credibility in the process.  They 
demanded clarifications of election procedures, calling them 
opaque.  Ambassador Khalilzad said the U.S. wants the 
election to meet international standards and promised to 
organize a meeting between the Sunni Arabs and the Iraqi 
election commission (IECI) and its UN advisors.  When the 
Sunni Arab group called for international election monitors, 
Khalilzad reminded them that violence prevented the dispatch 
of international observers.  If they want international 
observers, Khalilzad advised, they should issue a public 
statement calling for their participation and urging the 
Sunni Arab community to protect them.  The Sunni delegation 
agreed to this, and the Turkish representatives who observed 
the session said they could take such a public call from the 
Iraqi Sunni Arabs to the Organization of the Islamic 
Conference meeting this week. 
 
2.  (C)  Summary continued:  The Sunni Arab delegation 
stressed that life needs to return to normal in Sunni Arab 
regions and that Coalition Forces should stop raids and 
detentions and release detainees not charged in Iraqi courts. 
 Khalilzad pointed to releases of detainees to date and said 
there would be more.  He cautioned that U.S. forces would 
respond if attacked, and that the hunt for terrorists like 
Zarqawi who will never support the political process cannot 
be stopped.  Khalilzad rejected the Sunni Arabs' call for a 
timetable for withdrawal but underlined the U.S. has no 
desire for permanent bases in Iraq; as Iraqi security forces 
grow more capable the Coalition Force presence will diminish. 
 The Sunni Arab team also expressed disdain for the Interior 
Minister; one prominent Iraqi Sunni Arab politician demanded 
he be fired because of Interior Ministry abuses.  Khalilzad 
acknowledged there had been problems and noted that the 
Americans would be involved in investigations of Interior 
Ministry facilities.  Khalilzad urged the Sunni Arab figures 
to support more Sunni Arabs joining the Iraqi security forces 
to ensure balance.  End Summary. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
Sunni Arab Team:  Stability, Not Power 
-------------------------------------- 
 
3.  (C) In a meeting hosted by the Turkish Foreign Ministry 
in Istanbul, a delegation of six Sunni Arab political figures 
told Ambassador Khalilzad that the Iraqi Sunni Arab community 
wants stability, not full political control over Iraq.  They 
said they spoke "on behalf of the insurgency," and sought 
agreement from the Americans on technical election 
modalities, near-term confidence building measures and 
longer-term political changes in Iraq.  The group's 
spokesman, an Iraqi Turcoman businessman in Abu Dhabi named 
Felah Mustafa, told the Ambassador that the Iraqi Muslim 
Ulema Council, a rejectionist Sunni Arab religious body, had 
a representative in Istanbul and supported the list of 
proposals to be presented but would not meet with the 
American team in Istanbul. 
 
------------------------------------- 
Khalilzad:  Avoid Another Big Mistake 
------------------------------------- 
 
4.  (C)  Ambassador Khalilzad stressed to the group that the 
U.S. wants to avoid the division of Iraq and to prevent any 
foreign country from taking control of it.  He urged the 
Sunni Arab leaders to maximize Sunni Arab participation in 
the political process, noting that their failure to vote in 
the January 2005 elections was "the Mother of All Failures." 
Pointing to the concentration of violence and terrorism 
problems in the Sunni Arab regions, Ambassador Khalilzad 
reminded the Iraqi group that U.S. military operations focus 
on Sunni Arab regions precisely because of the concentration 
of violence there.  Ongoing security problems, however, open 
the way for sectarian militias and countries like Iran that 
support them.  The violence, therefore, hurts the Sunni Arabs 
both politically and economically.  The Sunni Arab community, 
he warned, should not be manipulated by hard-liners into 
boycotting the political process again. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
Election Modalities:  Sunni Complaints 
-------------------------------------- 
 
5.  (C)  Tariq al-Hashemi, the leader of the predominantly 
Sunni Arab Iraqi Islamic Party, stated that the election 
count procedures were still opaque.  Mustafa said the Sunni 
Arab groups want the December elections to meet minimal 
international standards.  The delegation proposed that: 
--  there should be no delays announcing the election results 
lest there be manipulation of the vote count; 
 
--  Iraqi detainees should have the right to vote; 
 
--  Iraqis abroad should have the right to vote; 
 
--  because of the IECI's lack of credibility, international 
monitors should come to watch the election; 
 
--  the IECI was not representative of Iraq, as it has only 
one Sunni Arab board member. 
 
6.  (C)  Khalilzad agreed that the election should meet 
international standards and the UN advisory team was 
responsible for ensuring that it does.  The U.S. agreed that 
the announcement of results should be made promptly. Embassy 
Baghdad PolCouns reviewed in detail American assistance 
through USAID for technical assistance to the IECI overseas 
vote campaign effort headquartered in Amman.  He also 
provided the delegation the names of the two Sunni Arab women 
who are board members.  Hashemi then rejoined that while 
there might be two Sunni Arab board members, the vast 
majority of IECI employees were Shia biased against the Sunni 
Arabs.  Khalilzad said the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad would 
arrange a meeting between the Sunni Arab group and the UN 
team to review these concerns and later would facilitate a 
meeting with the IECI board itself.  (Comment:  Embassy 
Baghdad has already organized IECI board trips to Ramadi, 
Fallujah, Tikrit, Mosul, Baqubah and Kirkuk during the past 
three weeks.  End Comment.) 
 
------------------------------------------- 
International Observers - Last Minute Push? 
------------------------------------------- 
 
7.  (C)  Khalilzad noted that while the American and British 
embassies had backed efforts to bring international observers 
for the December 2005 elections, the violence made it hard to 
convince any to come.  Only a few would be on hand.  What 
might help, he speculated, would be a statement from the 
Sunni Arab leaders urging that international observers come, 
and calling on the entire Sunni Arab community to welcome and 
protect them.  The Sunni Arab delegation agreed to issue such 
a statement, and Khalilzad promised the Embassy would 
publicly support visits from international observers.  The 
Prime Minister's advisor, Professor Ahmet Davutoglu, who was 
among the Turkish officials observing the meeting, said the 
Turks could take a public Sunni Arab call for observers to 
the upcoming Organization of the Islamic Conference to try to 
stir interest at this late moment. 
 
------------------- 
Voting in Abu Dhabi 
------------------- 
 
8.  (C)  Al-Hashemi and Mustafa underlined their concern that 
Iraqis resident in the Gulf have easy access to an expatriate 
polling station to be established in Abu Dhabi.  They 
complained that the UAE authorities have issued guidance that 
Iraqis may not drive to Abu Dhabi from neighboring states 
like Qatar and that they must have confirmed hotel 
reservations.  Khalilzad agreed to look at how the U.S. might 
be helpful with the Emirati authorities to facilitate Iraqi 
expatriate voting. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
Sunni Arabs Want More Parliament Seats 
-------------------------------------- 
 
9.  (C)  The Sunni Arab team claimed that the IECI decision 
on distribution of seats in the future national assembly is 
unfair because it robbed predominantly Sunni Arab 
governorates of eight seats.  They asserted that Planning 
Ministry population data made clear that the seat allocation 
was unfair.  The Ambassador reminded the group that the seat 
distribution came from the election law passed in the autumn 
by the Transitional National Assembly.  It made January 2005 
voter lists, not Planning Ministry data, the basis for seat 
allocation in the December 2005 election.  The Sunni Arab 
team highlighted that Dohuk governorate had an unbelievable 
ratio of voters to population far beyond the norm.  Khalilzad 
said the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad would look at the data in a 
September 11 announcement to Iraqi political parties from the 
IECI.  He also urged the Sunni Arab team to raise this 
question directly with the UN and IECI. 
 
10.  (C)  A second set of proposals from the Sunni Arab 
delegation concerned steps the U.S. could take on security 
operations that would build Sunni Arab community confidence 
in the near term.  It was urgent that life return to a 
semblance of normality in Sunni Arab regions, they stated. 
They proposed that: 
 
--  Coalition Forces stop raids on homes and attacks on Sunni 
Arab towns and cities; 
 
--  the Coalition Forces release Iraqi detainees not charged 
in an Iraqi court with crimes; and 
 
--  the U.S. agrees to a timetable for withdrawal of 
Coalition Forces. 
 
11.  (C)  Khalilzad responded that a premature Coalition 
Force withdrawal would be bad for the Sunni Arabs and for 
Iraq generally.  That said, the U.S. aims to withdraw totally 
from Iraq as soon as possible.  He told them that the U.S. 
does not seek bases in Iraq.  We would not set a timetable, 
but our strategy is clear:  we will reduce our forces as 
Iraqi security forces gain the capability to operate better 
on their own. 
12.  (C)  In the meantime, Khalilzad cautioned, Coalition 
Forces will respond when attacked.  In addition, there can be 
no stop to the hunt for terrorists like Zarqawi who do not 
support the political process in any case.  Meanwhile, the 
U.S. had released 280 prisoners on December 4 and planned to 
release more after the election.  (Hashemi said it was a 
useless political gesture to release hundreds of prisoners on 
the one hand while refilling detention centers with newly 
arrested prisoners.)  Khalilzad said he would seek a meeting 
between the Sunni Arab group and MNF-I CG Casey to discuss 
security issues. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
Post-Elections:  A Sunni Longer-Term Agenda 
------------------------------------------- 
 
13.  (C)  Several Sunni Arab delegated asserted that the U.S. 
must restructure the Iraqi army to include more Sunni Arabs 
while removing militia members from its ranks.  Falah called 
for "credible" Sunni Arabs to be named to head the Interior 
and Defense ministries (but they did not press this point). 
Defense Minister Saadun Dulaymi is a Sunni Arab, Falah 
acknowledged, but he is only a "puppet."   Khalilzad stated 
that the U.S. wants more Sunni Arabs to join the Iraqi 
Security Forces, but the response often has been limited.  He 
asked why Sunni leaders have not denounced the intimidation 
campaign against Sunni Arab recruits.  Embassy Baghdad 
PolCouns reminded the Sunni Arab delegates that then Ulema 
Council member Shaykh Ahmed Abdelghafur Samarai'e had urged 
Sunni Arabs to join the ISF, but few others had joined that 
public appeal. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
Interior Ministry - Sunni Arab Venting 
-------------------------------------- 
 
14.  (C)  The Sunni Arab delegation asserted that the 
Interior Ministry was responsible for widespread abuses, 
including murder and torture of detainees.  Hussein Falluji 
charged that Interior Minister Bayan Jabr Solagh was ignoring 
court orders to arrest officers of the Volcano and Hawk 
brigades on charges of illegal actions.  (Comment:  we have 
not heard of this court action, and Falluji when he was not 
proselytizing PolCouns promised to give us copies.  End 
Comment.)  Falluji called for an independent Iraqi judicial 
commission to look into the abuse allegations across Iraq. 
The Islamic Party's Hashemi warned that the Interior Minister 
was staining American credibility and called on Khalilzad to 
have him suspended. 
 
15.  (C)  Khalilzad rejoined that Iraq was a sovereign state 
and the U.S. could not fire its ministers.  However, the U.S. 
had strongly urged the government to investigate what had 
occurred at the Jadriyah bunker and suspend anyone found 
responsible pending a final determination of what had 
occurred.  Khalilzad said that together with the Iraqi 
government, the U.S. would begin checking on other detention 
facilities in Iraq on December 8.  Finally, he told the Sunni 
Arab delegation that he would work against anyone with ties 
to a militia from occupying a sensitive security post in the 
next government. 
 
16.  (C)  Participants: 
 
Felah Mustafa, Iraqi Turcoman businessman in Abu Dhabi; 
Tariq al-Hashemi, head of the Iraqi Islamic Party; 
Hamed al-Mutlak, Iraqi National Dialog Front (Salih Mutlak's 
brother); 
Raad Nasser, Iraqi Loyalty Gathering; 
Ali al-Mashadani, Iraqi Loyalty Gathering; 
Shaykh Ali ad-Daham, Iraqi Loyalty Gathering; 
Hussein al-Falluji, Conference of Iraqi People (Adnan 
ad-Dulaymi's group) 
 
Ambassador Khalilzad 
Baghdad PolCouns Ford 
Baghdad Special Assistant Hutchings 
Baghdad Communications Advisor Hopkins 
 
Amconsul Istanbul CG Jones 
Amconsul Pol/Econ Chief Smith 
 
NEA/I - Michelle Siders 
 
Oguz Celikkol, Director General for the Middle East, Turkish 
Foreign Ministry 
Professor Ahmet Davutoglu, Advisor to Prime Minister Erdogan 
Nabi Avci, Press Counselor to the Prime Minister 
Hakan Cakil, Iraqi Desk, Turkish Foreign Ministry 
JONES