US embassy cable - 05KUWAIT5032

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KUWAIT 005032 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR NEA/ARPI, LONDON FOR TSOU, PARIS FOR ZEYA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/29/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PTER, PREL, KISL, OFDP, SOCI, PINR, IZ, KU, 
KUWAIT-IRAQ RELATIONS 
SUBJECT: HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS CENTER CHIEF ON IRAQ AND 
HIS POSSIBLE MOVE TO BAGHDAD AS AMBASSADOR 
 
REF: A. KUWAIT 4451 
 
     B. KUWAIT 3507 
     C. KUWAIT 1120 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Richard LeBaron for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
1.  (C) Summary:  Lt. General (Ret.) Ali Mohammed Hassan Al 
Mu'min, head of Kuwait's Humanitarian Operations Center 
(HOC), met with poloff on November 28 and discussed his 
candidacy for ambassador to Iraq, the extension of the HOC's 
mandate until spring 2006, and Sunni-Shi'a relations in 
Kuwait.  The meeting was marked by frank comments from 
General Ali, the former Chief of Staff who retired from the 
military as the highest ranking Shi'a officer in 2002. 
Saying that Kuwaiti Sunni-Shi'a relations were "suffering" 
due to the growing influence of Sunni fundamentalists and 
Zarqawi's influence on youth throughout the region, General 
Ali counseled that "there would have to be more blood shed in 
Iraq" before the general public called for peace and the 
violence ended.  The General wanted to clear the air over 
misperceptions that his interest in Iraq was focused only on 
southern Iraq due to his ties to the Shi'a community.  The 
former chief of staff also described himself in the order of 
Kuwaiti, Arab, Muslim, and lastly Shi'a, offering some 
insight as to how he views his loyalties and how effective he 
might be if he served in Iraq.  A readout of his November 
29-December 1 trip to Baghdad will be coming septel.  End 
Summary. 
 
HOC Will Be Around in 2007 
-------------------------- 
 
2.  (C) General Ali opened the meeting by stating that when 
he came back from medical treatment for early-stage prostate 
cancer in England in August, he was fully prepared to find 
the HOC gone, its mission returned to the various offices in 
the ministries of the Interior (MOI), Health (MOH), and 
Foreign Affairs (MFA).  Instead he was surprised to find that 
the HOC would remain, but that it would be broken up into 
separate offices within those ministries, and that he would 
retain all administrative control over its authority (ref b). 
 Seated in his office within the MFA's Consular Affairs 
building in the industrial area of Shuwaikh, General Ali said 
that he initially doubted the separation of the HOC would 
work, but allowed that he now has the staff he needs to 
continue HOC's missions inside of Iraq.  The HOC's 
humanitarian mission continues in both in medical evacuation 
and treatment cases as well as funding health centers and 
schools.  The General said that he expected the HOC to be 
able to make valuable contributions to Iraq's people until 
"at least" 2007. 
 
3.  (C) Beginning in early 2004, the HOC received five or six 
three-month extensions to continue its work (ref c).  General 
Ali admitted that the Council of Ministers' failure to grant 
longer extensions annoyed him, but he hoped that the latest 
extension, which continues the HOC mandate until March 31, 
2006, will be renewed without "all the work and effort" it 
took previously.  Stating that it was the Foreign Minister, 
Shaykh Dr. Mohammed Al-Salem Al-Sabah, who kept him "reined 
in" in the past, Ali added that the FM now "gave up" and let 
him travel to Iraq when necessary, no longer questioning the 
necessity of his travel.  General Ali has traveled to Iraq 
over half a dozen times since 2003 and visited Baghdad as 
recently as November 29. 
 
Ambassador Ali? 
--------------- 
 
4.  (C) On his candidacy for ambassador to Iraq, General Ali 
was blunt: he claimed that the FM had approached him 6 months 
ago and asked if he would accept the ambassadorship.  The 
General replied that he "did not seek out any more glory" and 
would only "accept the job if his services were needed by the 
State of Kuwait."  Intimating that he found the HOC job 
enough of a challenge, he shared that there had been another 
candidate for the job but that he had dropped out after being 
given an ambassadorship to another country.  General Ali went 
on to say that the FM then told him that his nomination had 
been discussed with MP Mohammed Jassem Al-Sager, head of the 
Foreign Affairs Committee, and that it was now "well-known in 
Kuwait" that he was asked to go to Baghdad. 
 
5.  (C) General Ali voiced concerns over the quality of life 
issues in Baghdad, especially for his wife, and asked poloff 
if the USG could make space for the Kuwaiti Embassy within 
 
KUWAIT 00005032  002 OF 003 
 
 
the Green Zone, since that is where he felt most 
"comfortable."  He added that he had been investigating 
security firms which could provide bodyguards for him in 
Iraq.  According to Iraqis to whom he spoke, the firms should 
all provide at least one Kurd bodyguard because the "Kurdish 
will not have a problem shooting an Arab while an Arab might 
have a problem doing so," adding that he understood the logic 
behind it and would look to ensure that he had a Kurd or 
other non-Arab in his security entourage. 
 
Kuwaiti First and Foremost 
-------------------------- 
 
6.  (C) When discussing how General Ali identified himself, 
the General insisted that he was first and foremost Kuwaiti, 
and pledged to defend the Constitution of his country.  He 
would then consider himself Arab, then Muslim, and lastly 
Shi'a.  "So you see," he affirmed, "I am a Shi'a but that is 
only 25% of me.  The rest is the order that I just told you." 
 The former Chief of Staff criticized those who said he 
focused only on his Shi'a "brothers" stressing that his 
travel for the HOC included the Kurdish north as well as the 
Sunni Triangle and that he tried to ensure donations from the 
GOK were spread fairly around the country.  Ali said that the 
GOK may have given Najaf 5 million dollars in aid, but that 
he was also able to get Fallujah 3.5 million dollars as well 
(through private donations), a city that he claimed was "full 
of former Ba'athist military officers." 
 
Have Guard, Will Travel 
----------------------- 
 
7.  (C) General Ali has traveled extensively through Iraq, 
criss-crossing the country since Coalition troops went in 
during spring 2003.  He remarked that he felt safer in 2003 
when he traveled in an Iraqi-owned car with a couple of 
Iraqis as his guards, traveling from Basra to Mosul and towns 
in between, than he did traveling to and from the Green Zone 
in the company of U.S. troops.  He added that he was able to 
meet with a number of Iraqi local leaders, including 
Ayatollah Al-Sistani. 
 
Shi'a and Sunni Relations 
------------------------- 
 
8.  (C) General Ali spoke of his concerns of a faltering 
relationship between Kuwaiti Sunnis and Shi'as.  He said 
there was an increase in the allowance of takfiri ideology 
within Kuwait and that an unidentified Kuwaiti MP had spoken 
in defense of a Sunni Imam who preached takfiri ideology. 
(Note: "takfir" refers to the practice of accusing others, 
including some Muslims, of apostasy, a crime punishable by 
death in some extreme interpretations of Islam. End note.) 
According to the General, the negative influences and 
restrictiveness of the fundamentalist Sunnis began in the 
1960s when Gamal Abdul Nasser in Egypt cracked down on the 
Islamic Brotherhood (aka Muslim Brotherhood) and many of them 
moved to the Gulf, especially Kuwait.  In addition, he said 
that a number of Saudis have also moved into Kuwait since the 
1980s, pushing their Wahabbi traditions and thinking. 
Evidence of this could be seen during prayertime, "when 
Sunnis cross their arms to pray, something that they never 
did in the past," he claimed.  "This, combined with the fact 
that the Government has done little to stop it, is why we are 
now having problems." 
 
9.  (C) Going on to talk about the attack on a Shi'a mosque 
in Jahra on October 7 (ref a), he said "the recent incident 
in Jahra is surprising only because it did not happen (here) 
before." General Ali pointed out that the attack was possible 
"only in an atmosphere of tolerance for such action," and 
that excess money and fundamentalist influence among Kuwaiti 
youth made it possible.  "The Government must watch out.  You 
cannot stop this type of thinking after it has spread across 
the country," he counseled, warning that the influence of 
Zarqawi and others in Iraq was spilling over to Kuwait. 
General Ali advised that Zarqawi was not only receiving aid 
from Jordan and Syria but from other neighbors (read Iran) 
and that his influence would only grow in the near term.  The 
General commented that the region would have to see and shed 
more blood before the people "had enough" and called for true 
peace. 
 
Bio Note 
-------- 
 
 
KUWAIT 00005032  003 OF 003 
 
 
10.  (C) Bio Note:  Lt. General Ali was known to keep a cadre 
of Shi'a officers close to him during his time as Chief of 
Staff (March 1991 - December 2002).  This led to animosity 
within the upper military ranks which echoes today.  A recent 
purge of intelligence officers within the J-2 office at the 
Ministry of Defense in April saw all of the Shi'a officers 
reassigned elsewhere.  In addition, Kuwaiti contacts have 
told poloff that the reason the HOC cannot get longer 
extensions is because many Kuwaitis are uncomfortable with 
Ali, as a Shi'a, having control over so much money.  Ali's 
family was originally from Saudi Arabia.  He is married with 
five children, three sons and two daughters.  One of his sons 
works in the Ministry of Defense, one in the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, and one in the private sector.  His older 
daughter is married to a Finn and lives in London.  His 
younger daughter lives at home.  Ali speaks English fluently 
and was trained in the U.K.  He received treatment for 
prostate cancer in July 2005 in England. 
 
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LEBARON