US embassy cable - 05BAGHDAD4865

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 004865 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/04/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PTER, FR, IZ 
SUBJECT: FRENCH DCM PESSIMISTIC ABOUT IRAQ PROSPECTS 
 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Robert Ford, for 
Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). 
 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY  Only the Iraqis will be able to solve their 
problems, and the US should stay out of it said French DCM 
Franck Gellet in a December 4 meeting with Poloff.  The 
insurgency will continue for some time even with concessions 
to the Sunni Arabs, key among them, according to Gellet, a 
definitive statement of intent to withdraw and reconstitution 
of Iraq's Army, including its generals.  Even then, Iraq will 
not be democratic.  It will require a strong central 
authority, difficult, said Gellet, with the current 
"unworkable" federal Constitution.  At the same time, Gellet 
expressed a desire for regular meetings and offered to assist 
with advice and contacts.  End Summary 
 
2. (C) French DCM Franck Gellet met with Poloff on December 4 
to inquire about US policies in Iraq and to present French 
Government views on Iraq's prospects.  Gellet said that the 
meeting reflected French interest in regular meetings and 
readiness to assist with advice and contacts. 
 
France Not Happy with the Iraqi Constitution 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
3. (C) Gellet said the Constitution was defective because it 
did not incorporate Sunni Arab views.  Poloff pointed out 
that there is a mechanism to adjust the Constitution after 
the election, when the Sunni Arabs are expected to be better 
represented in the National Assembly.  Gellet then criticized 
the decentralization of power in the Constitution.  The 
French feel such a model is not workable - a strong central 
authority is needed, especially in Iraq, a country with 
little experience in democracy. 
 
Let the Arabs Decide Among Themselves 
------------------------------------- 
 
4. (C) The Arab League (AL) Reconciliation effort is a good 
start, said Gellet, the Arabs should decide contentious 
issues among themselves.  Once the parties realize that the 
Coalition will leave eventually, they will start to deal 
seriously with each other.  The U.S. cannot really expect to 
make significant progress in stopping the insurgency or in 
resolving the key issues separating the Shi'a, Sunni and 
Kurds, they must do it themselves.  Poloff told Gellet that 
the USG is very supportive of the AL process and is keeping a 
hands off policy, but without prodding, it is unlikely that 
the parties will reach resolution on key issues within a 
reasonable time frame.  We will continue to dialogue with the 
parties and urge resolution of key issues even as they do so 
among themselves. 
 
Tactical Error on UNSC Resolution 
--------------------------------- 
 
5. (C) Gellet said that the USG made a tactical error in 
requesting a one-year extension in the Coalition mandate. 
All the parties in Iraq want the Coalition to stay in Iraq 
for the time being, and if we had asked for a three month 
extension, we would have forced the Sunnis to ask us to stay 
longer.  That would have provided a valuable public relations 
bonus for us with little risk.  In times of better bilateral 
relations, the French would offer this advice directly, but 
at this time, Gellet said, the French advice would be 
misinterpreted. 
 
The Keys to Sunni Engagement 
---------------------------- 
 
6. (C) According to Gellet, Harith Al-Dhari can best broker 
an end to the insurgency and two issues are key -- a firm 
announcement that the Coalition will withdraw from Iraq, and 
reconstitution of the Iraqi Army, including its former 
generals.  A timetable for withdrawal is not needed but, 
despite the repeated public assurances from the USG, the 
Sunnis are not yet convinced that the withdrawal will 
actually take place.  Poloff countered that our Sunni 
interlocutors raise other serious issues of concern and 
senior former military offices do not expect to be 
reinstated.  Such a proposal was unlikely to be accepted by 
the Shi'a and Kurds.   Gellet countered that prisoner 
releases are viewed as a sign of weakness by the Sunni Arab 
insurgents and win us little leverage.  Even with a direct 
dialogue with Al-Dhari and other interlocutors, we cannot 
expect a quick end to the insurgency.  The insurgents view us 
as occupiers and cannot collaborate with us.  Having never 
been occupied, the US cannot appreciate this factor - the 
French can, said Gellet.  Poloff raised the issue of Iraq's 
neighbors, Syria and Iran, who have an interest in continued 
instability in Iraq.  Gellet warned that the US should not 
destabilize Syria, because the implications of such a 
destabilization would be far reaching. 
Best Case, Iraq will be Stable, but not Democratic 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
7. (C) Once again alluding to France's experience as a 
colonial power experienced in battling insurgency, Gellet 
said that the US can find a way to exit Iraq while saving 
face, but it is unrealistic to expect Iraq to be democratic. 
In the best case scenario, Iraq will be stable and at peace, 
but that will require a strong central government. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
8. (C) Gellet was unapologetic for his views.  Despite his 
lecturing tone, he was clear that he hoped dialogue between 
the two Embassies will continue.  We will use subsequent 
conversations with his Mission to continue to urge a more 
constructive stance. 
 
KHALILZAD