US embassy cable - 05BRUSSELS4300

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 BRUSSELS 004300 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/28/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PREF, PGOV, PHUM, EAID, MOPS, XA, EUN, USEU BRUSSELS 
SUBJECT: TRANSATLANTIC CONSULTATIONS ON AFRICA 
 
Classified By: PRMOFF MARC J. MEZNAR.  REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). 
 
1. (SBU) Summary.  The October 19 transatlantic consultations 
on Africa included a variety of big picture themes -- the EU 
strategy for Africa, peacekeeping, development, political 
Islam and extremism, China in Africa -- as well as discussion 
about key political issues in the Great Lakes, Uganda, Sudan, 
Horn of Africa, West Africa (including Mauritania) and 
Zimbabwe.  End Summary. 
 
------------------------ 
Participants 
------------------------ 
 
2. (U) EU participants included: James Bevan, UK Director for 
African Affairs (FCO), Anne Schmidt, FCO Pan African Policy 
Unit Advisor, and Ruth Bradley-Jones, Second Secretary, UK 
PermRep for the British Presidency; Aldo Ajello, EU Special 
Envoy for the Great Lakes and Pekka Haavisto, EU Special 
Envoy for Sudan; Koen Vervaeke, Head of the EU Council 
Secretariat Africa Task Force, and desk officers 
 
SIPDIS 
Jean-Christophe Belliard, Peter Clausen and Genoveva 
Hernandez; Roger Moore, Head of Unit for the Horn and East 
(DG DEV), Miriam Brewka and Andreas Fischer-Barnicol, both of 
the ACP Issues Unit (DG RELEX) for the European Commission 
(EC); and Georg Lennkh, Special Envoy for Africa for the 
incoming Austrian Presidency.  USDEL consisted of AF 
Assistant Secretary Jendayi E. Frazer, John Nay (Director, 
AF/Regional and Security Affairs), Michael McKinley (Charge 
d,Affaires, USEU), Patricia Lerner (Development Counselor, 
USEU/USAID) and Marc Meznar (Political Officer, USEU/PRM). 
 
------------------------ 
EU Strategy for Africa 
------------------------ 
 
3. (U) Bevan opened by presenting a preview of the EU 
Strategy for Africa, which will guide Europe's interaction 
with Africa over the next ten years.  According to Bevan, one 
of the most prominent pillars of the strategy will be in the 
area of peace and security.  Bevan noted that the European 
Commission (EC) has already presented a proposal for the 
other major pillars of the strategy: democracy and 
governance, economic growth (through trade agreements, 
infrastructure development and maintenance, etc.), and 
developing human capacity (health, education, etc.).  The EU 
strategy will also work to incorporate all the bilateral 
assistance programs and policy initiatives undertaken by the 
Member States.  Bevan said that the new strategy will help 
guide the disbursement of increased funding as Member States 
raise the percentage of their budgets dedicated to official 
development assistance (ODA) in the coming years.  Moore 
noted that the EC supports moving away from implementing 
specific projects in favor of generalized budget support for 
countries that have a track record of accountability and good 
governance.  He said that budget support would enhance 
"African ownership" of the development funds, as well as help 
the EU manage increased levels of ODA.  According to Bevan, 
the EU strategy for Africa will also deal with migration, 
including ways to stem the emigration of qualified Africa 
professionals, which negatively impacts important sectors in 
Africa (such as health care).  He said the EU was looking for 
ways to manage migration so that it was more beneficial to 
both countries of origin and countries of destination, noting 
that the largest number of asylum seekers in the EU is from 
Africa.  A/S Frazer expressed concern over the expedited 
deportations of Africans from the EU.  Meznar noted that many 
of those being interdicted and summarily removed were 
Africans from conflict zones that might be legitimate 
refugees. 
------------------------ 
Great Lakes:  DRC is key 
------------------------ 
 
4. (C) Ajello said that the peace process in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC) was currently stalled because of the 
upcoming elections.  According to Ajello, ongoing challenges 
in the DRC include: 
 
-- Security sector reform:  Soldiers were neither arriving 
at, nor departing from, the orientation centers; furthermore, 
the disarmament ("brassage") centers were empty. 
-- Lack of political will:  The international community 
needed to put pressure on all parties to keep the peace 
process moving forward. 
-- Corruption in the army: Many "phantoms" were on state 
payrolls and distributions of food and salary were erratic. 
 
-- Lack of good governance:  Although the current level of 
corruption is equivalent to the worst days of the Mobutu 
regime, China and Russia do not support a UN-sponsored good 
governance mechanism; the DRC,s neighbors also oppose the 
idea (as it might set a precedent to be used on them later). 
 
5. (C) Ajello said it was critical for the international 
community to develop a package of "carrots and sticks" to 
persuade the FDLR to return to Rwanda.  He distributed a 
proposal that outlined steps that could be taken by Rwanda, 
DRC, the international community, MONUC, the World Bank and 
the AU.  He described the EC,s contribution of 3 million 
euros to reintegrate ex-combatants in Rwanda by providing 
employment in building infrastructure projects around Kigali. 
 Ajello highlighted a part of the EU plan that would urge 
that the AU find third countries in Africa for resettling 
ex-combatants who did not want to return to Rwanda.  A/S 
Frazer noted that with regard to the FDLR, the days of 
"carrots" might be over.  It may be time to concentrate on 
"sticks". 
6. (C) Participants discussed a possible MONUC role in 
persuading the FDLR to leave DRC, and how an AU force might 
contribute to this goal.  Ajello praised the improvements in 
MONUC, crediting the Pakistanis and Indians with doing an 
excellent job.  He said that the nine brigades of Congolese 
being trained by MONUC should comprise a frontline "force de 
frappe" since they would not be limited by the terms of the 
UN peacekeepers' mandate.  Ajello noted that while the DRC 
had good soldiers, it lacked officers. 
 
7. (C) A/S Frazer said her view of MONUC was not as favorable 
as Ajello's; MONUC had failed -- even with the LRA -- because 
it had neither political will nor capacity.  She also said 
that it did not seem feasible to bring the Congolese troops 
up to speed quickly enough to be the key element in 
dislodging the FDLR from the DRC, so a combination of MONUC 
and AU forces seemed to be the best way forward, and for 
which the USG might be willing to financially support a 
command and control operation.  Ajello said the EC would be 
willing to contribute 15 million euros to support an AU peace 
mission in the DRC (possibly with Angolan, Ethiopian, and 
South African troops) to supplement Congolese and MONUC 
forces. 
 
8. (SBU) Bevan stressed that successful elections in the DRC 
are critical for all of Africa and asked what the U.S. was 
doing to support them.  A/S Frazer noted that the U.S. pays 
27 percent of MONUC's operating costs and has already spent 
over $300 million to support MONUC.  (Note.  The EU's total 
assessment for PKOs such as MONUC is 40 percent.  End note.) 
USAID also has provided critical assistance in helping the 
Congolese Independent Elections Commission organize itself. 
 
9. (C) Bevan raised concern at the EU's perceived exclusion 
from the latest round of Tripartite Commission talks.  He 
stressed the EU's desire to remain engaged in the process, 
noting the EU's substantial political clout and financial 
assistance.  A/S Frazer reviewed the purpose for creating the 
Tripartite Commission was to get the  three sides (Uganda, 
Rwanda, DRC) talking directly with the assistance of a 
neutral broker and that the ultimate objective was a direct 
dialogue without mediators.  She said it was not the USG's 
aim to create another talk shop, but also noted that she was 
not aware of any U.S. effort to exclude the EU from the 
talks. 
 
------------------------ 
Northern Uganda: Dealing with the LRA 
------------------------ 
 
10. (C) Bevan characterized Northern Uganda as a grave 
humanitarian problem with broader strategic implications.  He 
stated, "The ICC indictments have changed the equation 
completely" and that they "need to be seen to deliver 
justice."  Bevan added that the dialogue with the LRA is 
dead.  He favored pressing Uganda to welcome the LRA's foot 
soldiers home and to refrain from using force to deal with 
the LRA.  A/S Frazer agreed that the ICC indictments are 
working in this case.  She said that Presidents Museveni and 
Kabila should discuss the issue of hot pursuit and that 
forces should be able to cross the border with permission. 
Bevan was concerned that allowing Ugandan forces to enter DRC 
might add to instability there or lead to an unwelcome quest 
for mineral resources. 
 
------------------------ 
Sudan: Government of National Unity? 
------------------------ 
 
11. (C) A/S Frazer outlined several strategic issues for 
bringing stability to Sudan:  the nature and intentions of 
the Government of National Unity (GNU), the situation in the 
region (e.g. Darfur, Beja), the quality of southern 
leadership under Salva Kiir and the role of neighboring 
countries.  Regarding the GNU, Bevan said that he personally 
felt that partition should not be considered inevitable and 
that a single Sudan could still exist in ten years.   Bevan 
said he believes that a true government of national unity 
does not currently exist and that the death of John Garang 
has probably been more of a setback than initially perceived. 
 Participants agreed that the SPLM, the regime in Khartoum, 
and the rebels in the regions all influence each other and 
that the key to stabilizing the country lies in moving the 
various entities toward a common agenda.  Vervaeke expressed 
concern that two separate initiatives were currently being 
considered to stabilize Sudan, one by Chad and one by the 
U.S.; he urged that any U.S.-led initiative should not 
exclude the EU since it has been long been involved in the 
peace process and since it is a major donor.  A/S Frazer 
agreed that a unified initiative is needed and suggested that 
the critical players were the AU and France (as France could 
influence Chad, and Chad the rebels).  A/S Frazer also said 
that the international community could consider encouraging 
the creation of a shadow government and had no problem to be 
seen backing and strengthening the SPLM.  She added that a 
stronger SPLM could put pressure on the regime to transform 
itself. 
 
------------------------ 
Darfur: Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Challenges 
------------------------ 
 
12. (C) Regarding AMIS, Bevan said that the EU favored 
consolidating the peacekeeping force at about 5000 before any 
further expansion.   He added that the EU had agreed October 
18 to provide an additional 70 million euros to support AMIS. 
 Moore noted that increasing the force beyond 5000 could 
decrease its competence and that the EC was interested in 
seeing AMIS operating "properly and efficiently."  Bevan also 
highlighted the problem of finding troops to cover a 
significant expansion of the force; Vervaeke said South 
Africa was not delivering on its current troop commitment. 
Haavisto stressed the need to review the AMIS mandate to 
include protecting observers and humanitarian workers. 
Bevan noted deficiencies in the current command/control 
logistics and said that blue hats would probably be necessary 
"in due course".  Various participants noted that re-hatting 
would double the costs of the peace mission and that a proper 
transition from AU to UN would require six months 
preparation, even if the same forces stayed on.  A/S Frazer 
expressed satisfaction with AMIS, acknowledging the funding 
shortages.  She said that the U.S. was still committed to 
getting the AMIS force up to the 7000 ceiling level because 
"presence matters."  Both sides agreed that any transition to 
a UN force should underscore the AU,s success in keeping the 
peace in Darfur. 
 
13. (C) Lerner urged donors to follow through with pledging 
commitments, particularly since humanitarian agencies are 
already predicting a failed harvest.  She also asked for EC 
help in getting an update on disbursements of Oslo pledges. 
Moore stated that the EC was ahead of schedule in disbursing 
its Oslo commitments, but he expects problems in meeting 
humanitarian needs in 2006 once the EC stops using its 
development funds for humanitarian work.  To illustrate, he 
said that in recent years over 180 million euros given for 
humanitarian work in Darfur had come from the European 
Development Fund. 
 
------------------------ 
Ethiopia: Elections and Boundaries 
------------------------ 
 
14. (C) Bevan said that the U.S. and EU worked well in 
handling a volatile situation in Ethiopia following the 
elections.  He said the EU's congratulatory message to Prime 
Minister Meles Zenawi was sober in tone and urged him to 
respect the democratic process and called on Meles to allow 
the opposition to take their seats in Parliament and 
participate in the machinery of government, as well as to 
establish an independent inquiry into the electoral violence. 
 A/S Frazer agreed with the message, but noted that the 
opposition also had a responsibility to realize they were in 
the minority. 
 
15. (C)  Bevan also explained that the EU Council rejected 
Gomes, call to end development aid to Ethiopia due to the 
election problems because the country was impoverished, as 
well as for strategic reasons.  He stressed that all EU aid 
is conditioned on good governance; although Ethiopia did not 
have to achieve European standards, it was required to comply 
with basic democratic principles.  A/S Frazer said that the 
U.S. would give careful consideration to the EU's assessment 
as to whether Ethiopia had met the governance criteria of the 
international community.    Belliard added that in the EU's 
view, Meles had been weakened, not strengthened, by the 
election, so it would be more difficult than ever for him to 
resolve differences with Eritrea.  A/S Frazer said that while 
the U.S. stood by the need to implement the decision, there 
had been a subtle change regarding implementation, with the 
U.S. stressing the need for Addis Ababa and Asmara to 
communicate well to guarantee the process.  She said the U.S. 
was considering sponsoring a dialogue between the two 
parties. 
 
------------------------ 
Somalia: Renewed U.S. Interest 
------------------------ 
 
16. (C) A/S Frazer said that at her initiative the U.S. is 
taking a "whole new look" at Somalia as it might be the time 
for more active engagement.  Bevan welcomed renewed U.S. 
involvement in the Somali peace process.  Both Belliard and 
Moore underscored the increasingly prominent role of the 
Islamists in Somalia.  They did not discount the possibility 
that Islamists could provide a more positive and unifying 
role in the country (without being hijacked by Al Qaeda or 
jihadist elements). 
 
------------------------ 
West Africa: Democracy and Coups 
------------------------ 
 
17. (C) A/S Frazer praised the way elections in Liberia had 
been conducted, highlighting the "tremendous leadership" of 
SRSG Alan Doss and the work of the UN.  She said that it was 
inspiring to see the participation of the Liberian people in 
the process and that UNMIL had responded appropriately to any 
signs of unrest.  However, A/S Frazer said that the 
international community needed to stay engaged through the 
second phase of the election, as well as the reform of the 
security sector and economic recovery of the country.    A/S 
Frazer noted that the UK had played the same role in Sierra 
Leone and France in Cote d'Ivoire.  Regarding Cote d'Ivoire, 
Bevan said that the upcoming elections would not solve all 
the country's problems.  He noted that the "Gbagbo regime was 
over" but that no new leaders had been identified.  A/S 
Frazer expressed concern over developments in Guinea, saying 
that unless steps were taken, the military might step in as 
they had done in Togo.  She noted that the U.S. was reaching 
out to political parties in Guinea and that DOD had 
established outreach with the Guinean military.  She also 
said that the AU and ECOWAS were reviewing Guinea,s 
constitution.  Vervaeke said that the EU shared these 
concerns and that it had identified Guinea (along with 
Guinea-Bissau) for an "early warning and action" exercise. 
 
18. (C) A/S Frazer identified responses to the coup in 
Mauritania as an area of possible policy divergence between 
the EU and U.S. and said that a common approach was needed. 
Bevan noted that although there were no "good coups" some 
were less bad than others and that the coup in Mauritania had 
popular support.  A/S Frazer replied that although the 
populace had welcomed virtually every coup in Africa, because 
the deposed regimes were corrupt or dictatorial, the U.S. 
found offensive the Mauritania's current structure placing a 
"military council" above the cabinet.  She said that the 
military leaders needed to show genuine signs of 
transitioning to democracy within a year, and dispelled any 
notion that the U.S. would ignore the lack of democracy in 
Mauritania due to any Mauritanian self-perception that it was 
crucial  to the fight against international terrorism.   A/S 
Frazer criticized the AU for lacking a coherent policy with 
regard to Mauritania. 
 
------------------------ 
Zimbabwe 
------------------------ 
 
19. (C) Bevan stated that the situation in Zimbabwe was going 
from bad to worse but that Mugabe's regime was not on the 
verge of collapse.  He said that the EU continued maintaining 
its sanctions, condemning abuses, and urging SADC engagement, 
and noted a shift in U.S. policy to reengage with SADC after 
suspending the dialogue over Zimbabwe.  Bevan said he 
believed it was premature for the EU to appoint a special 
envoy to dialogue with Mugabe; he also noted that the track 
records of special envoys to Africa were not particularly 
good.  A/S Frazer said that South Africa was baffled by 
Mugabe's behavior, and that the international community 
needed to push for involvement of the UNSC, and particularly 
to work with China on its reservations, even if African 
countries were not on board.  Bevan indicated that EU 
sanction renewal would be considered February 22.  (Note:  We 
do not believe all EU Member States are necessarily on board 
with maintaining sanctions.  End note.) 
 
------------------------ 
China's Growing Presence in Africa 
------------------------ 
 
20. (C) The EU suggested that the results of China's activism 
throughout the continent are largely negative for Africa. 
The Chinese undermine good governance and transparency, fuel 
conflicts through weapons sales, strip away natural resources 
with little regard for the environment, and block consensus 
in the UNSC for dealing with problematic regimes. 
Development projects are aimed at gaining popular support 
rather than strengthening the economy.  Both sides agreed 
that moving China's engagement with Africa towards a pattern 
similar to Africa's current relationship with the West and 
certain Asian countries (e.g., Japan, India) was better than 
trying to block China,s relations with Africa, which could 
not succeed in any case.  A/S Frazer said she hoped to meet 
soon with Chinese authorities to discuss some of these issues 
and to seek areas of mutual interest and cooperation. 
McKinley suggested the EU might also like to put relations 
with Africa on the agenda of the next EU-China summit. 
 
------------------------ 
Political Islam,s Impact 
 
21. (C) Bevan said that the EU was grappling with political 
Islam in general, particularly since it posed a threat to 
European values such as the rights of women and free speech. 
He noted that EU Member States have increasingly large Muslim 
communities and that governments need to be careful to not 
define Islam as the problem.  Rather, the problem is the 
perversion of Islam's values.  Bevan argued that most 
Africans did not support shifting from secular to Islamist 
political systems, but that traditionally moderate and 
integrated societies, like Nigeria, were being threatened by 
funding from Saudi-based Wahabi fundamentalist and militant 
Pakistani preachers.  He also noted the worrying growth of 
"jihadism", particularly in the Horn of Africa.  McKinley 
added that the work of Islamic development agencies on the 
ground in many African countries provided order and a 
supra-structure that was proving popular; he noted that many 
Africans were embracing a more fundamentalist version of 
Islam.  Lerner linked the discussion back to the EU Strategy 
for Africa, noting the emphasis on infrastructure and growth 
in that context.  She stressed the importance of investments 
in secular education, as well as stimulating the private 
sector to create jobs for young people.  A/S Frazer reviewed 
the objectives of the East African Counter-Terrorism 
Initiative, as well as a similar program planned to address 
the use of ungoverned spaces in the Sahel.  Vervaeke briefly 
mentioned three Council initiatives to support 
counter-terrorism efforts in Algeria, Kenya, and Morocco, 
including the strengthening of border controls. 
 
------------------------ 
Comment 
------------------------ 
 
22. (C) The troika meeting underscored the overall alignment 
of U.S. and EU objectives in Africa, and EU interlocutors 
appreciated the open and candid talks with the new Assistant 
Secretary and welcomed possible enhanced U.S. engagement in 
 
SIPDIS 
certain areas like Somalia.  Some important differences were 
clear, however, including: 
 
-- EU concern at being included in various policy dialogues 
spearheaded by the U.S. (e.g., Tripartite Commission in the 
Great Lakes, and possible new dialogues between 
Eritrea/Ethiopia and among key Sudan players); 
-- U.S. aim of expanding AMIS vs. EU goal of consolidating 
the existing force; 
-- softer EU response to Mauritania coup; 
-- EU willingness to continue a "carrot and stick" approach 
to the FDLR, rather than discontinuing the carrot as no 
longer appropriate; 
-- somewhat differing assessments of MONUC; 
-- continued EU lobbying for U.S. funding for the DRC 
elections; and, 
-- EU favoring budget support to stimulate development. 
 
23. (C) Although the UK made Africa a hallmark of its twin G8 
and EU Presidencies in 2005, generating much attention and 
discussion, we do not expect this to carry over to the 
Austrian Presidency next year.  In fact, the participation of 
the Austrian official was the weakest yet for an incoming 
Presidency, and no mention was made of a focus or date for 
the next Africa troika meeting. 
 
(A/S Frazer has cleared this message.) 
 
McKinley 
.