US embassy cable - 05AMMAN9393

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CODEL HAGEL MEETING WITH KING ABDULLAH

Identifier: 05AMMAN9393
Wikileaks: View 05AMMAN9393 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Amman
Created: 2005-12-06 09:30:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL PTER KPAL IZ JO
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

060930Z Dec 05
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 009393 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/05/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PTER, KPAL, IZ, JO 
SUBJECT: CODEL HAGEL MEETING WITH KING ABDULLAH 
 
REF: AMMAN 9329 
 
Classified By: Ambassador David Hale for Reasons 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
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SUMMARY 
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1.  (C) In a November 29 meeting, King Abdullah told CODEL 
Hagel that the December 15 elections in Iraq were crucial to 
that country's stability.  He warned against Iranian 
influence in Iraq, and highlighted Jordan's efforts to assist 
in quelling the insurgency.  The King agreed with efforts to 
isolate the SARG, though he cautioned the U.S. to be prepared 
in case the Syrian regime were to unravel.  On the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the King said that Jordan 
remained ready to assist the Palestinian Authority on 
security and economic matters.  END SUMMARY. 
 
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IRAQ 
---- 
 
2.  (C) A U.S. Congressional delegation comprised of Senator 
Chuck Hagel, Senator Thomas Carper and Representative Ellen 
Tasucher (accompanied by Charge) met with King Abdullah on 
November 29 to discuss regional issues and to express 
condolences on the November 9 bombings in Amman.  Prime 
Minister Marouf Bakhit and Foreign Minister Abdul Ilah Khatib 
also attended.  Regarding Iraq, the King said that 
"everything depended" on the results of the December 15 
elections.  A moderate government not aligned with Iran would 
be the most positive outcome, according to the King, and 
would allow Jordan to continue or perhaps even increase its 
efforts to help quell the insurgency.  He stated that if a 
pro-Iranian government - "like the current one" - were to 
instead emerge from the elections, "I don't know what we'll 
do."  The King reiterated his willingness to do more to train 
and equip Iraqi soldiers in Jordan, and mentioned the 
possibility of embedding Jordanian special forces into Iraqi 
military units in western Iraq.  He characterized as 
counterproductive some of the MNF-I military campaigns in 
western Iraq vis-a-vis getting tribal leaders to stop their 
support of insurgents. 
 
3.  (C) The King strongly cautioned against Iranian influence 
in Iraq, particularly in the South.  If this influence was 
not checked, he warned, it could lead to effective Iranian 
rule of southern Iraq, and to an even more active and 
dangerous Hizballah in Lebanon.  In response to the CODEL's 
inquiry about Iraqi Deputy PM Ahmad Chalabi, the King said 
that contacts between the GOJ and Chalabi to resolve their 
differences out-of-court had unfortunately broken off.  The 
King speculated that once Chalabi felt he was getting back 
into good USG graces, as evidenced by his recent visit to 
Washington, he no longer felt the need to take a soft 
approach with Jordan.  The King emphasized that Jordan was 
still planning to sponsor a postponed conference of Iraqi 
tribal and religious leaders, noting that the Arab League 
(AL) preparatory conference in Cairo on Iraq - which had not 
impressed him - had pushed back the proposed timing of the 
event.  PM Bakhit agreed that the Cairo conference had 
accomplished very little. 
 
----- 
SYRIA 
----- 
 
4.  (C) On Syria, King Abdullah said he supported U.S. 
efforts to isolate, and to apply political and economic 
pressure on, the SARG.  He added, however, that the U.S. 
should be prepared for what may happen next in Syria in case 
"things unravel."  A possible takeover of the country by the 
Muslim Brotherhood, the King warned, would be very negative 
for both Syria and the region.  During Bakhit's recent visit 
to Damascus (reftel), the King explained that the SARG had 
tried to enlist Jordan to help fend off pressure to cooperate 
with the Melhis investigation.  The GOJ refused, bluntly 
telling the Syrians to fully comply with the investigation, 
and asking why Jordan should come to the aid of Damascus when 
the SARG deemed the GOJ to be the "agent" of the U.S. and 
Israel.  The King noted that he sensed that both the 
Egyptians and Saudis had pulled back - to a degree - from 
their earlier, tougher line with the SARG. 
 
---------------------------- 
ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT 
---------------------------- 
 
5.  (C) King Abdullah stated that the GOJ continues to try to 
help the Palestinian Authority on security issues, especially 
organizational reform of Palestinian security forces.  Jordan 
was also willing, according to the King, to further 
facilitate Palestinian trade, including possibly constructing 
a transportation terminal on Jordan's border with the West 
Bank.  He underscored that Quartet Envoy Wolfensohn had the 
most complete understanding of the needs of the Palestinian 
economy, as well as the necessary plans to strengthen it. 
The election of Amir Peretz as the new leader of the Israeli 
Labor Party, the King remarked, could impact the peace 
process by bringing "increased dynamism" to the Israeli 
political scene. 
6.  (U) CODEL Hagel did not have the opportunity to clear 
this message before departing Jordan. 
HALE 

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