US embassy cable - 05NAIROBI5019

S E C R E T NAIROBI 005019 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF/FO AND AF/E 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/05/2025 
TAGS: PGOV, PTER, PREL, ASEC, KPAO, SO, KE 
SUBJECT: SOMALIA POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: PolCouns Michael J. Fitzpatrick. Reasons: 1.4 
(B&D) 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
1.  (C) As the Department develops new approaches to 
Somalia, Post recommends the USG seek a role in bringing 
into being -- and sustaining -- a coalition of Somalis that 
can rule Somalia and combat the violent Islamists.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (C) Embassy Nairobi welcomes the opportunity to forward 
additional material relevant to the December 8 PCC 
discussion of Somalia policy. 
 
DYNAMIC FACTORS 
---------------- 
 
3.  (S) The key factors to consider in formulation of a new 
policy towards Somalia are generally well understood: 
 
-- The Al-Qaida terrorist threat in Somalia is numerically 
small, with limited resources, but still poses a very 
significant danger to US interests.  Surrounding, and at 
times intertwined with, the AQ threat is a larger circle of 
Islamic Somali extremists.  For the most part, these 
extremists are inwardly focused, i.e. their main concern is 
control over souls, territory and resources inside/inside 
Somalia.  It would not take much, however, for these 
extremists to expand their attention to targets outside 
Somalia.  It is possible that successful USG counter- 
terrorism efforts in Somalia will generate a violent 
backlash outside Somalia from these groups.  Defeating the 
terrorist threat in Somalia and bringing an end to this 
period in which Somalia has been a safe haven for terrorist 
elements must remain the policy priority against which all 
other USG action in Somalia is masured. 
 
-- The formation of the Transitional Federal Institutions 
(defined as the Presidency, the Cabinet -- government, or 
"TFG" -- and the Parliament) in October 2004 was a positive 
step forward for Somalia.  Stalemate has ensued however, 
with the TFG executive under President Yusuf installed in 
Jowhar, and the country's most powerful warlords (and key 
components of Parliament) sharing control of Mogadishu.  At 
the present time, some analysts such as the UN arms Embargo 
Monitoring Group believe the two sides are probably closer 
to a renewal of open armed conflict than they are to 
reconciliation of any sort. Others point out that despite 
significant rearming efforts, the two sides are not prepared 
for a sustained engagement.  There is no doubt however that 
this standoff has given jihadist elements new space within 
which to maneuver and assert their authority.  The jihadists 
will oppose the formation of any centralized government they 
perceive hostile to their Islamic extremist principles. 
 
-- Pressure is building internationally to support President 
Yusuf and the executive against the Mogadishu businessmen, 
warlords and parliamentarians.  Ethiopia, Italy, Yemen, 
Uganda and parts of the African Union have long been 
partisans of Yusuf.  Kenya has recently joined this chorus. 
Now the EU, Sweden, Germany and World Bank are moving 
forward with larger-scale support for Yusuf and the TFG 
executive.  If this campaign rolls on without any US 
involvement or mediation, it could embolden Yusuf to make 
the wrong choices, igniting conflict and possibly 
undermining our CT goals. 
 
-- We cannot remain neutral or on the sidelines if we want 
to position ourselves to influence the political and 
security dynamic in Somalia.  Hence the need for a new 
strategy of engagement. 
 
OPPORTUNITY AND PERIL 
IN "PICKING A HORSE" 
----------------------- 
 
4.  (S) Among President Yusuf's many weaknesses is that he 
has greater standing outside Somalia than at home, where he 
is perceived by most as just another warlord, albeit the one 
who emerged on top after a messy but typically Somali 
presidential selection process in 2004.  Yusuf surely 
understands that he cannot impose his "presidential" 
authority by military means unless he is amply supported by 
international forces.  Despite encouragement from Ethiopia, 
Italy and some others, it is most unlikely that any 
constellation of foreign forces will ever align to give 
Yusuf this opportunity.  Thus his only hope of eventually 
governing as President is probably to combine increased 
foreign support and assistance with active diplomacy and 
outreach to his rivals.  This just might allow him to build 
a coalition that unites the business community, rival clans 
and achieves some semblance of centralized governance under 
his authority.  That in turn would position him to take on 
the Islamic extremists and jihadists whom, he has always 
said, are the main enemy in Somalia.  Whether Yusuf has the 
vision, patience and political skills to do this is 
questionable at best although there are very recent signs 
that he sees himself becoming marginalized and may need to 
seek accommodation. 
 
5.  (S) Chances for success may be slim, but there appears 
little alternative to working more closely with both Yusuf 
and/and his principal rivals in Mogadishu to try to build a 
working coalition government.  In so doing, we should keep 
in the mind that the complex nature of Somali clan politics 
makes it extremely difficult for any outsider to try to pick 
"winners" and back them.  It is a fact of the Somali clan 
structure that it is impossible for any one leader, with or 
without the support of the USG or others in the 
international community, to prevail over all the others. 
Somalia today cannot be dominated by a single individual -- 
nor can a single individual impose his will on the violent 
Islamist extremists in their midst.  But together, the clans 
can both rule and combat the violent Islamists.  Somalia 
today can only be ruled by a coalition.  While the details 
of that coalition are for the Somalis to determine, the USG 
must seek a role in bringing it into being -- and keeping it 
going. 
 
6.  (S) As we do so, we should stay the course in supporting 
the governmental process that the Somalis themselves agreed 
to -- the TFIs.  In doing so, we must place emphasis on the 
"transitional" nature of the current structures.  Support 
for any individual must be clearly cast as support for the 
institutional positions held -- as part of the larger TFIs - 
- and not as support for a given individual at the expense 
of others. 
 
ELEMENTS OF GREATER ENGAGEMENT 
------------------------------- 
 
7.  (S) In reaching out to Yusuf, we should build from the 
September meetings on the margins of the UN General Assembly 
in New York between USG officials and Yusuf and his aides to 
make clear that our goal is to help consolidate the 
authority of the TFG executive, but only as Yusuf reaches 
out to engage and partner with his rivals.  As a first step, 
we should communicate a similar message to both sides of the 
TFI divide.  This could be done by Ambassador in Nairobi 
which, in itself, would be seen by all as a significant 
elevation in our level of engagement. 
 
8.  (S) In discussions with all key obstructionists, we need 
to insist on the primacy of dialogue and coalition building. 
Points we might wish to emphasize would include: 
 
--   Our engagement in Somalia is aimed at standing up the 
TFIs so that stable governance can return to Somalia. 
 
--   The USG does not offer exclusive backing to any leader, 
group or institution.  The return of governance to Somalia 
depends on Somalia's leaders coming together and cooperating 
for the good of the country. 
 
--   The TFIs are sufficiently formed for the various 
elements to provide the necessary venues for this 
cooperation. 
 
--   We will look for the cabinet to meet, debate, and 
present motions to Parliament for action. 
 
--   We will expect the Parliament to meet and debate the 
motions, and vote. 
 
--   On the basis of Parliament's decisions, we will 
determine our support for the TFIs. 
 
--   We will bring our indirect financial support and voice 
to those same actors who have shown their strengths in 
conflict resolution and reconciliation in many areas 
throughout Somalia, and to whom the USG is already providing 
support through multi-donor funded projects. 
 
--   These groups, drawn from civil society, moderate 
Islamists, women's groups and business associations, are 
already seeking to engage with members of Parliament who 
appear to be pulling together in an "alternative center of 
gravity" at least somewhat independent of the TFI factions. 
 
--   We will identify those members of Parliament who can 
cooperate with each other across the clan and the 
Jowhar/Mogadishu divide. 
 
--   We will seek to create this new center of gravity, 
through united international attention and carefully applied 
resources, to attract a quorum of members to the "cross- 
cutting middle". 
 
9.  (S) Our increased engagement must be communicated 
internationally.  We must be clear about what we want, and 
what we are willing to support.  We must be clear that we 
will seek to lead the international community to a united a 
position on Somali questions. 
 
SOMALILAND 
----------- 
 
10.  (S) As we develop a strategy of more active engagement 
in Somalia, we should keep in mind that Somaliland, for all 
its appeal as a relatively peaceful, partially governed 
geographic entity, could become a harmful distraction. 
Because it is somewhat easier for foreigners to visit 
Somaliland, there is a natural tendency to try to view 
Somaliland as a place where we can "engage" and do business. 
Often such engagement is seen as a means to influence and 
instruct the rest of Somalia on the advantages of following 
Somaliland's model. 
 
11.  (S) This logic is flawed, we believe.  Donor engagement 
with Somaliland is not likely to be seen by either Yusuf or 
the warlords in Mogadishu as a sufficient incentive to re- 
evaluate or change their positions.  If international 
engagement were to accelerate Somaliland's drive to achieve 
independence, forcible resistance from the rest of the 
country would result.  Such a conflict, we believe, would 
give extremists and jihadists even more room to operate, 
while further postponing resolution of Somalia's most urgent 
program, which is formation of a functioning (and friendly) 
government in Mogadishu.  Thus any USG involvement in 
Somaliland should be carefully calibrated to ensure the 
question of Somaliland's independence be postponed for the 
time being. 
 
AMBITION AND RESOURCES 
----------------------- 
 
12.  (S) As the USG steps up its diplomatic engagement in 
Somalia, we must commit commensurate resources.  At present, 
Somalia is covered by a single mid-level FSO at Embassy 
Nairobi.  A very small cadre of USAID officers and FSNs 
administers our assistance program in Somalia.  Embassy 
Nairobi has very limited Somali language capabilities (none 
at all among Americans present at post).  This staffing 
level is scarcely sufficient to maintain a watching brief 
and comply with mandatory reporting and support 
requirements.  It is well short of what will be needed to 
sustain an engagement strategy.  If it is decided to 
intensify our diplomatic engagement, step up official travel 
to the region in connection with Somalia, possibly stand up 
a Somalia country team in Nairobi, prepare an MPP for 
Somalia, channel more ESF, FMF and other forms of assistance 
to Somalia, etc., it cannot be done within current staffing 
levels.  Embassy Nairobi will send in more detailed notes on 
possible resource solutions in a separate message. 
 
SECURITY 
--------- 
 
13.  (S) An unavoidable constraint on our engagement in 
Somalia is the extreme danger of travel to that country. 
There is abundant evidence that extremist groups in Somalia 
are continually on the lookout for foreign targets of 
opportunity inside Somalia, especially Americans. 
Somaliland is not an exception to this rule.  Any official 
American visiting  Somalia will immediately be targeted by 
one extremist group or another for hostile action.  Although 
officials of other nationalities have cautiously stepped up 
the number of their quick visits to sites in Somalia in 
recent months, it is only a matter of time before they take 
casualties as well.  Embassy Nairobi does not have the 
security resources to support a program of frequent visits 
to Somalia, nor we would we recommend undertaking such a 
program.  Fortunately,  we have a number of ways of engaging 
key Somali actors from Nairobi (and possibly other regional 
capitals) without frequent travel into Somalia. 
 
BELLAMY