US embassy cable - 02RANGOON1580

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ASSK TALKS BIG PICTURE WITH NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR DEMOCRACY'S AMBRAMOWITZ

Identifier: 02RANGOON1580
Wikileaks: View 02RANGOON1580 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Rangoon
Created: 2002-12-11 09:14:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL EAID BM TH ASSK
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L RANGOON 001580 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV - PLEASE PASS TO USAID/ANE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/11/2012 
TAGS: PREL, EAID, BM, TH, ASSK 
SUBJECT: ASSK TALKS BIG PICTURE WITH NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR 
DEMOCRACY'S AMBRAMOWITZ 
 
 
Classified By: COM CARMEN M. MARTINEZ FOR REASON 1.5(D). 
 
1. (C)  Summary:  Following meetings with several SPDC 
officials, former Ambassador Morton Ambramowitz met at the 
EMR with NLD Secretary Aung San Suu Kyi on December 5th.  The 
COM and the PAO were also present.  In a discussion that 
lasted nearly two hours, Ambramowitz checked his impressions 
and the assertions of the SPDC officials with ASSK.  He asked 
for ASSK's reading of the gravity of the situation facing the 
country and the prospects for change, and her views on how 
best to provide humanitarian assistance.  End Summary. 
 
2. (U)  The former ambassador, now a Director of the National 
Endowment for Democracy, had met earlier with the Home, 
Labor, and Education Ministers, as well as with Kyaw Thein 
and Hla Min.  A meeting with S1 General Khin Nyunt was 
cancelled at the last minute.  Ambramowitz reported that a 
theme he had not heard in his last visit in 1997, the 
"integration of the ethnic nationalities," permeated all his 
discussions with SPDC officials.  Most officials averred that 
there was no economic crisis, and the SPDC was moving at its 
own pace toward transition, because the integration of the 
nationalities was not secure enough to move precipitously to 
a new arrangement. 
 
3. (C)  ASSK replied that in her recent visit to Shan State 
she found "strong solidarity between the ethnicities and us" 
and greater support than the NLD enjoyed twelve years ago. 
She said she was encouraged that the Shans had evidently laid 
aside ethnic considerations and had recognized that the most 
important need was for political change.  Even in the go-go 
border town of Tachileik, she found "amazing support," 
signifying that the merchants dependent on the border trade 
had realized that there could be no economic development 
without political change.  She indicated that she would 
complete a round of visits to each of the States during this 
dry season. 
 
4. (C)  Ambramowitz asked whether a "humanitarian crisis" 
exists and, if so, should more assistance be given, even if 
through the Burmese Government?  ASSK agreed there were very 
serious problems, such as HIV/AIDS, the quality of education, 
and the health care system.  While she said she didn't 
believe the system was on the verge of collapse, something 
very small could spark "unforeseen circumstances."  She said 
that assistance programs should be expanded, but not through 
the SPDC.  Although she allowed there have to be dealings 
with the government, there should be "no compromise" on the 
basic requirements for accountability, transparency, 
independent monitoring, and providing no benefit to the SPDC. 
 She offered the Network Project (a UNICEF early childhood 
development program) as an example of a program that worked 
without helping the SPDC and promoted pluralism at the same 
time.  She expressed dismay that USG assistance for this 
project may not be continued. 
 
5. (C)  She complained that the SPDC was able to "pressurize" 
the UN agencies against cooperating with her, and asked, if 
UN agencies cave in to pressure on this front "how can we 
trust them" on other matters.  She pointed out it must be 
questioned whether humanitarian assistance would help the 
Burmese people provide for themselves in the future.  "Are 
they going to survive just to die another day?  Or are they 
going to survive to change the system?" 
 
6. (C)  Ambramowitz said he was leaving Burma with the 
impression that the current regime would make very little 
effort to deal with her or to move toward civilian 
government, and asked whether the only way to effect change 
under these circumstances would be to encourage a split in 
the military.  ASSK agreed he was "basically right" and that 
it was probably Sr. General Than Shwe who opposed change. 
She opined that he could not be as firmly in control as is 
supposed because he is "too lazy to do his homework" and lets 
people around him do all the work.  She said the 
international community must keep up the pressure, continue 
to point out that change is inevitable and at the same time, 
make clear to those in the military that favor political 
change that reasonable elements are appreciated, and give 
them more confidence. 
 
7. (C)  As the discussion wound down, ASSK said it was 
necessary to continue to "work on practical terms" and "build 
up the strength of the people -- but that's our (e.g. the 
party's) job and . . . we're not doing badly."  She said 
although she cannot say the NLD as an organization is getting 
stronger -- citing the stumbling blocks to opening branch 
offices including harassment by local PDC's and USDA's -- 
support for the party is getting much stronger. 
Martinez 

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