US embassy cable - 05BAGHDAD4846

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 004846 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/04/15 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, KDEM, KISL, MOPS, IZ, Elections, Sunni Arab 
SUBJECT: LEADING SUNNI ARAB SLATE REP ON ELECTIONS, U.S. 
ROLE IN IRAQ 
 
Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROBERT S. FORD, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) 
AND (D). 
 
1.  (C)  Summary:  A leading Sunni Arab coalition 
representative recounted the Sunni Arab sense of grievance 
and estrangement from the political transition process, and 
asserted the solution to the security problem is a "balanced" 
government (read: more Sunni officials) and "professional" 
security forces devoid of sectarian bias.  While lamenting 
the "deficiencies" of the American "occupation" of Iraq, he 
acknowledged USG advocacy for Sunni participation and 
proposed a process for withdrawal that he claimed would 
culminate in a positive relationship between the United 
States and Iraq.  He predicted 90 percent of the Sunni 
community would vote in the December 15 elections, but feared 
ballot-stuffing.  End Summary. 
 
2. (C)  Poloff met December 3 with Imad Mohamed Ali, the 
secretary general of the Sunni political party, the General 
 
SIPDIS 
Conference for the Iraqi People.  Ali said he was speaking on 
behalf of the Iraqi Consensus Coalition (Tawafoq), the 
leading Sunni list, which also includes the Iraqi Islamic 
Party (IIP) and the Iraqi National Dialogue Council.  Ali 
denied that Tawafoq has a religious coloration.  Although 
admittedly the IIP has a religious orientation, he claimed 
the Conference and Council parties are composed of secular, 
liberal, tribal and religious Iraqis.  Ali estimated that 90 
percent of the Sunni community would vote in the December 15 
elections.  Tawafoq expects to pick up much of this support, 
although Ali said Sunni tribal leaders would draw support 
from their respective tribes (e.g., Dulaymi, Jabbouri, and 
Shammar).  He predicted the list headed by Mithal al-Alusi 
would do poorly, because of his visit to Israel and because 
many in the Sunni Arab community perceive him as holding them 
responsible for terrorism following the murder of his sons. 
Ali said Tawafoq has close ties with Iyad Allawi.  While 
claiming good relations with Barzani, he said Tawafoq 
calculates that the Kurds will make decisions based on their 
own interests, rather than the nation's. 
 
Election Assessment 
------------------------- 
 
3. (C)  Ali criticized the IECI as anti-Sunni.  He also 
characterized the commission as weak, alleging the IECI could 
not stop inappropriate campaign symbols (e.g., photos of 
Sistani) and actions to deface campaign material.  He 
complained that the parties were not receiving equal air time 
on television.  He recommended three steps to ensure a 
successful election.  First, describing the challenges voters 
faced in reaching polling centers, especially in hostile 
environments like Anbar province, he recommended the IECI 
permit maximum flexibility in voting location, arguing the 
practice of dyeing a voter's finger would prevent fraud. 
Second, he stressed the importance of the widespread presence 
of observers, especially foreign observers, particularly 
during the ballot counting phase.  Third, he sought 
reassurances on the integrity of the process of transporting 
ballot boxes.  He said these last two steps would be designed 
to prevent ballot-stuffing. 
 
Prospects for New Government 
---------------------------- 
 
4. (C)  Ali said the USG must use its influence to ensure the 
new government is "balanced" and "strong."  He claimed the 
Governing Council and Interim Government had been appointed 
on a sectarian basis, and insisted the new cabinet eschew 
this practice.  The Sunni community, he threatened, would not 
accept a Shia Minister of Defense or a Shia Minister of 
Interior (i.e., the resistance would continue).  When poloff 
protested that a policy of excluding Shia from these specific 
positions would itself be sectarian, he clarified that these 
ministerial portfolios must not be held by anybody who acts 
in a sectarian manner.  He observed that the Sunni community 
supports Allawi, although he is a Shia, because he does not 
allow religion to interfere in matters of the state. 
 
Views of Sunni Community 
---------------------------------- 
 
5. (C)  Ali described a gulf in understanding between the 
Iraqi and American people.  He said the Americans believe 
they have liberated Iraq, whereas the Iraqis believe they are 
suffering from an alternatively inept and brutal occupation. 
Ali claimed American forces that had reached Baghdad and 
Sunni majority provinces in spring 2003 encountered no 
resistance.  The resistance developed, he claimed, once it 
became clear to the Sunni community that they were being 
excluded from the political process. For example, he said, 
few Sunni Iraqis even knew Pachachi, because of his age and 
long exile.  (When poloff pointed out that the IIP had been a 
member of the Governing Council, he said a single seat was 
insufficient representation of the Sunni community.)  Ali 
said the situation was aggravated by cultural errors made by 
uninformed soldiers and ineptitude in restoring basic 
utilities and meeting economic needs. 
 
6. (C)  Ali accused the U.S. of "dereliction of duty" through 
"encouragement" of sectarian policies and an unchecked Shia 
government leadership.  He recounted a familiar litany of 
complaints, including: the assertion that a Sunni cannot 
obtain a job in a government ministry; the drop in the number 
of seats to the National Assembly allocated to Anbar 
province; and the reports of abduction of Sunni men by 
Shia-led police who are then tortured and killed.  "Have you 
seen the photos," he asked, "where you can see how they 
drilled holes into their heads?"  He dismissed the view that 
terrorists dressed in police clothing; he argued that given 
the curfew only the police could drive around in vehicle 
convoys at night.  The result, said Ali, is that Sunni men 
sleep at a different house each night to avoid detention.  He 
exclaimed that the maltreatment has been so bad that Sunni 
men would prefer to be detained by American forces than Iraqi 
forces.  The extrajudicial practices of Shia police in Anbar 
province, he insisted, fueled the insurgency. 
 
Plan for Withdrawal 
------------------- 
 
7. (C)  Ali said the Sunni community recognized that the USG 
is engaged in a serious effort to promote Sunni involvement 
in the political process.  He lauded the USG for ensuring 
Sunni participation in the drafting of the constitution; for 
brokering the amendment package to the constitution; and for 
reaching out to regional Sunni Arab states.  He said he had 
participated in the Arab League conference in Cairo, and 
praised the participation of the "neutral" United Nations as 
well as the final statement. 
 
8. (C)  Asked about Tawafoq's policy toward the issue of 
withdrawal, Ali said the issue should be handled in stages. 
In the short-term, coalition forces should release the 
thousands of detainees (He claimed that "no one even knows 
the number") and withdraw from cities.  Coalition forces 
should reduce "excesses" in use of force; Ali claimed his 
three-year old daughter believes the sight of the American 
military means she will be killed.  During this initial time 
period, the security services should be transformed into a 
professional force; under no circumstances should militias be 
incorporated into the security forces.  Ali, who described 
himself and Tawafoq as part of the "political resistance," 
asserted that the political resistance could convince the 
"armed resistance" to desist if they could present a 
withdrawal plan tied to a timetable.  Otherwise, he said, the 
armed resistance would remain active as long as coalition 
forces were in Iraq, as their goal is to eject them.  He 
claimed Tawafoq seeks to establish a positive bilateral 
relationship between a sovereign Iraq and the United States. 
 
9. (C)  Ali solicited poloff's view of the presence of 
coalition forces.  Drawing on the President's recent speech, 
she noted that many of Ali's ideas tracked with current 
policy, chiefly the need to develop Iraqi security forces. 
Poloff described the considerable efforts devoted to this 
process.  She urged Ali to use his influence to encourage 
Sunni men, particularly in Anbar, to join the ISF. 
Explaining the United States is conscious of cultural and 
national sensitivities to a foreign military presence, she 
urged Ali to be realistic.  Al-Qaeda terrorist elements, who 
are exploiting Iraq's situation for their own purpose, would 
overwhelm the young Iraqi democracy if left unchecked by 
coalition forces.  The result would have negative 
consequences for Iraq, neighboring countries, and the United 
States.  She urged Ali to continue his dialogue with the 
embassy and to introduce us to other prominent Sunni leaders. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
10.  (C)  This was Ali's first meeting with an American 
diplomat, and he explicitly sought to confirm that his 
viewpoint would be conveyed, albeit discretely, to the 
American government.  He agreed to travel to the green zone 
for the meeting, although he said he was reluctant to enter 
the area because the continued American "occupation" of the 
palace is proof that Iraq does not control its own country. 
When asked about his profession prior to politics, Ali said 
he has a degree in Islamic jurisprudence from Baghdad 
University, and his manners were that of a religious man.  He 
said he had never worked for the government.  Originally from 
Diyala, he considers himself a Baghdadi.  At one point he 
abruptly asked poloff if she was a "fanatical" Christian, and 
characterized Iraqis as Muslims and Americans as Christians 
and Jew, but asserted that there could be a fruitful dialogue 
between the two countries. 
KHALILZAD