US embassy cable - 05BAGHDAD4843

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 004843 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/02/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, KISL, KDEM, IZ, Shia Islamists, Elections 
SUBJECT: SHIA INDEPENDENT ALI AL-DABAGH ON ELECTIONS, SHIA 
ALLIANCE, AND SADR 
 
Classified By: ACTING POLITICAL COUNSELOR MICHAEL J. ADLER, FOR REASONS 
 1.4 (B) AND (D). 
 
 1. (C) SUMMARY.  Poloffs met December 1 with TNA member Ali 
al-Dabagh, a politician who left the United Iraqi Alliance to 
form his own party, while maintaining his ties to Ayatollah 
Sistani.  Al-Dabagh accused the Shia Alliance of candidate 
intimidation as well as inappropriate efforts to convey to 
Iraqis that Sistani has blessed the Alliance list.  He said 
that the Shia Alliance is too pro-Iranian and theocratic. 
Moqtada Al-Sadr, in al-Dabagh's opinion, "is a reality now" 
and must be dealt with by the other Iraqi political leaders 
and the United States.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2. (C) Ali Al-Dabagh's "Qualified Iraqis Party" is a slate of 
defectors from the Shia Islamic Coalition.  Al-Dabagh, who is 
known to have a strong relationship with the Hawza in Najaf, 
told poloffs that four days previously Ayatollah Sistani 
issued an indirect blessing of the Shia Alliance and other 
parties acceptable to the Shia leadership, including 
al-Dabagh's.  He complained about the Shia Alliance's 
intimidation of other Shia candidates, its misuse of Sistani 
images (e.g., picture on posters), and its effort to 
communicate to Iraqis that Sistani has blessed the Alliance 
list.  Al-Dabagh said he opposed such tactics, adding that he 
had declined opportunities -- for the present -- to put 
Sistani's image on his campaign material.  Al-Dabagh said he 
did not expect Sistani to say anything further about the 
elections. 
 
3. (C) Al-Dabagh predicted that the Shia Alliance will get 
the majority of seats in the elections for the Council of 
Representatives.  However, he told poloffs that it will be 
impossible for the Shia Alliance to govern with just the 
Kurds and that Sunni participation will be required.  He 
speculated that PM Jafari and SCIRI head Abdul Aziz al-Hakim 
will not be able to work together in the next government for 
longer than one year.  He added that the future government 
will need to create jobs and criticized the proposed 2006 
Iraqi budget for only creating 250,000 jobs.  He highlighted 
the need for a vibrant private sector. 
 
4. (C) Al-Dabagh described the Shia Alliance as too 
pro-Iranian.  He described this as destructive because the 
Iraqi Shias should be seen as Iraqis, not as "a shadow of 
Iran."  He acknowledged that Iraq should have neighborly 
relations with Iran, but added that Iraq should not be paying 
for Iran's problems with the United States (referring to 
Iranian support for Syria, etc.).  He added that Iran is 
financing Dawa and the Sadrists and controls several 
newspapers in Iraq.  (COMMENT:  Al-Dabagh denied that his 
party has any links to Iran.  END COMMENT) 
 
5. (C) Al-Dabagh, who speaks fluent Farsi from his 26 years 
in Dubai and has extensive business ties to Iran, believes 
that the Shia Alliance is using religion in a way that is 
harmful to Iraq.  He noted with concern Sunni Arab 
perceptions of a Shia attempt to establish a theocratic 
state, despite Sistani's wishes to the contrary. 
 
6. (C) Al-Dabagh stressed that Moqtada al-Sadr "is a 
political reality," who has the capacity to "destroy much of 
the south."  Al-Dabagh added that Moqtada will have a share 
of seats within and outside the Shia Alliance so he "must be 
dealt with in a smart way."  When asked for clarification, 
al-Dabagh said the other Iraqi leaders and the United States 
need to accommodate Moqtada, who "wants others to recognize 
him."  Al-Dabagh added that Moqtada is not really interested 
in throwing out the Coalition, "he just wants to be treated 
as a real leader."  Moqtada knows that "the political process 
is much cheaper than fighting."  He made several references 
to his close relationship with al-Sadr, saying that al-Sadr 
tried to pressure him into remaining in the Alliance. 
 
7.  (C) Al-Dabagh said that since June, Moqtada has been 
playing his cards strategically.  He noted a meeting 
organized by Moqtada November 30 in Najaf with various Shia 
groups designed to issue a statement asking for troop 
withdrawal, recognition of the insurgency, release of all 
Iraqi prisoners, and a formal rejection of Israel.  He said 
that Moqtada would expand his outreach to include Sunnis as 
well. 
SATTERFIELD