US embassy cable - 05BAGHDAD4836

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PM JA'AFARI PLANS MAJOR SHAKEUP OF IRAQI MILITARY LEADERSHIP; WARNED BY MNF-I AND EMBASSY

Identifier: 05BAGHDAD4836
Wikileaks: View 05BAGHDAD4836 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Baghdad
Created: 2005-12-04 12:47:00
Classification: SECRET
Tags: PGOV MOPS IZ Security
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BAGHDAD 004836 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/03/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, MOPS, IZ, Security 
SUBJECT: PM JA'AFARI PLANS MAJOR SHAKEUP OF IRAQI MILITARY 
LEADERSHIP; WARNED BY MNF-I AND EMBASSY 
 
Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES DAVID M. SATTERFIELD FOR REASONS 1.4 ( 
a), (b), AND (d). 
 
1. (S//REL GBR AUS) SUMMARY: Iraqi Prime Minister Ja'afari is 
preparing to sign decrees which will lead to a major 
reorganization of the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and the Iraqi 
Joint and Army Land Forces Headquarters.  The new leadership 
personnel he plans to bring in are all Shia.  MNF-I 
Commanding General Casey warned Ja'afari that such a move 
would amount to a wholesale reorganization of Iraq's military 
leadership during a time of war and would be a threat to the 
national security of the country.  Charge and British 
Ambassador told Ja'afari that, in addition to the grave 
security implications, such an obviously political move to 
pack the MOD on the eve of a major election would fuel 
sectarianism and would amount to "madness."  Ja'afari 
admitted that the move was purely political as members of his 
political coalition are demanding their "fair share" of 
places in the MOD.  He claimed not to like it and to be 
personally opposed to the need for such quotas but kept 
repeating: that the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) 
required diversity in the MOD; that since his government took 
office he has been talking about making such a change; and 
that unless it is illegal he plans to move ahead.  GEN Casey 
persuaded Ja'afari not to act until he, Ja'afari, returns 
from a planned trip to Japan that begins on December 4.  When 
Ja'afari returns, Casey will present him an analysis of the 
serious harm this plan would do to Iraq's security.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (S//REL GBR AUS)  On the evening of December 2, MNF-I 
Deputy Commanding General Houghton was called to the Prime 
Minister's office on short notice.  Upon arrival, he was met 
by Senior Advisor Adnan Ali, who gave him copies of three 
decrees pertaining to a reorganization of the MOD and the top 
ranks of the Iraqi Army.  These decrees: abolished several 
high ranking committees and positions; called for ten new 
senior appointments to the MOD, all of which involve placing 
a uniformed officer in a position formerly held by a 
civilian; and replaced the commanding generals of the 6th, 
8th, and 9th Iraqi Army Divisions.  These generals are the 
best division commanders in the Army and their divisions are 
located in the first areas likely to be turned over to Iraqi 
control.  MNF-I and the U.S. and British embassies 
immediately requested a meeting with Ja'afari to discuss the 
implications of these moves.  On the evening of Dec. 3, GEN 
Casey, Charge, British Ambassador Patey, MNF-I Deputy 
Commanding General Houghton, and Acting PolMilCounselor 
called on Ja'afari at his residence.  Ja'afari was 
accompanied by Chief of Staff Abdul Aziz al-Tamimi and Senior 
Advisor Adnan Ali. 
 
------------------ 
"ARE YOU SERIOUS?" 
------------------ 
 
3.  (S//REL GBR AUS)  GEN Casey began the meeting by telling 
Ja'afari that he had seen the three decrees and wanted to 
know the Prime Minister's intent.  "Are these serious 
proposals you're planning to announce?"  Ja'afari replied 
that he has been talking about changing the structure of the 
MOD since his government took power in April.  He said that 
the TAL requires balance in the MOD.  In the previous 
government, the minister was a Shia, so the other senior 
positions in the ministry went to Sunnis and Kurds.  When 
Ja'afari came in, the Shia minister was replaced by Sunni 
Saadoun Dulime, who Ja'afari acknowledged is much more 
concerned with the national interest than was the prior 
minister.  Nevertheless, this meant that the top man was a 
Sunni, making it necessary to maintain balance by juggling 
other top portfolios.  Ja'afari maintained he had discussed 
this many times with GEN Casey, Ambassador Khalilzad, and the 
Charge.  He said that two or three months ago he had given 
the Ambassador a list of three names of possible top level 
appointments to the Iraqi National Intelligence Service. 
Ja'afari continued that "as far as I'm concerned, this is an 
agreement I must live up to."  He believes the most important 
thing is that the new appointees are patriotic, are well 
qualified, and perform well.  That said, he admitted that he 
didn't know any of the individuals on the list.  However, he 
considers this normal, pointing out that he was even forced 
to accept ministers in his cabinet about whom he had 
reservations.  Nevertheless, he has held the government 
together.  Ja'afari concluded by saying "We did not come up 
with the TAL, but it is our responsibility to follow it and 
bring in the right people.  I believe in direct democracy.  I 
do not believe in quotas, but this was agreed upon to obtain 
balance and I must obey.  I did not want to have Deputy Prime 
Ministers, but I agreed because it was required by the law." 
 
----------------------------------------- 
"THIS IS NOT THE ACT OF A WAR GOVERNMENT" 
----------------------------------------- 
 
4. (S//REL GBR AUS) GEN Casey replied that if this is what 
Ja'afari believes, then he has been poorly served by his 
advisors.  He firmly warned Ja'afari that "this is a 
wholesale restructuring of the armed forces two weeks before 
a major election at a time when your country is engaged in a 
war, and is not the action of a war government.  This will 
disrupt two and a half years of work with the General Staff 
and Land Forces Headquarters at a critical time, will be seen 
by the people as a negative act, and will in turn strengthen 
the insurgency."  Ja'afari asked if Casey was concerned abut 
the change to the structure or with the names proposed.  GEN 
Casey replied he does not know the men named and will have to 
review the list in more detail but that he is clearly 
concerned about the proposed change to the structure of the 
military.  "My problem is the impact on the ministry and the 
forces they supervise and the fact that your advisors 
recommended to you this type of change at this time without 
consulting with the Minister of Defense, which is 
irresponsible."  GEN Casey made clear that we are not 
questioning Ja'afari's sovereign authority but noted that we 
are his partners in this struggle and must consult on such 
important changes together.  Ja'afari replied that he had 
spoken to Dulime several times, and Dulime had always pledged 
he would do whatever the Prime Minister ordered.  "He 
understands that this is a political agreement and has told 
the Iraqi united coalition that he has no problems with 
changes in the ranks." 
 
---------------------- 
A POLITICAL OBLIGATION 
---------------------- 
 
5. (S//REL GBR AUS)  Charge told Ja'afari that, while GEN 
Casey had spoken as a military expert, it is critical that 
the political consequences of such a move also be fully 
appreciated.  If Ja'afari goes through with the planned 
reorganization, there will be a definite perception that this 
is a significant political decision eleven days before a 
major election that should be left to the incoming 
government.  It will be seen as an obvious attempt to pack 
the MOD with Shias at the expense of the Sunnis.  Ja'afari 
replied again that he had spoken of taking these steps for a 
long time. He emphasized that the move needs to be looked at 
in a legal context:  "Is this illegal?  If it is, it cannot 
go forward.  If it is not, I will consider arguments against 
it; but as long as the intent of the TAL is to maintain 
balance, I must do this.  I am not Prime Minister because I 
was selected by the people.  I'm Prime Minister due to the 
agreement of political parties.  Although I do not believe in 
this, this is a coalition government based on political 
agreements." 
 
6.  (S//REL GBR AUS)  The British Ambassador seconded 
Charge's view, noting that GEN Casey's concerns about the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the army are the most 
important factors.  But also, does Iraq really want to be in 
the position where government and military officials are 
picked by political parties based on their religious sect? 
If this is the case, Iraq is on the road to sectarianism.  He 
pointed out that the names on the decrees are the same as 
those which surfaced two months ago when an attempt was made 
to sweep senior officials out of the MOD under charges of 
corruption.  The list was handed over to the Minister of 
Defense by an official of a Shia political faction. 
Ambassador Patey assured Ja'afari that no one is questioning 
his integrity and intentions to appoint patriotic officers, 
but to make such changes a few weeks before the election with 
the names proposed will have a deleterious effect on 
perceptions and on our ability to fight the insurgency. 
Ambassador Patey also raised a legal question, pointing out 
that it was for the Presidency Council to select officers, 
once recommended by the Prime Minister or Minister of 
Defense.  Therefore, decrees naming officials must go before 
the Presidency Council. 
 
7.  (S//REL GBR AUS)  Again, Ja'afari fell back on his 
argument that as long as the move is not illegal, he is 
obligated by politics to act. "I understand the military 
concerns, but this was agreed to by the political parties.  I 
am a Prime Minister in a coalition government, this has been 
agreed upon a long time ago.  If there are concerns about the 
legality or the qualifications of the names I will reexamine 
them, but I am obligated to live up to the agreement.  What 
am I going to tell them?  That it's not my responsibility?  I 
can't just tell them I can't do this because it's late in my 
term." 
 
--------------------------- 
"WE HAVE AN AGREEMENT, TOO" 
--------------------------- 
 
8. (S//REL GBR AUS)  GEN Casey again reiterated his belief 
that Ja'afari's advisors had not adequately explained the 
magnitude of the changes contemplated.  "This is not 
replacing a few people.  This is a wholesale reorganization 
of the land forces headquarters."  Casey reminded Ja'afari 
that the first time they met, they had agreed there would be 
no political disruptions of the functioning of the security 
ministries.  Other political leaders from all factions had 
received this same briefing.  "We have an agreement, too," 
Casey emphasized.  Ja'afari replied that he concurred that 
the military cannot be politicized. 
 
-------------------- 
QUESTIONS OF BALANCE 
-------------------- 
 
9. (S//REL GBR AUS)  Ja'afari then turned to Tamimi and asked 
him about the list of names.  Tamimi replied that all on the 
list are Shia but that this helps to maintain the proper 
balance in the MOD.  MNF-I Deputy Commanding General Houghton 
disagreed, producing figures to demonstrate otherwise.  He 
pointed out that of the 58 senior positions at the 
Headquarters staff, there are currently 15 Sunni, 38 Shia, 4 
Kurds, and one Turkman.  Under the proposed changes, ten new 
Shia will be brought in at the expense of the Sunni and 
Kurds.  The same can be said for the division commander 
positions.  Of the ten, there are currently 3 Sunni, 4 Shia, 
3 Kurd, and one Turkman.  The three new proposed commanders 
are Shia, and some of those to be replaced are not.  GEN 
Casey added that the three commanders slated to be replaced 
are the best in the Army.  Ja'afari replied that all that 
matters to him is the patriotism of the officers, but the 
quotas were agreed upon when the government was formed. 
Ambassador Patey pointed out that the Shia already have more 
than fifty percent of the top slots in the military and 
questioned whether the quota agreement that applied to the 
formation of the government even applied to the military. 
Houghton then raised another concern, noting that, under the 
plan, ten civilians at the ministry are to be replaced by 
military officers.  This jeopardizes the concept of civilian 
control over the military and is a bad move that will 
dangerously empower military officers to have control over 
the ministry.  Ja'afari replied that these observations are 
important and that he will see that, in addition to 
maintaining sectarian balance, balance between the uniformed 
and civilian leadership also is preserved. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
"NATIONAL SECURITY MUST BE YOUR FOREMOST CONCERN" 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
10. (S//REL GBR AUS)  GEN Casey forcefully returned to the 
main point: "As Prime Minister, national security must be 
your foremost concern.  You are the Commander in Chief of the 
armed forces.  Your country is under vicious attack by an 
armed insurgency and is under emergency measures.  The 
changes you propose to make will fundamentally affect your 
ability to defend the nation.  If there was ever a time when 
national security concerns must trump political deals, this 
is it."  Ja'afari rejoined that we should take into 
consideration and appreciate all he has done to hold this 
government together: "I took from the Shia to give to the 
Sunnis and Kurds. I am now near the end of my term and they 
feel it is their right to have their fair share in the 
ministry."  Ambassador Patey remonstrated that what Ja'afari 
was planning to do -- change the country's military structure 
in the middle of a war with an election approaching -- is 
against common sense.  Charge warned Ja'afari that such a 
move would be "madness."  Talk of balancing the ministry 
might have made sense in April but not now, before an 
election when such a move will be seen only as an attempt to 
pack the MOD with Shia and will surely serve to inflame 
sectarian suspicions and passions. 
 
--------------- 
ONE MORE CHANCE 
--------------- 
 
11.  (S//REL GBR AUS)  Convinced that Ja'afari was failing or 
refusing to see our points, GEN Casey and Charge persuaded 
Ja'afari to consider this one more time upon his return from 
a pending trip to Japan.  When Ja'afari returns, MNF-I and 
Embassy will present a detailed briefing outlining the 
dangers, military and political, of pursuing the proposed 
course of action.  Ja'afari agreed and also said that he 
would have two members of his staff work with us in the 
meantime to try to understand and address our concerns.  He 
also agreed to take this matter before the Ministerial 
Committee for National Security. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
12.  (S//REL GBR AUS)  This is the third time in two months 
that Shia political factions have tried to gain control of 
the MOD.  They make no secret of the fact that they harbor 
deep suspicious of a "Sunni controlled" army, recalling that 
all coups in Iraq's history have sprung from the military. 
Ja'afari, entertaining hopes of retaining the prime ministry 
in the next government, is squeezed between what he might 
believe is right and the political realities of trying to 
maintain his support with activist Shia factions.  We will 
continue to forcefully push back this proposal (including 
through discussions with the Kurds and SCIRI leader Hakim). 
This proposal, if successful, would seriously impede the 
progress made to date in developing the capabilities of the 
Iraqi Army and threaten the ability of the Army to function 
effectively, at least in the short term.  In addition, this 
move, if carried out, would serve to confirm the worst fears 
of the Sunni population that Iranian-supported Shia 
hard-liners are intent on controlling all organs of Iraq's 
armed security services.  END COMMENT. 
SATTERFIELD 

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