US embassy cable - 05OTTAWA3580

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 OTTAWA 003580 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/05/2015 
TAGS: AS, CA, KDEM, PGOV, PREL, PTER, SL, UK 
SUBJECT: QUAD MEETING ON SRI LANKA IN OTTAWA 
 
Classified By: POLMINCOUNS Brian Flora, reasons 1.5 (b) (d) 
 
1. (C) Summary: A Quad meeting was held in Ottawa November 29 
on Sri Lanka on the margins of scheduled meetings on 
Bangladesh and Pakistan.  The participants expressed concern 
over the downward spiral in the peace process and  slackening 
international attention to Sri Lanka.  The participants 
agreed on four action items:  1) Coordinate messages and 
declarations from capitals in order to give them more weight 
and consistency; 2) Refresh the Co-Chair process; 3) 
Coordinate on the listing of LTTE as a terrorist 
organization; and 4) Hold another meeting in the spring at 
the DG or above level.  End Summary 
 
2. (SBU) Poloff attended the Quad meeting on Sri Lanka 
November 29 hosted by Canadian Foreign Ministry South Asia 
Deputy Director Glen Hodgins on the margins of the scheduled 
meeting on Bangladesh.  Other attendees included Australian 
DFAT South Asia Director Peter Howarth and UK FCO South Asia 
Director Anthony Stokes.  The meeting was held largely at the 
behest of Howarth, whose wanted to maximize his being in 
Ottawa after travel from Canberra. 
 
VIEW FROM CANADA 
---------------- 
 
3. (C) Hodgins began with an overview of Canada's interest in 
Sri Lanka, which is centered on the 200,000 strong Tamil 
community here, much of which comes from LTTE controlled 
territory.  Hodgins said Canada is concerned the peace 
process has gone off the rails and sees a self-destructive 
downward spiral, with "internal inertia that will soon be 
beyond self-correction."  He referred to a "criminal 
inability to work things out," in large part, because people 
in the South "haven't suffered enough."  The Sinhalese were 
relatively unaffected by the conflict and in some ways 
benefited from it, Hodgins said, while the Tamils have 
suffered much in the last 20 years and won't agree to a 
settlement without a large payout. 
 
4. (C) Hodgins said the GOC is concerned with the 
"de-internationalization" of the conflict.  The Tokyo 
Co-Chairs, he said, have outlasted their utility and "no one 
pays attention to them any more."  Canada has been engaged in 
the peace process since the Oslo discussions in 2002, largely 
through the efforts of former Ontario Premier Bob Rae and the 
Forum of Federations which he directs.  Rae and the Forum 
spent a good deal of time advising LTTE negotiator Tamil 
Cheldun and others on the federalism issue, but the Sri 
Lankan government negotiators were cool to the concept, 
understanding it as a simple devolution of power. 
 
5. (C) Hodgins spent a good bit of time explaining Canada's 
position on the listing of LTTE and emphasized that Canada 
has been unfairly judged over the issue.  He said Canada 
listed the LTTE as of 7 November 2001 as part of the UN 
Suppression of Terrorism motion.  Since the mid-90's the GOC 
had not allowed LTTE members entry into Canada.  He noted 
Britain went further in banning membership altogether, but 
added that Canada cannot legally do this because of its 
Charter of Rights. 
 
6. (C) Stokes asked whether there was an issue with listing 
the LTTE under Canada's criminal code in addition to the UN 
listing.  Hodgins responded that policymakers are debating 
the issue, but have been unable to reach consensus on which 
activities to criminalize and what would be considered 
facilitation of criminal or terrorist activities under the 
law.  Part of the problem, he said, is that this would 
involve criminalizing activities that are currently legal, 
which would be poorly received by Tamil constituents so 
unlikely to get through Parliament.  The new government could 
revisit LTTE policy, and certainly a Conservative minority 
government would be more inclined to take a more hard-line 
position.  Toward the end of the meeting, when listing was 
suggested as one of the four key issues to come out of the 
meeting, Hodgins went further, saying "it is only a matter of 
time on listing LTTE." 
 
7. (C) In terms of a long-term prognosis, Hodgins said he 
believes there will be a breakdown in the cease-fire and a 
return to hostilities.  In his view, the LTTE would be 
initially successful, taking the east and Jaffna, but in the 
long-run they would be defeated.  He said the government 
lacks intelligence, not manpower, and if provided 
intelligence on Tamil troop movements (e.g. by the U.S.), 
would be able to defeat the LTTE.  Hodgins suggested that 
violence could break out as early as six months hence, or the 
two sides could muddle along for 18-plus months before 
returning to hostilities. 
 
8. (C) Hodgins suggested that the Quad reconvene in the 
spring of 2006 at the DG level to discuss Sri Lanka further. 
He suggested bringing in some outside experts on the peace 
process to look at what is going wrong and how to move the 
process further.  The key, he believes, will be increasing 
international support.  Stokes and Howarth concurred that 
such a meeting would be beneficial.  Hodgins finally 
suggested that the "elephant in the room" was Karuna and the 
split in the LTTE, but lamented that this was something he 
can't convince the intelligence community to focus on. 
 
VIEW FROM THE UK 
---------------- 
 
9. (C) Stokes said the UK analysis is also that the situation 
on the ground is getting worse, not better.  HMG officials 
have criticized the LTTE as unhelpful on several issues: 
first, urging Tamils to essentially boycott the elections 
(either because the LTTE really did not want them to go 
forward, or because they wanted to increase their leverage); 
and second, Balasingham's Heroes Day speech.  In short, the 
UK shares the assessment that there is a downward spiral and 
wants to keep attention on Sri Lanka in particular so as to 
find ways to urge restraint.  HMG believes it is vital to 
coordinate, and fully supports the idea of a spring meeting. 
 
 
VIEW FROM AUSTRALIA 
------------------- 
 
10. (SBU) Howarth asked if it would be possible to add a day 
of policy discussions to the Quad information exchange in 
order to talk about strategy.  Since the Australian rep will 
have traveled so far they want to get as much value out of 
the talks as possible. 
 
11. (C) Howarth said that Australia was greatly disappointed 
with the election as it had hoped for a better outcome in 
terms of participation.  Some commentators, he said, believe 
the outcome strengthened President Mahinda Rajapaksa's hand 
in the negotiations with the Tamils, and wondered if he could 
yet be the Ariel Sharon of Sri Lanka. 
 
12. (C) Howarth said the listing issue is of great interest 
to Australia as well.  Australia lists LTTE under the UN list 
but not as a terrorist organization under domestic 
legislation on terrorism.  This was on hold pending the last 
election, but with the assassination of Kadirigama, it is 
back on the agenda.  He mentioned that Kadirigama's 
assassination personally affected the FM, since they had had 
many encounters.  The GOA wants to take a more hard-line 
position on the LTTE, and include criminal sanctions. 
Howarth said the Sri Lankan diaspora in Australia is somewhat 
balanced compared to Canada's, which is 90% Tamil.  Howarth 
mentioned the case of an MP whose visa to Australia was held 
until he signed a statement outlining his intentions and 
accepting certain restrictions to his activities.  Howarth 
said if the peace process shows no progress, the Australians 
would consider stronger steps.  At present they are focusing 
on cracking down on fundraising. 
 
13. (C) Howarth said that a strong message needs to be sent 
to President Rajapaksa, including the possibility of 
sanctions.  Hodgins expressed concern at the word sanctions, 
for which he didn't think there would be support, but Howarth 
corrected his intention as being investment restrictions, not 
formal sanctions (Australia is a leading investor in Sri 
Lanka). 
 
14. (C) Howarth said the Australian Embassy in Copenhagen, 
which covers Norway, heard that the Norwegians are thinking 
about continuing as the lead for the peace process (UK had 
also heard this; Canada wondered if they weren't looking for 
a face-saving way to disengage).  Hodgins also wondered if it 
would be better if Norway were not both facilitator and 
enforcer (head of PKO), but emphasized the importance of 
outside support for its role as facilitator. 
 
15. (SBU) Stokes suggested that there is a need for refreshed 
Co-Chairs.  Hodgins also believes there is a need to refresh 
or even extend the Co-Chairs, perhaps a "friends of Sri 
Lanka" group.  He wondered if Switzerland would consider such 
a role, especially given its potential as a federation and 
its large Tamil diaspora. 
16. (SBU) SA/INS has cleared this cable. 
 
Visit Canada's Classified Web Site at 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/ottawa 
 
WILKINS