US embassy cable - 05SANSALVADOR3396

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SAN SALVADOR 003396 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10 YEARS 
TAGS: PINR, PREL, KCRM, PINS, SOCI, ES, ACCELERATED DEPORTATION 
SUBJECT: EXPEDITED DEPORTATIONS MAY NOT INITIALLY DISSUADE 
ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION FROM EL SALVADOR 
 
 
Classified By: CDA MICHAEL A. BUTLER FOR REASONS 1.4 (b) & (d) 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY:  Expedited deportations may not initially 
dissuade illegal immigration from El Salvador.  Approximately 
half of all illegal entry attempts are successful, which 
provides sufficient incentive for Salvadorans to make 
attempts and reattempts.  In addition, many Salvadorans must 
secure jobs in the U.S. in order to repay loans acquired to 
hire smugglers.  Finally, El Salvador's close proximity to 
the U.S. enables first time migrants and prior deportees to 
attempt or reattempt illegal entries with relative ease. This 
close proximity will likely preclude the type of immediate 
success we have had recently with Brazilian illegal 
immigrants.  Nonetheless, a well-planned expedited 
deportations plan should begin to have a mid-term impact in 
slowing down the Salvadoran pipeline.  All indications are 
that the GOES will cooperate with us on such a plan, which 
will be necessary for the plan's eventual success.  End 
Summary. 
 
2. (C) The Department of Homeland Security recently announced 
its intention to end the "catch and release" of immigration 
violators detained at the border.  A new program entitled the 
Secure Borders Initiative (SBI) aims to deport one-hundred 
percent of border detainees.  This shift in policy is part of 
a larger initiative to demonstrate that we can secure our 
borders.  At issue is whether SBI will instantly dissuade 
first time migrants and prior deportees from attempting to 
enter the United States illegally. 
 
3. (C) In fiscal year 2005, Customs and Border Protection 
officers captured approximately one million persons 
attempting to illegally enter the United States.  Many of 
these individuals had been apprehended previously for the 
same offense.  During the same period, however, DHS 
acknowledges an estimated 800,000 illegal immigrants 
successfully reached the interior of our country.  Roughly 
stated, half of those attempting to immigrate to the United 
States are successful.  This fact alone is sufficient 
incentive for Salvadorans -- first time migrants and prior 
deportees -- to attempt or reattempt to enter our country 
illegally.  Complicating the issue of access is the fact 
that, as recently noted in the UNDP Human Development Report, 
Salvadorans living in the U.S. earn salaries six times that 
of their countrymen back home.  In the short term, it is 
doubtful that the threat of being instantly deported will 
deter intending immigrants from El Salvador. 
 
4. (C) Moreover, there are other compelling motivations for 
deportees to try again.  Many migrants employ smugglers to 
safely guide them across the border and into the interior of 
our country.  Salvadoran smugglers charge between USD $5-8 
thousand for their services.  Almost all migrants must borrow 
the money to pay this fee.  If the money is borrowed from 
family and friends, the migrant is expected to pay off the 
loan after finding employment in the U.S.  If it is borrowed 
from a loan shark, the money is due by a certain date, 
regardless of whether the migrant's attempt was successful. 
Even if the repayment of debt is not an issue, the deportee 
is another mouth to feed and must compete with the local 
populace and other returning migrants for the limited amount 
of jobs that pay a living wage.  For most, this is why they 
left El Salvador in the first place. 
 
5. (C) In addition to being sufficiently motivated to 
immigrate, Salvadorans have the good fortune of close 
proximity to their target.  An immigration agreement between 
their countries permits all Central Americans to travel 
freely to Mexico's border with Guatemala.  Much of the border 
is unguarded and can be easily crossed.  Arranging 
transportation to the U.S. border is not difficult.  From 
there, migrants can hire Mexican smugglers or cross the 
border on their own. 
 
6. C) The success of SBI depends in part on creating a 
financial disincentive to immigrate.  If caught and deported, 
the migrant loses the money invested in his migration.  This 
can be substantial if he employed a smuggler.  This 
disincentive can be mitigated, however, with a change in 
"business" practices.  It is widely known that "legitimate" 
Mexican smugglers charge for a successful border crossing, 
not just for the attempt.  One real possibility is that 
smugglers will start offering an additional crossing without 
charge to their "clients" who were caught and deported before 
reaching the interior of the United States.  Once SBI begins 
to produce substantial and instantaneous deportations, 
Salvadoran smugglers may also adopt this practice, thereby 
diminishing the financial disincentive created by SBI. 
 
7. (C) COMMENT: Post realizes that the objective of SBI is to 
demonstrate that we can control our borders.  In the mid- to 
long-term, an expanded border patrol presence and sanctions 
against employers hiring undocumented workers will lead to 
decreased illegal immigration as potential migrants see 
limited opportunities to successfully cross the border and 
find gainful employment.  In the short term, however, it 
remains unclear if SBI -- expedited deportations of one 
hundred percent of illegal aliens detained at the border -- 
will substantially impact the presently massive illegal 
immigration from El Salvador.  Despite the setback to those 
caught and deported, there remain strong incentives for 
Salvadorans to continue attempting illegal entries until they 
are successful in reaching the interior of our country. 
Nonetheless, a well-planned expedited deportations plan 
should begin to slow down the Salvadoran illegal pipeline in 
the mid-term. The GOES has given every indication that it 
wants to cooperate with us, a necessary condition for 
eventual success. 
Butler