US embassy cable - 05TELAVIV6766

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 006766 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR NEA/IPA AND EUR/AGS, PRM FOR ACTING A/S GREENE, L 
FOR BELLINGER, NEA FOR FRONT OFFICE AND IPA, NSC FOR 
ABRAMS, H, L 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/02/2015 
TAGS: IS, PGOV, PREF, PREL, SZ, GOI EXTERNAL, ISRAELI SOCIETY, GOI INTERNAL, ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS 
SUBJECT: EMBLEM: WHY THE GOI NEARLY BALKED 
 
REF: GENEVA 02903 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Richard H. Jones for reasons 1.4 (b,d). 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY:  While Israel did not oppose the recent 
MDA-PRCS agreements, the issue hits the GOI at an unusually 
volatile transitional moment in Israeli domestic politics. 
During this tenuous period an issue such as this that touches 
on security, or the status of East Jerusalem and the 
settlements, could explode onto the national stage at a 
moment's notice, forcing Israeli leaders to take a public 
stand on the political price of MDA admission into the 
movement.  The MDA-PRCS agreements reached the desk of a 
Foreign Minister campaigning to lead the political party that 
the Prime Minister had just abandoned.  FM Shalom objected to 
the MDA-PRCS agreements possibly because he perceived an 
electoral liability in failure to oppose any agreement that 
acknowledges the de jure applicability of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention to the West Bank.  Responding to pressure from 
Washington firmly articulated by the Charge, Shalom passed 
the final decision on the MDA-PRCS agreements to PM Sharon, 
who decided not to oppose them.  Through his actions FM 
Shalom tried, simultaneously, to protect the interests of 
traditional Likud supporters, to highlight the Prime 
Minister's failure to do so, and to avoid standing in the way 
of MDA's accession into the movement.  It is likely that, in 
addition to PM Sharon, the only senior political figures in 
Israel familiar with the agreements' actual content are FM 
Shalom, Attorney General Menachem Mazuz, and Health Minister 
Dan Naveh.  None of these leaders has yet criticized in 
public the PM's decision not to oppose the MDA-PRCS 
agreements.  It remains possible that FM Shalom may do so at 
a later date if it serves his political advantage.  End 
Summary. 
 
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CHRONOLOGY: THE FOREIGN MINISTER PUNTED TO THE PRIME MINISTER 
--------------------------------------------- --------------- 
 
2.  (C) The Charge called FM Shalom's office late evening 
November 27 after learning that the GOI might suddenly advise 
MDA President Noam Yifrach not to sign the following day a 
memorandum of understanding and operational agreement with 
the PRCS.  FM Shalom's policy advisor, Opher Bavley, said 
that Shalom had only just received two hours earlier the text 
of the agreements, though the MFA had certainly been aware of 
their contents for a long time.  Bavley said FM Shalom, 
advised to be cautious in a letter from Attorney General 
Menachem Mazuz, believed the MDA-PRCS agreements represented 
too great a political commitment and liability for the GOI to 
accept.  Bavley added that Health Minister Dan Naveh also 
wanted to further examine the agreements before deciding 
whether to object to them.  Charge subsequently spoke to 
Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's Foreign Policy Advisors, in the 
absence of Shalom Turgeman, and spelled out the brewing 
crisis. 
 
3.  (C) After consulting with NEA A/S Welch, Acting PRM A/S 
Greene, and Ambassador Moley, Charge contacted FM Shalom 
directly, arguing that his position was unhelpful.  The 
MDA-PRCS agreements represent a vital step toward MDA 
recognition, the Charge insisted, and to back out at this 
late date would diminish the prospects for MDA's accession 
into the Red Cross / Red Crescent Movement.  He also stressed 
that the Syrians and other MDA opponents would seize upon any 
last-minute GOI intervention to bolster their claim that the 
MDA is not independent of the GOI.  Moreover, the USG has 
worked very hard over many years to support MDA's bid to join 
the movement, and a postponement would constitute a major 
set-back for all parties. 
 
4.  (C) Shortly after this conversation, FM Policy Advisor 
Bavley called to inform the Charge that FM Shalom and Health 
Minister Naveh had decided to pass the decision to PM Sharon. 
 At that point, Turgeman, who was in Washington, took over 
the issue.  MFA Director for International Organizations and 
Human Rights Daniel Meron told poloff November 28 at 0830 
that PM Sharon said he appreciated the significance of the 
agreements, understood USG concerns, and decided to refrain 
from advising Yifrach not to sign the agreements.  Meron also 
said the MFA issued a statement to the Government of 
Switzerland stipulating that the agreements do not represent 
a commitment on the part of the GOI. 
-------------------------- 
DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONTEXT 
-------------------------- 
 
5.  (C) The passing of the MDA issue like a hot potato from 
political rival to political rival reflects the significantly 
heightened sensitivity among Israeli leaders to any issue 
that may have political repercussions.  With Ariel Sharon's 
formation of a new party, the split of his old Likud home 
base and dynamic movement throughout the political arena, 
right-wing political leaders in Israel are divided, 
defensive, and desperate.  Recent public opinion polls in 
Israel indicate that the now solidly right-wing rump Likud 
party may lose many seats in the Knesset during the next 
election.  During this tenuous period any issue that touches 
on security, or the status of East Jerusalem and the 
settlements, could explode onto the national stage at a 
moment's notice, forcing Israeli leaders to take a public 
stand on the political price of MDA admission into the Red 
Cross / Red Crescent Movement.  Fortunately, Israeli 
newspapers did not publish the text of the MDA-PRCS 
agreements.  It is likely that, in addition to PM Sharon, the 
only senior political figures in Israel familiar with the 
agreements' actual content are Foreign Minister Silvan 
Shalom, Attorney General Menachem Mazuz, and Health Minister 
Dan Naveh.  None of these leaders has yet criticized in 
public the PM's decision not to oppose the MDA-PRCS 
agreements.  It remains possible that FM Shalom may do so at 
a later date if it serves his political advantage. 
 
6.  (C) Comment:  Having habitually sought to claim credit 
for the actions of others, FM Shalom notably passed up the 
opportunity to take part in MDA's victory march by handing a 
key decision to the Prime Minister.  FM Shalom may perceive 
an electoral liability in failure to oppose any agreement 
that acknowledges the de jure applicability of the Fourth 
Geneva Convention to the West Bank.  He presently seeks to 
avoid actions that might jeopardize support among settlers 
for his campaign to lead the Likud party.  By objecting to 
the agreement and then passing the decision to the Prime 
Minister, he protected the interests of traditional Likud 
supporters, highlighted the Prime Minister's failure to do 
so, and avoided standing in the way of MDA's accession into 
the movement.  End Comment. 
 
7.  (C) Health Minister Dan Naveh recommended that FM Shalom 
advise MDA President Yifrach to delay signing the agreement. 
He heads the GOI Ministry with jurisdiction over ambulances 
in East Jerusalem.  In the face of recent political turmoil, 
he has decided to remain in the Likud.  While his political 
ties thus remain closer to FM Shalom than to PM Sharon, Naveh 
has avoided publicity during the Likud party's leadership 
battle. 
 
8.  (C) Attorney General Menachem Mazuz also recommended that 
FM Shalom advise MDA President Yifrach to delay signing the 
agreement.  Mazuz appears firmly committed to the GOI 
position that the Fourth Geneva Convention does not apply de 
jure to the occupied territories, which the GOI claims had no 
recognized sovereign before 1967 and thus is not "occupied." 
MFA IO Director Meron informed poloff that concerns about the 
Fourth Geneva Conventions led Mazuz to advise FM Shalom not 
to support the agreement. 
 
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