US embassy cable - 05TEGUCIGALPA2434

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HONDURAS: WAIVER OF LIBERTAD ACT TITLE III

Identifier: 05TEGUCIGALPA2434
Wikileaks: View 05TEGUCIGALPA2434 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Tegucigalpa
Created: 2005-12-02 16:05:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: ETTC PREL CU HO
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L TEGUCIGALPA 002434 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR WHA/CCA, WHA/CEN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/02/2015 
TAGS: ETTC, PREL, CU, HO 
SUBJECT: HONDURAS:  WAIVER OF LIBERTAD ACT TITLE III 
 
REF: A. A) SECSTATE 207359 
 
     B. B) TEGUCIGALPA 01240 
 
Classified By: Econ Chief Patrick Dunn; reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
 1.  (C) The Government of Honduras (GOH) has actively worked 
to advance democracy, human rights, and fundamental freedoms 
in Cuba.  On April 15, 2004, the UN Commission on Human 
Rights (UNCHR) passed a Honduran-sponsored resolution calling 
for greater respect for human rights in Cuba.  In April 2005, 
Honduras voted with the United States on the UNCHR 2005 
resolution, which also called for greater respect for human 
rights in Cuba. 
 
2. (C) On April 19, 2005, then-Honduran MFA Vice Minister AMB 
Mario Fortin pledged to vote against the Cuban UNCHR 
resolution on the Guantanamo detainees, if it came to a vote 
(Note:  Mario Fortin has since been promoted to Foreign 
Minister).  This stance was consistent with the GOH position 
on the 2004 Cuban resolution on the detainees, before that 
resolution was dropped. 
 
3. (C) Despite a move to thaw relations in 2000, Honduras has 
not yet named an Ambassador to Cuba, partly out of deference 
to U.S. wishes. (Comment:  In the last days of its term, the 
Flores administration ended the suspension of relations with 
Cuba.  The Maduro administration has declined to take further 
actions toward rapprochement with Cuba, and initially sought 
in summer 2005 to halt an extensive Cuban medical assistance 
program to Honduras, before public outcry forced the GOH to 
renew the program.  End Comment.) The GOH consistently and 
publicly states that concern over Cuba's human rights 
policies is a fundamental tenet of its policy toward the 
Castro regime.  In 2004, PolCouns met with the new Honduran 
Charge d'Affaires in Havana, Humberto Lopez Villamil, prior 
to his recent departure to Havana to emphasize the importance 
of human rights in Cuba.  Villamil welcomed the meeting and 
indicated he would seek out the U.S. Interests Section in 
Havana. 
 
4. (C) In addition, in 2005 the GOH accepted 20 Cubans 
resettled by the International Organization of Migration 
(IOM).  The GOH did this despite a possible negative reaction 
from the GOC. 
 
5. (SBU) The Ministry of Industry and Trade and the Central 
Bank recently began collecting information on Honduran 
investments abroad, and now are preparing a preliminary 
report.  Last year, for the first time, the Central Bank 
added a question on Honduran investment abroad to its annual 
questionnaire of Honduran companies.  Based on EconOff 
conversation with the chief economist from the Central Bank, 
we do no expect any significant Honduran investments in Cuba 
throughout 2005. 
 
6.  (U) Honduras also receives very little investment from 
Cuba.  In an August 2005 report on flows of international 
investment, the Central Bank reports no significant flows of 
investment from Cuba into Honduras. 
 
6.  (C) On May 5, 2005, Mr. Antonio Kattan, owner of Honduran 
steel company Aceros Alfa, told EconOffs that he is facing 
unfair competition from Cuban government-owned competitor, 
Aceros Centro Caribe.  According to Mr. Kattan, Aceros Centro 
Caribe is importing production inputs without paying its 
parent company in Cuba, then selling steel rebar in Honduras 
at less than market value.  It should be taken into account, 
however, that Mr. Kattan,s company is one of a handful in 
the region that meet periodically to fix regional steel 
prices, and therefore it would be in his interest to 
overstate the allegations against this Cuban competitor (ref 
B). 
 
7. (C) If the Title III waiver were not renewed for Honduras, 
it could undermine clear GOH support for pressuring Cuba to 
improve its human rights record, undermine general GOH 
support for U.S. Cuba policy, and unnecessarily punish a 
supportive regional ally. 
Ford 

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