US embassy cable - 02ABUJA3256

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NIGERIA: PRESIDENT OBASANJO SUPPORTS CODE OF CONDUCT, PLEDGES TO FUND INEC

Identifier: 02ABUJA3256
Wikileaks: View 02ABUJA3256 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Abuja
Created: 2002-12-10 13:21:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PGOV KDEM PREL SOCI KDEM NI
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ABUJA 003256 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
LONDON FOR GURNEY 
PARIS FOR NEARY 
 
 
E.O.12958: DECL: 09/23/12 
TAGS: PGOV, KDEM, PREL, SOCI, KDEM, NI 
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: PRESIDENT OBASANJO SUPPORTS CODE OF 
CONDUCT, PLEDGES TO FUND INEC 
 
CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR HOWARD F. JETER.  REASONS 1.5 
(B) AND (D). 
 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY: During a November 20 meeting with 
USAID Administrator Andrew Natsios and Ambassador 
Jeter, President Obasanjo endorsed an all-parties Code 
of Conduct and promised to honor INEC's 27 billion 
Naira (USD 210 million) 2003 elections funding 
request.  Obasanjo expressed confidence that electoral 
violence would be contained. He downplayed criticism 
of the voter registration exercise but stated that he 
would press INEC to quicken logistical preparations 
for the elections. Throughout the meeting both Natsios 
and Jeter stressed the importance of free, fair and 
peaceful elections not only for Nigeria but also for 
Africa and initiatives like NEPAD. Obasanjo pledged to 
do his utmost to ensure that the elections would be 
credible. End Summary. 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
OBASANJO SAYS VIOLENCE WILL NOT DERAIL ELECTIONS 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
 
2. (C) After a quick overview of AID's programs and 
presence, Administrator Natsios told President 
Obasanjo that, while President Bush wanted to visit 
Nigeria, it would be difficult to do so if there were 
widespread violence associated with upcoming 
elections. The Administrator stressed that President 
Bush had explicitly asked him to relay these concerns 
to his friend President Obasanjo. Obasanjo quipped 
that much of the tension and uncertainty was generated 
by people preoccupied about whether he would "come or 
go".  More seriously, he admitted being "a little bit 
concerned" about electoral violence but believed 
"prospects were good" for containing it. Obasanjo 
indicated government efforts to minimize violence were 
beginning to bear fruit. To stem violence, the 
security forces must have the clear mandate that all 
violators should be arrested and none is above the 
law, he posited. Obasanjo recalled police hesitation 
at arresting a PDP senator who was caught interfering 
with voter registration.  When the police explained 
they feared arresting an elected member of the ruling 
party, Obasanjo told them the senator should have been 
among the first arrested in order to send a public 
message that no one was above the law. (Comment: 
Obasanjo's account is reassuring but also self- 
serving.  We have not seen reports of a PDP senator 
arrested for interference with the voter registration. 
End Comment.) 
 
 
 
 
3.  (C) Obasanjo identified the Southeastern region 
and Plateau State as troubled areas where he has 
conferred with the affected governors about quashing 
electoral violence.  In conjunction with the Anambra 
and Abia states, the federal government has crack- 
downed on the vigilante Bakassi Boys in those two 
states.  Obasanjo pointed to Enugu State as the most 
complex problem in the Southeast.  A few advisors 
close to the Governor have been implicated in 
violence.  Governor Nnamani had sworn noninvolvement; 
however, it was apparent that Obasanjo had second 
thoughts about the Governor's disavowal. 
 
 
4. (C) Obasanjo predicted little violence in his 
ethnic home base, the Southwest. The region would not 
live up to its moniker as the "wild, wild West" as 
long as the rival parties, the  "AD and PDP talk as 
they should," he stated cryptically.  (Comment: 
Obasanjo may have good reason to be sanguine about the 
Southwest.  Apparently, he and the AD governors of the 
six Southwest states are close to an electoral modus 
vivendi whereby the Governors will support Obasanjo's 
presidency if Obasanjo does not actively support the 
PDP gubernatorial candidates in those states during 
the general elections. Perhaps it was no coincidence 
that the AD National Chairman was in the waiting room 
when our group was leaving the Villa.  End Comment.) 
 
 
5.  (C) When Administrator Natsios mentioned a Code of 
Conduct as the best mechanism to elicit public 
commitment to non-violence by all political parties, 
Obasanjo enthusiastically endorsed the idea and asked 
that we help Nigeria establish such a Code.  Obasanjo 
continued that the National Assembly had recently 
rejected an electoral violence bill he had proposed. 
It was considered "too harsh" by those members who 
thought it could be used against them. The bill, he 
explained, provided that any elected official could be 
investigated for participation in electoral violence 
but would only be tried after leaving office.  The 
measure also contained a provision for restitution by 
the wrongdoer to those harmed by his misconduct. 
Apparently undaunted by the Assembly's prior 
rejection, Obasanjo asserted that he would resubmit 
the bill. After Ambassador Jeter stressed the 
usefulness of all parties gathering to publicly 
renounce violence, Obasanjo nodded at the suggestion, 
saying he would get the parties to agree to such an 
event. (Comment: The impetus behind the violence bill 
was laudable but the measure was poorly written. Some 
lawmakers reasonably feared that overzealous security 
forces might abuse its overbroad language to stifle 
the political campaigns of non-office holders. End 
Comment) 
 
 
----------------------------------------- 
INEC -- ELECTION PREPARATIONS AND FUNDING 
----------------------------------------- 
 
 
6. (C) During the meeting Administrator Natsios 
repeatedly voiced concern about INEC logistical 
preparations for the elections.  Time was getting 
short; INEC needed to quicken the pace of ordering 
essential material like ballot boxes and paper. 
Obasanjo replied that INEC could use the boxes from 
the 1999 contests. When Ambassador Jeter mentioned the 
current stock might be insufficient for next year's 
elections, Obasanjo seemed genuinely surprised.  He 
stated he would talk to INEC Chairman Guobadia about 
its logistical planning. 
 
 
7. (C) Obasanjo declared that funding INEC was 
"priority number one". Press reports were inaccurate 
that INEC requested 36 billion Naira (USD 275 million) 
in its supplemental budget. The INEC supplemental was 
27 billion (7 billion Naira to pay for September 
voters registration exercise, 20 billion Naira for 
balloting material and 300 million for party 
registration). He instructed the Finance Minister to 
fund the request completely and immediately lest he be 
threatened with impeachment again, Obasanjo joked. He 
added that he also was intent to recover the 21 
million Naira lost in a scandal regarding the INEC 
legal department that was discovered several months 
ago. 
 
 
8.  (C) Regarding voter registration, Obasanjo's did 
not seem to understand that many, if not most, 
Nigerians saw the exercise as flawed. Responding to 
Natsios's question, Obasanjo discounted claims of 
widespread under-registration and stated that those 
who were unable to register could submit a claim 
during the normal five day review period following the 
publication of the voters roll by INEC. Somewhat 
contradicting himself, however, he said that 
politicians bought and hoarded forms believing that 
they could stack the voter lists in their favor by 
having loyalists only complete the forms. Otherwise, 
he said, there was no reason for a shortage of forms. 
 
 
9.  (C) Obasanjo felt the security features in the 
computerization process of the forms would winnow the 
resultant multiple registrations out of the system. 
The President then described a demonstration of the 
thumbprint analysis that INEC was employing to detect 
multiple registrations. He was confident the 
computerized thumbprint analysis, conducted at each 
stage of tabulation from the ward to the national 
level, would detect multiple registrations by the same 
person. (Comment: Obasanjo's explanation that under- 
registration was not a major problem is unconvincing. 
Politicians illegally hoarding forms could have 
precluded numbers of innocent, eligible voters from 
registering. His statements suggest the President has 
been paying more attention to catching fraudulent 
registrants than in remedying the inability of 
innocent citizens to register. Even there, however, 
his confidence in INEC's security features might be 
too high.  End Comment) 
 
 
10. (C) Natsios emphasized that the coming elections 
were not only important to Nigeria and the bilateral 
relationship, but also to Africa and to such 
continental initiatives like NEPAD. Western nations 
would view the quality of Nigerian elections as a 
barometer of commitment of Africa's largest nation to 
the good governance objectives of NEPAD. Meanwhile, 
other African countries would view the elections as a 
good or bad precedent to follow. Obasanjo cautioned 
that Washington must not view the process entirely 
through a Western optic. Understanding of Nigeria's 
background was important. For example, increased 
communal violence in the past years, ironically, was a 
by-product of democracy.  Before 1999, the military 
brutally suppressed but did nothing to resolve 
underlying communal problems.  The advent of democracy 
and its concomitant freedoms have allowed people to 
express themselves, sometimes violently. Obasanjo 
maintained the frequent communal violence in Plateau 
State was inevitable because tensions had been there 
for a long time but military suppression kept these 
fractures hidden.  As a democratically elected leader, 
Obasanjo said that he could not employ the same 
tactics.  Instead, at his urging, Plateau Governor 
Dariye was spending more time talking to the rival 
communities. The violence was slowly abating, Obasanjo 
claimed. 
11. (C) Pointing to the Yoruba greeting practice of 
youth prostrating before elders as an example, 
Obasanjo contended important cultural differences 
would mark differences in democratic practices in 
Nigeria and the West. Natsios emphasized that the 
NEPAD good governance standards were not Western 
imports but were authored by Obasanjo and other 
African leaders.  Visibly warming to this topic, 
Obasanjo cited the example of corruption as an 
abhorrent dysfunction that unfortunately had gotten a 
foothold in Nigeria's political economy.  While 
corruption was not part of traditional culture, time 
would be needed to uproot it from the political 
system. Likewise, eliminating political violence would 
take time. In the interim, Nigeria would continue to 
build its democracy by keeping what is vital to its 
culture, discarding what is harmful, and borrowing 
what is good and relevant from the West, Obasanjo 
maintained. 
 
 
12. (C) By campaigning on substantive issues and 
letting people freely criticize him, Obasanjo hoped to 
set a personal example in excising violence and 
promoting tolerance. In this regard, Obasanjo said he 
welcomed other contenders for the PDP presidential 
nomination.  "The more the merrier," he asserted. 
 
 
13. (C) Natsios mentioned that he and Secretary Powell 
had successfully fought for, and President Bush had 
approved, an unprecedented 25 percent increase in 
regular development assistance to Africa  over and 
above funding from the Millennium Challenge Account. 
However, in Washington and throughout the Western 
donor community, there was skepticism about whether 
that money would be put to good use unless it were 
allocated to countries with demonstrated good 
performance.  Nigeria could diminish the negativism by 
holding credible elections, Natsios said. Conversely 
bad elections would diminish those who had advocated 
increased assistance to Africa. Obasanjo acknowledged 
the point by stating that he knew political violence 
and the Shari'a adultery stoning sentences had put 
Nigeria in an ugly light. As the meeting concluded, 
both Natsios and Jeter reiterated the importance of 
Nigeria holding its first successful civilian-run 
elections.  Obasanjo shook his head affirmatively, 
vowing to do all in his powers to do just that -- to 
conduct good elections. 
 
 
-------------------- 
FOND MEMORIES OF AID 
-------------------- 
 
 
14. (U) Obasanjo expressed deep appreciation for 
current USAID programs and assistance in Nigeria. He 
also mentioned, with visible fondness, how USAID 
assistance had helped construct the "first 
comprehensive high school in Nigeria", located in 
Obasanjo's home state, Ogun.  Down there, people see 
USAID as America, he told Natsios. 
 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
 
15. (C) The meeting was generally positive. Despite 
the phalanx of officials and politicians waiting to 
see him, Obasanjo was relaxed, engaging and generous 
with his time. Administrator Natsios was able to make 
our key points.  By endorsing the Code of Conduct and 
pledging to fund INEC, Obasanjo took two of those 
three key points on board. On the third major point, 
his take on voter registration was disappointing; 
Obasanjo appeared not to fully appreciate the public's 
criticism of the exercise. However, remedying the gaps 
in voter registration lies in INEC's exclusive purview 
and its Chairman told Natsios that INEC would reopen 
voter registration in December or January 2003 
(septel). 
 
 
16. (C) While Obasanjo's statements were encouraging, 
we also know that stifling violence will be easier 
said than done. Obasanjo took the high road and seemed 
overly optimistic. The much of the violence in Kaduna 
that claimed hundreds of lives began the day of the 
meeting and the riots in Abuja took place only two 
days after. 
 
 
17. (U) The Administrator cleared this message. 
JETER 

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