US embassy cable - 05BANGKOK7462

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 007462 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, EAP/MLS, S/CT 
PACOM FOR FPA (HUSO) 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/01/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PTER, PINR, TH, Southern Thailand 
SUBJECT: SOUTHERN VIOLENCE: INSIDE THE ARMY'S HEARTS AND 
MINDS CAMPAIGN 
 
Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR SUSAN M. SUTTON FOR REASONS 1.4 (B,D 
) 
 
 1. Summary. (C)  In a meeting with poloffs on 1 December, 
Royal Thai Army (RTA) civil affairs officer Lt. Col. Saniroj 
Thumayos explained the challenges facing the RTA's attempts 
to win the hearts and minds of the public in the violent 
South.  Saniroj outlined RTG efforts to train and support 
Islamic leaders who preach a "correct" form of Islam, 
detailed previously unknown insurgent insults against the 
monarchy, and lamented both police corruption and the 
impatience of national political leaders.  When asked about 
rumors of government elements "disappearing" insurgents, 
Saniroj stated that Prime Minister Thaksin had clearly 
forbidden such actions, but that some lower-level officials 
may not be aware of this policy.  Poloffs impressed upon 
Saniroj our strong concern over any extra-judicial efforts to 
neutralize insurgents.  End Summary. 
 
WINNING HEARTS AND MINDS ON THE SMALL SCALE 
------------------------------------------- 
 
2. (C) Lt. Col Saniroj Thumayos met with poloffs on 1 
December to discuss his recent service as the deputy 
spokesman for the 4th Army and Southern Provinces Peace 
Building Command (SPPBC).  Saniroj, who is currently assigned 
to Supreme Command HQ in Bangkok, explained that national 
level military and political leaders increasingly realize the 
need for integrated civil affairs components in their efforts 
to deal with the restive South.  Saniroj himself spent much 
of his time forging links with local officials and leaders 
and even accompanied security forces on raids and arrests 
when possible.  While these "ride-alongs" allowed him to ease 
friction with locals, for instance directing raid team 
members to remove their shoes before entering a house, the 
civil affairs staff cannot move quickly enough to assist in 
every operation.  Moreover, civil affairs budgets have 
increased recently, but the SPPBC civil affairs unit remains 
understaffed. 
 
CONTROLLING THE MUSLIM MESSAGE 
------------------------------ 
 
3.  (C) On a larger scale, civil affairs staff in the South 
have also worked to counter what Saniroj characterized as 
biased Malaysian and other international Muslim media, to 
mixed results.  The visit of a team from the Organization of 
Islamic Conference (OIC) was tightly scripted by RTG 
officials down to every meeting they attended and location 
visited.  The initial readout of their trip provided to the 
RTG appeared balanced and helpful, but when the OIC team left 
Thailand, they became harshly critical of RTG policies in the 
South. 
 
4. (C) Saniroj said that a major focus of the civil affairs 
staff has been the creation of and support to a group of 
sympathetic Islamic teachers called the Ustaz "Da I."  The 
RTG has "trained" this group of approximately 70 men and paid 
for them to travel to central Thailand to see how the small 
Muslim community there lives in unrepressed peace (Note. The 
majority of Thai Muslims living in central and northern 
Thailand speak Thai, are not ethnically Malay, and are well 
integrated into the community. End Note).  The Da I are then 
expected to be active in combating extremist rhetoric and 
"incorrect" Islamic teaching, mostly through public sermons 
on Friday nights.  That said, the utility of the Da I remains 
unclear.  Many are fearful of reprisals from insurgents for 
working with the government, but the RTG has not "lost any" 
yet. 
 
CONCERN OVER MUSLIM-BUDDHIST SPLIT 
---------------------------------- 
 
5. (C) The growing split between the Muslim and Buddhist 
communities clearly concerns Saniroj.  He is worried that the 
exodus of Muslims students from state-run schools means that 
a generation of Buddhists and Muslims will have grown up 
without significant contact.  Muslim students are drawn to 
better-funded private Islamic schools with a more rigorous 
curriculum taught in Yawi, the local dialect.  However, 
Saniroj says that many of these students can barely speak 
Thai and some cannot even sing the Thai national anthem.  For 
their part, many Buddhists feel "left behind" by the 
government and think that authorities do "too much" for the 
Muslims. 
 
THE ROYAL FAMILY AND THE SOUTH 
------------------------------ 
 
6. (C) The monarchy remains revered by people of both 
religions in the South, but insurgents have tried to drive a 
wedge between them on this issue as well.  In a hushed tone, 
Saniroj explained that last year some insurgents moved from 
burning Thai flags to torching pictures of the King. 
Realizing the extreme sensitivity surrounding such a profound 
insult to the beloved monarch--and the likely violent 
Buddhist backlash--RTG officials strictly suppressed these 
reports.  Perhaps realizing their error, insurgents soon 
switched to burning pictures of Thaksin instead. 
 
7. (C) When asked about the frequent travel of Royal Family 
members to the South, Saniroj explained that this year's trip 
by the Queen had been uneventful, but that last year, a 
threatening note saying "this is not your land" had been 
placed in a gift basket given to her.  When the Crown Prince 
traveled to the three provinces this year, he made a point of 
driving the length of all three provinces, as opposed to 
flying in a helicopter.  Saniroj explained that this was not 
intended to highlight the safety of the southern provinces 
but instead as a naked "show of force" displaying the large 
number of RTA troops protecting the prince. 
 
COPS STILL A PROBLEM 
-------------------- 
 
8. (C) Although Saniroj dutifully explained that 
military-police cooperation was significantly improved, he 
began the meeting with an anecdote about a crooked cop in the 
South turning people against the government through petty 
corruption.  Saniroj also related his repeated frustration 
over sloppy police methods, saying that police teams would 
inevitably ruin evidence and/or crime scenes and that very 
often whichever force got to an incident first, whether 
police or army, would block the other side from entering. 
Saniroj quickly snapped back into public relations mode, 
explaining that cooperation had improved however, "because 
Thaksin ordered so." After another few rounds of personnel 
transfers, military-police relations should be settled. 
 
TIDBITS ON UNITS, ORGANIZATION 
------------------------------ 
 
9. (C) Corrupt police aside, Saniroj admitted that the 
quality of Army units was uneven as well, especially in 
regard to their relationship with local communities.  Task 
Force 36, comprised of the 11th Infantry Division from 
Bangkok was very good, and "feel(s) like family to people." 
The 5th Infantry regiment, however, was "hated."  The 
creation of the 15th development division earlier this year 
is good news to Saniroj, who explained that his superiors at 
the SPPBC saw development as the key to a durable solution. 
 
10. (C) Saniroj also outlined the division of Army forces in 
the SPPBC area.  Currently, each province is home to a task 
force under the command of the SPPBC and 4th Army.  Task 
Force One in Yala, Task Force Two in Pattani and Task Force 
Three in Narathiwat.  Each task force is divided into three 
district units of 600 men each.  Of these 600, at one time 
200 are on training or leave, 200 are on day duty and the 
remaining 200 are on night duty.  This means that there are 
only 200 soldiers available in each district at any one time, 
which Saniroj suggested was less than optimal.  These task 
forces would soon be removed from SPPBC control and placed 
under each provincial governor in a bid to increase local 
control.   When asked if any new deployments or shifts in 
forces were planned, Saniroj said no and explained that media 
interest in "escalation" of government forces kept the RTG 
from moving in more troops and had even slowed or halted 
normal force rotations, because the Thai media often 
mischaracterized them as build-ups. 
 
LONG TERM SOLUTION NEEDED 
------------------------- 
 
11. (C) RTA leaders believe that the major outbursts of 
violence will take three years to control, and that life may 
return to "normal" in the South (i.e. some sporadic violence) 
in the next decade.  Saniroj explained that the military was 
trying to educate political leaders on these realities but 
the politicians need more patience.  He compared the 
insurgents to Bangkok teens who race motorcycles, write 
graffiti and brawl in public.  You can't eliminate all of 
this behavior, but you can limit it to a very small group. 
 
NO KNOWLEDGE OF EJKS 
-------------------- 
 
12. (C) When asked about media reports and rumors of 
government elements "disappearing" suspected insurgents, 
Saniroj denied knowledge of any such activity, saying that 
Thaksin had clearly said "no, no, no, no."  Moreover, 
military policy formally forbade such actions.  Saniroj 
admitted, however, that some lower level officials may not 
know or understand these orders, but that, in his opinion, 
such activities are counterproductive and worsen the 
situation.  Poloffs expressed our strong concern about such 
actions and the potential negative impact on our close and 
productive bilateral relationship. 
BOYCE