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| Identifier: | 05RANGOON1346 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 05RANGOON1346 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Rangoon |
| Created: | 2005-12-02 09:24:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | PGOV PHUM PREL ECON SNAR MARR BM Pyinmana |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RANGOON 001346 SIPDIS STATE FOR EAP/MLS; PACOM FOR FPA E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/01/2015 TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PREL, ECON, SNAR, MARR, BM, Pyinmana SUBJECT: BURMA'S NEW CAPITAL: NOT READY FOR PRIME TIME REF: RANGOON 1325 AND PREVIOUS Classified By: P/E Chief W. Patrick Murphy for Reasons 1.4 (b,d) 1. (C) Summary: Embassy officers, making an unannounced (and unwelcome) visit to the Burmese regime's new capital in Pyinmana, observed a massive, though largely unfinished, project to construct a new city from scratch. A nearby military zone, inaccessible to Emboffs, is even more substantial and is reportedly already in full operation. Although the regime has described Pyinmana as a strategic crossroads of communications and transportation, neither modern communications nor decent highways currently exist at the remote site. Officials there told Emboffs that the "GOB in Pyinmana is not open for business." The scope and cost of the ongoing project is staggering, likely over one billion U.S. dollars. Real motives for the sudden move, and its timing, remain unknown, but it is clear that any future government of Burma will be saddled with the costs and consequences of the GOB's absurd relocation. End Summary. THE ROAD TO MANDALAY (AND PYINMANA) 2. (C) Emboffs on November 29 made an unannounced visit to the Burmese regime's new administrative capital of Pyinmana. The 225-mile overland trip from Rangoon took roughly seven hours driving time (public transport takes 8-10 hours). The route follows Highway 1, Burma's principal north-south corridor running from Rangoon to Mandalay, a potholed, narrow two-lane road crowded with commercial trucks, busses, bicycles, pedestrians, and ox carts. In line with a country-wide practice, local farmers also use the paved portion of the road to dry their rice crops. 3. (SBU) Highway 1 also now supports an endless stream of government and military convoys that are busy moving Burma's capital from Rangoon to remote Pyinmana. Emboffs saw at least four convoys traveling north under military escort, transporting GOB payroll and office furniture for the Ministry of Labor and the Ministry of Social Welfare, Relief, and Resettlement. Local shopkeepers along the route told Emboffs that the furniture-laden convoys, which take about thirteen hours to make the trip to the new capital, have been traveling north on alternating days since the official move began on November 6. 4. (SBU) Emboffs saw a new airport about 17 miles south of Pyinmana, located at the village of Ela, that will serve the new capital. Emboffs observed well constructed access roads, but entry to the airport site was prohibited. According to Embassy military sources at the MOD's foreign liaison division, military aircraft are already using the new airport, but commercial flights are not yet scheduled. NOBODY'S CROSSROADS 5. (SBU) The town of Pyinmana itself, located just off Highway 1, is more substantial than the small farming village described by some press reports. According to GOB figures, the existing population of the district is about 90,000 persons; the central town has at least 50,000 inhabitants. Emboffs observed a bustling market area and a small commercial district in the central part of town. 6. (SBU) The foreign media has not been inaccurate, however, in describing Pyinmana as "located in the middle of nowhere." The GOB said that it selected Pyinmana as a strategic location "at the crossroads of the country's communications and transportation networks." The Pyinmana region, however, has neither transport nor communications links of any substance. There is no cell phone or internet access in the entire area. The so-called "highway" to Rangoon (south) or Mandalay (north) is a two-lane country road. There are no direct routes to the east (Shan State). Routes leading west must cross the Bago Yoma mountain range. Emboffs returned to Rangoon along what maps identify as a principal east-west corridor, but in reality is little more than an ox cart path. It took over five hours to travel the first 60 miles across the remote mountain terrain. MEN AT WORK 7. (SBU) The Burmese regime has not constructed new government facilities within the town of Pyinmana itself, but rather at fairly distant locations to the east and west of the town. To the east is a heavily guarded, massive military complex. Emboffs were prohibited from reaching this area, but sources report that the construction of military command centers, offices, barracks, housing units, and golf courses is substantial and close to completion. Many military sites within the complex are already functioning. 8. (SBU) Seven miles west of Pyinmana lies a massive construction zone, perhaps as large as 20 square miles, that is the future site of the government bureaucracy. The administrative and housing complex is known as "Kyatpyay" (roughly translated as "Running Chicken," although in a play on words in Burmese, locals refer to the area as "Running Devil"). Emboffs toured the Kyatpyay complex for about an hour, passing hundreds of apartment complexes, all in various stages of completion, that construction workers said will be future housing for civil servants and their families. 9. (SBU) Emboffs also entered a ministerial sub-zone at Kyatpyay that appeared to be about five miles long. There are over thirty sites within the sub-zone where workers are constructing individual complexes for each GOB ministry. Although none of the ministry buildings appeared complete, and no civil servants were seen on site, several structures were at an advanced stage of construction, including the future Ministries of Home Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Energy, Information, and Transportation. Based on our rough estimates, each ministry, situated on 10 to 15 acre sites, appeared to cost between 10 and 20 million USD. 10. (SBU) The remote ministerial zone does have not yet have significant infrastructure. Roads and water and sewer lines are still under construction. Construction sites are separated by rice and sugar cane fields, with no evidence of any commercial outlets or other services to support the GOB's large civil service. Emboffs observed a single, crude phone line providing service to the entire administrative zone. The GOB has built a 300-bed hospital in the administrative zone and staffed it with nurses, but doctors and medical equipment have yet to arrive. Hospital staff told Emboffs that the military complex east of Pyinmana already has a functioning 1,000 bed hospital. CRONY BUSINESS 11. (SBU) All of the individual sites at Kyatpyay are identified by the construction company awarded each building sub-contract. Our quick tour revealed a Who's Who of SPDC crony companies, many of which are associated with money laundering and/or with ethnic Kokang and Wa druglords. Among the several dozen companies constructing new housing and government buildings are Htoo Trading, KAF (a Kanbawza Bank subsidiary), Asia World (run by U Aik Htun, former chairman of the now defunct Mayflower Bank), A-1 Construction, Dagon International, Tekkham (linked to the United Wa State Army), and Golden Flower. YOU'RE NOT WELCOME: UNWANTED VISITORS 12. (C) Emboffs' self-guided tour through the ministerial complex was cut short by a half dozen security agents who stopped the Embassy vehicle, requested "authorization papers," and demanded to inspect our cameras. Emboffs declined to meet the agents' demands, but agreed to accompany them to nearby Military Affairs Security and Burmese Police offices. Emboffs explained to the senior military officer at the office, a Director of the Ministry of Border Affairs, that they had stopped off in Pyinmana to see the new capital and deliver some demarches to MFA counterparts. When asked, another security officer said that the GOB had staked out land in the Kyatpyay area for future diplomatic missions, but that it had not yet identified specific plots for any individual countries. 13. (C) The Lt Colonel in charge of the site consulted by phone with his superiors in Rangoon and told Emboffs that the "capital project is not completed," that the GOB in Pyinmana is not open for business, and that GOB officials relocated to the area "are not available" to meet with Emboffs. He advised that access to the new capital area is prohibited and directed his subordinates to escort Emboffs back to Pyinmana and Highway 1. On December 1, an MFA protocol officer approached P/E chief at a Japanese Embassy reception in Rangoon and said he had heard that Emboffs had visited Pyinmana. "Next time, I suggest you submit an official request to make a visit," he said, adding, "Of course, the answer will be no, because our new capital is not yet ready." COMMENT: THE ABSURDITY OF IT ALL 14. (C) We are not aware of any other diplomats who have visited the Pyinmana area since the GOB's announcement in early November that it was moving to a new administrative capital. Our November 29-30 visit to the region revealed several new dimensions to the absurdity of the relocation. The scope and cost of the new construction is staggering and underscores the regime's profitable control of natural resources such as natural gas, timber, and precious gems. Our rough estimate is that the GOB has expended over one billion USD for construction of the administrative zone alone. This estimate does not include the more substantial and unseen military zone east of Pyinmana, the new airport, or other capital relocation costs. Nor does our estimate include future costs for the necessary infrastructure upgrades to link Pyinmana with the rest of the country. 15. (C) Our visit also revealed that the ongoing relocation, which involves thousands of civil servants, is well before its time. We have seen no signs that GOB offices are actually functioning in Pyinmana, or that they even have the basic infrastructure that would allow them to operate. While it possible that relocated GOB ministries are using "swing space" in the restricted military district, the administrative zone is, at best, less than fifty percent completed. It will take at least another year or two for the new ministerial and housing complexes to be operable. It seems most relocated GOB functionaries are on an extended holiday. We have heard reports that the GOB has directed some civil servants, sitting idle in Pyinmana, to return to Rangoon until further notice or to rotate their time between the two locations. 16. (C) The genuine motives for the relocation remain uncertain. As we have reported (reftels), among the theories are the various whims, fears, and astrological peccadilloes of the SPDC Chairman Than Shwe. We cannot rule out any of these possibilities, no matter how far-fetched, since much GOB decision-making seems more suited for Oz than for reality. The obviously premature relocation, well in advance of completion of the new capital, was likely undertaken in order to meet Than Shwe's artificial deadline for the operation. What is certain, however, is that any future government will be saddled with the largest infrastructure project in the country's history. This will be a difficult and costly decision to reverse. End Comment. STOLTZ
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