US embassy cable - 05ALMATY4282

UNCLAS  ALMATY 004282 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR EUR/CACEN (JMUDGE); EUR/ACE (JMCKANE); EUR/PPD 
(JBASEDOW); DRL/PHD 
 
STATE PASS TO USAID 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV, KDEM, KPAO, KZ, 2005 Election 
SUBJECT:  SCENESETTER: PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IN 
KAZAKHSTAN, DECEMBER 4, 2005 
 
REF: Almaty 4281 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY:  President Nazarbayev is poised to win a 
substantial victory with support likely exceeding 70 
percent of the vote.  While the pre-electoral playing 
field was not level, opposition candidates engaged in a 
serious campaign effort that was hindered more by their 
inability to connect with voters than governmental 
obstacles.  Nazarbayev chose the Kazakhstani equivalent of 
a Rose Garden strategy, engaging in virtually no personal 
campaigning after the official start of the campaign 
period.  Opposition candidates Tuyakbay and Baymenov 
traveled throughout the country, but their strategy of 
focusing on corruption and competence failed to develop 
much appeal beyond their core supporters, perhaps 20 
percent of the electorate.  The majority of voters appear 
to care most about their improving economic status and 
stability in the country. 
 
2. (SBU) SUMMARY COT'D: Compared to previous elections, 
the Central Election Commission has substantially improved 
its performance and transparency, and has been technically 
focused and largely impartial.  In contrast to last year's 
Parliamentary (Mazhilis) elections, the CEC has also had a 
more cooperative and less defensive relationship with the 
OSCE/ODIHR observer mission headed by Ambassador Glover. 
Despite significant obstacles, the opposition candidates 
have gotten their message out through their own 
newspapers, campaign literature, 15-minute uncensored time 
blocs on national television, a 60-minute televised open 
debate, and - in the last few days of the campaign - a few 
prominent billboards.  Government media have provided 
coverage of all candidates, but little of the substance of 
the opposition campaign has gotten any airtime.  Misuse of 
administrative resources has been a serious issue. 
 
3. (SBU) SUMMARY COT'D:  Despite the numerous shortcomings 
in the pre-electoral environment, the fundamental fact 
that opposition candidates were registered and are 
actively participating in the campaign represents a 
significant improvement over previous presidential 
election campaigns.  The big question remains how voting 
and, most importantly, counting and aggregation of the 
vote will proceed on Election Day.  There is also talk of 
post-election violence:  while we discount the likelihood, 
we have strongly urged the authorities to lower their 
rhetoric and to exercise restrain (reftel).  Our 
governmental interlocutors are increasingly confident that 
their message to local authorities to keep their hands off 
the ballot box will be heeded, but we believe that there 
is still a major risk that local intervention will mar the 
voting process.  We have made clear to the government that 
our post-election evaluation will hinge on the honesty and 
accuracy of the vote count.  END SUMMARY 
 
--------------------- 
Results Not in Doubt. 
--------------------- 
 
4. (SBU) The major unknown in this presidential election 
campaign is not the outcome.  Few observers expect that 
any opposition candidate would be able to defeat President 
Nazarbayev, or even force a second round of voting, in the 
fairest of elections.  Nazarbayev told EUR Assistant 
Secretary Fried in October that his campaign strategy was 
 
SIPDIS 
to stay in his office - a prediction that turned out more 
accurate than we had anticipated.  After a vigorous round 
of regional visits in the spring and summer, Nazarbayev 
has avoided any formal campaign appearances, choosing the 
Kazakhstani equivalent of a Rose Garden strategy of 
looking presidential.  Nonetheless, his poll ratings have 
remained consistent at around 70 percent.  A USAID-funded 
poll that was overseen by the Gallup Organization in late 
September indicated that 86 percent of the respondents 
intended to vote for him, a figure we found implausibly 
high, but nonetheless, one that underscores the genuine 
support Nazarbayev enjoys. 
 
5.  (SBU) The President's absence from the hustings has 
 
 
contributed to what has been a pretty lackluster campaign. 
His four opponents, by contrast, have been engaged 
throughout the campaign period, making campaign 
appearances throughout the country.  The principal 
opposition candidate, Zharmakhan Tuyakbay, has not 
succeeded in generating much enthusiasm beyond the strong 
core support that the "For a Just Kazakhstan" movement 
enjoyed going into the election.  Charges of high-level 
corruption, and even explicit mention of the James Giffen 
"Kazakhgate" scandal in the televised debates, have not 
overcome the voters' apparent inclination to vote their 
increasingly prosperous pocket books.  Peace, stability, 
and ethnic accord (particularly important for the 30 
percent of the population that is ethnic Russian) work 
strongly in Nazarbayev's favor.  Voters show little sign 
of wanting to change the status quo. 
 
-------------------------- 
. But Electoral Conduct Is 
-------------------------- 
 
6.  (SBU) The bigger question is whether this election 
will represent the kind of significant progress in 
democratization that we would like to see, and which 
Nazarbayev has assured us he will deliver.  The pre- 
election period has been decidedly mixed, and has not 
fully met international standards.  Nonetheless, on 
balance we believe that there has been substantial 
progress, particularly when measured against previous 
presidential elections in Kazakhstan.  For the first time, 
there are genuine opposition candidates who are running 
substantial and determined campaigns.  The performance of 
the Central Election Commission has improved dramatically. 
 
7. (SBU) The government has welcomed a large-scale OSCE 
election observation mission.  Opposition candidates 
received 15 minutes of uncensored air time on the state- 
controlled television channel that is received throughout 
the country, and there was a live 60-minute televised 
debate.  Although the debate was marred by the absence of 
Nazarbayev, it provided a real opportunity for the other 
candidates to lay out their programs. Opposition 
candidates produced and distributed campaign literature, 
and the opposition press increased their press runs 
substantially.  Candidates traveled freely throughout the 
country and made daily public appearances.  The government 
accepted as its own a U.S.-proposed "code of conduct" and 
largely followed through on the letter of its provisions. 
 
8. (SBU) There were also significant shortcomings.  Two 
print-runs of opposition newspapers were seized during the 
early days of the campaign.  State-owned media provided 
news coverage of the opposition campaign, but largely in a 
negative and not particularly informative fashion. 
Candidates were assigned smaller, less-central campaign 
venues than they requested.  Tuyakbay and Baymenov 
reported numerous efforts to disrupt or prevent their 
campaign events.  There have been numerous incidents of 
low-level police harassment, seizure of campaign materials 
and opposition newspapers, and unproven accusations of 
opposition campaign malfeasance.  Vague charges by the 
security authorities of planned violence have marred the 
atmosphere.  Nazarbayev posters have popped up in some 
governmental institutions, and the OSCE has documented 
numerous incidents of pressure being applied to potential 
voters. 
 
9. (SBU) The major outstanding questions focus on Election 
Day.  During last year's parliamentary elections, despite 
certain procedural difficulties voting went relatively 
smoothly during the first round at the polling places, and 
precinct-level counting was by-and-large accurate.  There 
was large-scale manipulation during the aggregation 
process, when local authorities clearly intervened to 
ensure pre-determined results.  A complete lack of 
transparency in releasing disaggregated vote totals was an 
enabling factor.  The second round of voting was marred by 
blatant misuse of administrative resources, including the 
bussing of voters to numerous polling stations. 
 
 
10. (SBU) This time, Nazarbayev's senior advisors tell us 
they have undertaken serious measures to ensure that local 
authorities, particularly the regional akims (governors) 
appointed by the President, will not repeat this 
performance.  The advisors seem increasingly confident 
that they have this problem in hand, in part by 
threatening the akims with dismissal or even criminal 
prosecution if they engage in such falsifications and 
abuses.  The CEC has assured us that they will release 
precinct-by-precinct results on the Internet within 24 
hours, and that photocopiers have been installed in all 
polling stations to ensure that all observers receive 
copies of precinct protocols. 
 
11. (SBU) Comment:  We are not nearly as confident as our 
interlocutors that the process will be as smooth as they 
anticipate.  In the final analysis, only a transparently 
honest vote count will get the government the recognition 
of "substantial improvement" that it is seeking. 
 
ORDWAY