US embassy cable - 05ALMATY4281

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KAZAKHSTAN: RUMORS OF ELECTION-RELATED VIOLENCE SPARK PUBLIC ANXIETY

Identifier: 05ALMATY4281
Wikileaks: View 05ALMATY4281 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: US Office Almaty
Created: 2005-12-02 09:08:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PGOV PREL KZ 2005 Election
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L  ALMATY 004281 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/CACEN, J. MUDGE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/02/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, KZ, 2005 Election 
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: RUMORS OF ELECTION-RELATED VIOLENCE 
SPARK PUBLIC ANXIETY 
 
REF: ALMATY 4144 
 
Classified By: DCM Mark Asquino, reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). 
 
1. (C) Summary:  A series of ill-advised public statements by 
Kazakhstani law enforcement authorities regarding the 
potential for violence connected with upcoming Kazakhstani 
presidential elections has significantly increased the level 
of public anxiety, at least in Almaty.  The comments appear 
to have alarmed a public already on edge after the November 
12 death of a controversial opposition figure.  Post is using 
every opportunity to urge restraint and promote dialogue. 
End summary. 
 
2. (C)  Senior Kazakhstani law enforcement authorities have 
made vague but loud public announcements about alleged plans 
for post-election violence.  The Ambassador has raised this 
over the course of this week with the Minister of Internal 
Affairs, Chief of the Presidential Administration, the 
Secretary of the Security Council, and the Procurator 
 
SIPDIS 
General, urging them to lower the rhetoric on the grounds 
that it is more likely to encourage, rather than discourage, 
unlawful and possibly violent reaction to the election 
results.  All four interlocutors said that they had concrete 
evidence that specific individuals were planning provocative 
post-election acts of violence. 
 
3. (C) Security Council Secretary Utemuratov said that 
"operative measures" had produced transcripts showing clear 
planning in this regard.  He said there was no evidence that 
the major opposition leaders were implicated in this, and 
added that suspicion was focused on second-level FJK leaders 
Kozhakhmetov and Tokhtasinov, both of whom have a street 
reputation somewhere between radical and hot-head.  (Note: 
FJK leaders, including Zharmakhan Tuyakbay and Oraz 
Zhandosov, have repeatedly denied any such intentions and 
have pledged to address any grievances peacefully.  Tuyakbay 
issued a public statement calling on the government to back 
up the assertions with concrete evidence and arrest anyone 
known to be plotting violence, or cease making statements 
that create public anxiety. End note.) 
 
4. (C) Interior Minister Mukhamedzhanov told the Ambassador 
that members of a youth group in Taraz (southern Kazakhstan) 
had been arrested for criminal activity such as arson, and 
investigation had implicated an additional suspect who had 
financed this activity and who was planning post-election 
"illegal" actions.  The Ambassador urged the MVD to focus on 
clearly illegal activity and to restrain its rhetoric, which 
was having a negative impact on Kazakhstan's foreign 
reputation as well as increasing domestic tensions. 
 
5. (C) With the Procurator General, the Ambassador urged 
restraint in dealing with any post-electoral peaceful 
demonstrations, regardless of whether they were "legal" or 
not.  The Procurator General said that it went against 
Kazakhstani traditions to engage in violence, and that he 
recognized that it was necessary to allow opponents to "let 
off steam." 
 
6. (C) The opposition has leveled countercharges in response 
to the repeated GOK allegations.  In a December 1 posting in 
the "Rumors" section of mizinov.net (the successor site to 
Navigator), opposition activist and independent journalist 
Sergey Duvanov alleged that law enforcement authorities were 
planning a provocation on December 2 in Almaty.  Duvanov 
claimed that protesters would set cars on fire and rob 
stores.  The police would disperse the crowd and arrest a few 
participants, who would say the opposition had paid them to 
create an incident.  (Note:  On Friday evening, rumors are 
circulating that four cars are on fire near the Ramstore on 
Timuryazev in Almaty and/or on Republic Square.  Post has 
dispatched the mobile patrol to verify.  End note.) 
 
7. (C) The charges and countercharges have had a dramatic 
effect on the level of public anxiety, at least in Almaty. 
Post has issued an internal security notice and a warden 
message to address the numerous rumors of possible violence. 
Conversations with Embassy staff, taxi drivers, and household 
staff reveal a significant level of concern about the coming 
weekend, with some individuals hesitant to leave their homes. 
 
8. (C) These allegations and countercharges are building on a 
wave of public anxiety in Almaty resulting from the November 
12 shooting here of former GOK official-turned- opposition 
figure Nurkadilov (reftel).  Although there is no evidence 
that the murder was politically motivated, the public 
perception is that it was intended as a warning. (From whom 
and to whom the warning was directed is the subject of much 
debate.)  A November 29 quote from an anonymous MVD source 
 
that the death would be ruled a suicide has fueled public 
speculation of a cover-up.  The same day, Nurkadilov's 
widow's lawyer held a press conference to reveal what he 
claimed were details of the death that ruled out suicide, 
including the fact that the body was covered with a sheet 
when discovered, with the gun on top of the sheet.  (Note: 
In his November 30 meeting with the Ambassador, 
Mukhamedzhanov said that the investigation, the results of 
which would be announced after the elections, had determined 
that Nurkadilov had committed suicide.  He was well aware of 
the public skepticism that would greet such a report, but 
maintained that the forensic evidence allowed for no other 
conclusion.) 
 
9. (C) Comment:  While we think that the government's 
concerns about the danger of election-related violence are 
exaggerated and largely unfounded, we cannot exclude the 
possibility that a few individuals or very small groups may 
be considering actions designed to provoke the authorities. 
The larger danger is that the police would in fact overreact 
to unsanctioned gatherings and bring about the very disorder 
that they are seeking to avoid.  We will continue to use 
every opportunity to urge restraint and to promote dialogue. 
ORDWAY 

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